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A Perfect Price Discrimination Market Model with Production, and a (Rational) Convex Program for It

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Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT 2010)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNISA,volume 6386))

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Abstract

Recent results showed PPAD-completeness of the problem of computing an equilibrium for Fisher’s market model under additively separable, piecewise-linear, concave utilities. We show that introducing perfect price discrimination in this model renders its equilibrium polynomial time computable. Moreover, its set of equilibria are captured by a convex program that generalizes the classical Eisenberg-Gale program, and always admits a rational solution.

We also introduce production into our model; our goal is to carve out as big a piece of the general production model as possible while still maintaining the property that a single (rational) convex program captures its equilibria, i.e., the convex program must optimize individually for each buyer and each firm.

Research supported by NSF Grants CCF-0728640 and CCF-0914732, ONR Grant N000140910755, and a Google Research Grant.

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Goel, G., Vazirani, V. (2010). A Perfect Price Discrimination Market Model with Production, and a (Rational) Convex Program for It. In: Kontogiannis, S., Koutsoupias, E., Spirakis, P.G. (eds) Algorithmic Game Theory. SAGT 2010. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6386. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-16170-4_17

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-16170-4_17

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-16169-8

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-16170-4

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