Abstract
The first systematic comparisons of voting procedures appeared in the 1970’s. The journal Behavioral Science became a major forum for these early publications. Especially notable are the article by Fishburn (1971) and a series of works by Jeffrey T. Richelson. This series culminated in a summary (Richelson 1979) that is perhaps the most extensive of its kind in terms of both the number of systems and the number of criteria.
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Acknowledgements
The author wishes to thank Dan S. Felsenthal for inspiration, criticism and guidance far beyond the call of duty of an editor. Numerous constructive comments of an anonymous referee are gratefully acknowledged as well.
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Nurmi, H. (2012). On the Relevance of Theoretical Results to Voting System Choice. In: Felsenthal, D., Machover, M. (eds) Electoral Systems. Studies in Choice and Welfare. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-20441-8_10
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-20441-8_10
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