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Blunting Differential Attacks on PIN Processing APIs

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Identity and Privacy in the Internet Age (NordSec 2009)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 5838))

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Abstract

We propose a countermeasure for a class of known attacks on the PIN processing API used in the ATM (cash machine) network. This API controls access to the tamper-resistant Hardware Security Modules where PIN encryption, decryption and verification takes place. The attacks are differential attacks, whereby an attacker gains information about the plaintext values of encrypted customer PINs by making changes to the non-confidential inputs to a command. Our proposed fix adds an integrity check to the parameters passed to the command. It is novel in that it involves very little change to the existing ATM network infrastructure.

Work partially supported by Miur’07 Project SOFT: “Security Oriented Formal Techniques”.

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© 2009 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Focardi, R., Luccio, F.L., Steel, G. (2009). Blunting Differential Attacks on PIN Processing APIs. In: Jøsang, A., Maseng, T., Knapskog, S.J. (eds) Identity and Privacy in the Internet Age. NordSec 2009. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5838. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-04766-4_7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-04766-4_7

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-04765-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-04766-4

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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