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New Impossible Differential Cryptanalysis of Reduced-Round Camellia

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Cryptology and Network Security (CANS 2011)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 7092))

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Abstract

Camellia is one of the widely used block ciphers, which has been selected as an international standard by ISO/IEC. This paper introduces a 7-round impossible differential of Camellia including FL/FL − 1 layer. Utilizing impossible differential attack, 10-round Camellia-128 is breakable with 2118.5 chosen plaintexts and 2123.5 10 round encryptions. Moreover, 10-round Camellia-192 and 11-round Camellia-256 can also be analyzed, the time complexity are about 2130.4 and 2194.5, respectively. Comparing with known attacks on reduced round Camellia including FL/FL − 1 layer, our results are better than all of them.

Supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant No. 60931160442), and the Tsinghua University Initiative Scientific Research Program (2009THZ01002).

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Key Laboratory of Cryptologic Technology and Information Security, Ministry of Education, Shandong University, Jinan, 250100, China

    Leibo Li & Jiazhe Chen

  2. School of Mathematics, Shandong University, Jinan, 250100, China

    Leibo Li & Jiazhe Chen

  3. Institute for Advanced Study, Tsinghua University, Beijing, 100084, China

    Keting Jia

Authors
  1. Leibo Li
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  2. Jiazhe Chen
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  3. Keting Jia
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. The State Key Laboratory of Information Security, Institute of Software, Chinese Academy of Sciences, 100190, Beijing, China

    Dongdai Lin

  2. Computer Science Department, University of California, 92697-3435, Irvine, CA, USA

    Gene Tsudik

  3. Shandong University, China

    Xiaoyun Wang

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© 2011 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Li, L., Chen, J., Jia, K. (2011). New Impossible Differential Cryptanalysis of Reduced-Round Camellia. In: Lin, D., Tsudik, G., Wang, X. (eds) Cryptology and Network Security. CANS 2011. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7092. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-25513-7_4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-25513-7_4

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-25512-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-25513-7

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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