Abstract
In recent years, algorithms for computing game-theoretic solutions have been developed for real-world security domains. These games are between a defender, who must allocate her resources to defend potential targets, and an attacker, who chooses a target to attack. Existing work has assumed the set of defender’s resources to be fixed. This assumption precludes the effective use of approximation algorithms, since a slight change in the defender’s allocation strategy can result in a massive change in her utility. In contrast, we consider a model where resources are obtained at a cost, initiating the study of the following optimization problem: Minimize the total cost of the purchased resources, given that every target has to be defended with at least a certain probability. We give an efficient logarithmic approximation algorithm for this problem.
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Bhattacharya, S., Conitzer, V., Munagala, K. (2011). Approximation Algorithm for Security Games with Costly Resources. In: Chen, N., Elkind, E., Koutsoupias, E. (eds) Internet and Network Economics. WINE 2011. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7090. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-25510-6_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-25510-6_2
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
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