Abstract
Consider a model with a finite number of alternatives, and buyers with private values and quasi-linear utility functions. A domain of valuations for a buyer is a monotonicity domain if every finite-valued monotone randomized allocation rule defined on it is implementable, in the sense that there exists a randomized truth-telling direct mechanism, which implements this allocation rule. The domain is a weak monotonicity domain if every deterministic monotone allocation rule defined on it is implementable. I discuss the literature on (weak) monotonicity domain, which includes the early mathematical literature as well as the recent CS/Economics literature.
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© 2009 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Monderer, D. (2009). Monotonicity in Mechanism Design. In: Mavronicolas, M., Papadopoulou, V.G. (eds) Algorithmic Game Theory. SAGT 2009. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5814. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-04645-2_1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-04645-2_1
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
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