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Mechanism Design for Multi-slot Ads Auction in Sponsored Search Markets

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Frontiers in Algorithmics (FAW 2010)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNTCS,volume 6213))

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Abstract

In this paper, we study pricing models for multi-slot advertisements, where advertisers can bid to place links to their sales webpages at one or multiple slots on a webpage, called the multi-slot AD auction problem. We develop and analyze several important mechanisms, including the VCG mechanism for multi-slot ads auction, the optimal social welfare solution, as well as two weighted GSP-like protocols (mixed and hybrid). Furthermore, we consider that forward-looking Nash equilibrium and prove its existence in the weighted GSP-like pricing protocols.

We prove properties and compare revenue of those different pricing models via analysis and simulation.

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References

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Deng, X., Sun, Y., Yin, M., Zhou, Y. (2010). Mechanism Design for Multi-slot Ads Auction in Sponsored Search Markets. In: Lee, DT., Chen, D.Z., Ying, S. (eds) Frontiers in Algorithmics. FAW 2010. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6213. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-14553-7_4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-14553-7_4

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-14552-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-14553-7

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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