Abstract
Let G:{0,1}n → {0,1}m be a pseudorandom generator. We say that a circuit implementation of G is (k,q)-robust if for every set S of at most k wires anywhere in the circuit, there is a set T of at most q|S| outputs, such that conditioned on the values of S and T the remaining outputs are pseudorandom. We initiate the study of robust PRGs, presenting explicit and non-explicit constructions in which k is close to n, q is constant, and m > > n. These include unconditional constructions of robust r-wise independent PRGs and small-bias PRGs, as well as conditional constructions of robust cryptographic PRGs.
In addition to their general usefulness as a more resilient form of PRGs, our study of robust PRGs is motivated by cryptographic applications in which an adversary has a local view of a large source of secret randomness. We apply robust r-wise independent PRGs towards reducing the randomness complexity of private circuits and protocols for secure multiparty computation, as well as improving the “black-box complexity” of constant-round secure two-party computation.
The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense, the National Science Foundation, or the U.S. Government.
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Ishai, Y. et al. (2013). Robust Pseudorandom Generators. In: Fomin, F.V., Freivalds, R., Kwiatkowska, M., Peleg, D. (eds) Automata, Languages, and Programming. ICALP 2013. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7965. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-39206-1_49
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-39206-1_49
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