Packet Forwarding Strategies for Cooperation Enforcement in Mobile Ad Hoc Wireless Networks

Abstract

In self-organized ad hoc networks, all networking functions rely on the contribution of the relay nodes. Since nodes are energy constrained, nodes may not wish to relay packets for other nodes, hence leading to a drop in network throughput. In this paper, we address the issue of enforcement of cooperative behavior in network nodes. A number of approaches based either on credit or on reputation mechanisms have been proposed in the literature but these have been found to be largely unsatisfactory in the context of mobile ad hoc networks. A game theoretic approach to the solution to the cooperation problem that relies on rational and selfish behavior of network nodes may be more effective. This paper aims at determining conditions under which, such cooperation without external incentives can exist. We have focused on the packet forwarding function of the nodes and proposed a game theoretic model for achieving cooperation. Our simulation results show that cooperation is enforced in network based on a suitable strategy function under a wide range of parameters like strategies, initial condition of nodes, energy cost for sending or forwarding packets, traffic rate, noise effect, mobility, etc.