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Introduction

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Political Economy of Institutions, Democracy and Voting

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Abstract

Modern Political Economy cannot be understood without considering the work of two pre-eminent scholars, Douglass C. North and William H. Riker.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    North (1961, 1981, 1990, 1994), North and Thomas (1973), North and Weingast (1989).

  2. 2.

    Riker (1962, 1964, 1982, 1986, 1996), Riker and Ordeshook (1973).

  3. 3.

    Acemoglu and Robinson (2000, 2006), Schofield (2006), Clark (2007), Mokyr (2010).

  4. 4.

    Acemoglu et al. (2004, 2005).

  5. 5.

    Schofield (2006).

  6. 6.

    Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002), Sokoloff and Engerman (2000), Przeworski and Curvale (2006).

  7. 7.

    Schofield (2009), Bunce and Wolchik (2010).

  8. 8.

    Epstein et al. (2006), Gallego and Pitchik (2004).

  9. 9.

    Collier (2007, 2009), Easterly (2007).

  10. 10.

    Persson and Tabellini (1999, 2003), Przeworski et al. (2000), Przeworski (1991, 2006), Boix (2003), Acemoglu et al. (2008, 2009).

  11. 11.

    See also Acemoglu (2008).

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Washington University in St. Louis, St. Louis, MO, USA

    Norman Schofield

  2. University of Vigo, Vigo, Spain

    Gonzalo Caballero

Authors
  1. Norman Schofield
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  2. Gonzalo Caballero
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Correspondence to Norman Schofield .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Center in Political Economy, Washington University in St.-Louis, Brookings Drive 1, Saint Louis, 63130, Missouri, USA

    Norman Schofield

  2. , Faculty of Economics, University of Vigo, Lagoas Marcosende, Vigo, 36310, Spain

    Gonzalo Caballero

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Schofield, N., Caballero, G. (2011). Introduction. In: Schofield, N., Caballero, G. (eds) Political Economy of Institutions, Democracy and Voting. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-19519-8_1

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