Abstract
Security and interoperability issues are increasing in smart card domain and it is important to analyze these issues carefully and implement appropriate countermeasures to mitigate them. Security issues involve attacks on smart cards which can lead to their abnormal behavior. Fault attacks are the most important among them and they can affect the program execution, smart card memory, etc. Detecting these abnormalities requires some redundancies, either by another code execution or by an equivalent representation. In this paper, we propose an automatic method to provide this redundancy using a security automaton as the main detection mechanism. This can enforce some trace properties on a smart card application, by using the combination of a static analysis and a dynamic monitoring. The security officer specifies the fragments of the code that must be protected against fault attacks and a program transformer produces an equivalent program that mesh a security automaton into the code according to the security requirements.
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Bouffard, G., Thampi, B.N., Lanet, JL. (2013). Detecting Laser Fault Injection for Smart Cards Using Security Automata. In: Thampi, S.M., Atrey, P.K., Fan, CI., Perez, G.M. (eds) Security in Computing and Communications. SSCC 2013. Communications in Computer and Information Science, vol 377. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-40576-1_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-40576-1_3
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