Abstract
The design of truthful auctions that approximate the optimal expected revenue is a central problem in algorithmic mechanism design. 30 years after Myerson’s characterization of Bayesian optimal auctions in single-parameter domains [8], characterizing but also providing efficient mechanisms for multi-parameter domains still remains a very important unsolved problem. Our work improves upon recent results in this area, introducing new techniques for tackling the problem, while also combining and extending recently introduced tools.
In particular we give the first approximation algorithms for Bayesian auctions with multiple heterogeneous items when bidders have additive valuations, budget constraints and general matroid feasibility constraints.
This project has been funded by the Vienna Science and Technology Fund WWTF grant ICT10-002.
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Henzinger, M., Vidali, A. (2011). Multi-parameter Mechanism Design under Budget and Matroid Constraints. In: Demetrescu, C., Halldórsson, M.M. (eds) Algorithms – ESA 2011. ESA 2011. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6942. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-23719-5_17
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-23719-5_17
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