Abstract
A standard SPA protection for RSA implementations is exponent blinding (see [7]). Fouque et al., [4] and more recently Schindler and Itoh, [8] have described side-channel attacks against such implementations. The attack in [4] requires that the attacker knows some bits of the blinded exponent with certainty. The attack methods of [8] can be defeated by choosing a sufficiently large blinding factor (about 64 bit).
In this paper we start from a more realistic model for the information an attacker can obtain by simple power analysis (SPA) than the one that forms the base of the attack in [4]. We show how the methods of [4] can be extended to work in this setting. This new attack works, under certain restrictions, even for long blinding factors (i.e. 64 bit or more).
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Bauer, S. (2012). Attacking Exponent Blinding in RSA without CRT. In: Schindler, W., Huss, S.A. (eds) Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design. COSADE 2012. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7275. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-29912-4_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-29912-4_7
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