Abstract
The evolution of the electric power infrastructure into a smart grid carries with it the potential for residential homes to become malicious attackers on global state estimation. This paper presents an attack model where a distributed cyber controller in a smart grid executes an internal attack to falsify its advertised generation. This differs from current attack models in that the attacker is an active element of the system that participates in its normal operation. Through the use of information flow properties, the attack is proven to be nondeducible and thus unidentifiable in a current smart grid architecture. An adaptation of mutual exclusion is then applied to break the nondeducible attack.
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Roth, T., McMillin, B.M. (2013). Breaking Nondeducible Attacks on the Smart Grid. In: Hämmerli, B.M., Kalstad Svendsen, N., Lopez, J. (eds) Critical Information Infrastructures Security. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7722. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-41485-5_8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-41485-5_8
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-41484-8
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