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Motivation and Nontechnical Overview

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Network Economics and the Allocation of Savings

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems ((LNE,volume 653))

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Abstract

The telecommunications market is one of the most fascinating witnesses of technological progress. Three decades ago “telecommunications” would refer almost exclusively to fixed-line telephony. And international, let alone intercontinental calls were exotic, mainly due to their high prices.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See Fransman (2003) for more on the evolution of the telecommunications industry.

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  1. Department of Quantitative Economics, Université de Fribourg, Bd. de Pérolles 90, 1700, Fribourg, Switzerland

    Philipp Servatius

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Servatius, P. (2012). Motivation and Nontechnical Overview. In: Network Economics and the Allocation of Savings. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 653. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-21096-9_1

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