Abstract
Side Channel Analysis (SCA) is a powerful key recovery attack that efficiently breaks block ciphers implementations. In software, it is usually counteracted by applying a technique called masking, that combines the key dependent variables with random values. When the block cipher to protect mixes affine functions and power functions, a natural strategy is to additively mask the first category of functions and to multiplicatively mask the second one. Several works that follow this strategy have been proposed in the literature, but all of them have been proved to be flawed or very costly. The main difficulty comes from the multiplicative masking of the zero value in a finite field. In this paper, we propose a scheme to multiplicatively mask power functions in such a way that the security against first-order SCA is maintained. We moreover show how to securely combine additive masking of affine transformations with multiplicative masking of power functions. We then apply our method to protect the AES implementation and we show that our proposal offers good timing/memory performances.
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Genelle, L., Prouff, E., Quisquater, M. (2010). Secure Multiplicative Masking of Power Functions. In: Zhou, J., Yung, M. (eds) Applied Cryptography and Network Security. ACNS 2010. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6123. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-13708-2_13
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-13708-2_13
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