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Computer-Aided Cryptographic Proofs

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Static Analysis (SAS 2012)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNPSE,volume 7460))

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Abstract

Provable security [6] is at the heart of modern cryptography. It advocates a mathematical approach in which the security of new cryptographic constructions is defined rigorously, and provably reduced to one or several assumptions, such as the hardness of a computational problem, or the existence of an ideal functionality. A typical provable security statement is of the form: for all adversary \(\mathcal{A}\) against the cryptographic construction \(\mathcal{S}\), there exists an adversary \(\mathcal{B}\) against a security assumption \(\mathcal{H}\), such that if \(\mathcal{A}\) has a high probability of breaking the scheme \(\mathcal{S}\) in time t, then \(\mathcal{B}\) has a high probability of breaking the assumption \(\mathcal{H}\) in time t′ (defined as a function of t).

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References

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© 2012 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Barthe, G., Grégoire, B., Zanella Béguelin, S. (2012). Computer-Aided Cryptographic Proofs. In: Miné, A., Schmidt, D. (eds) Static Analysis. SAS 2012. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7460. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-33125-1_1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-33125-1_1

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-33124-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-33125-1

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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