Abstract
In [1] Smale considered a repeated game with bounded memory. In this model, the players only kept some kind of average of the past outcomes in their memory, and decisions were based on this memory. Here, we aim to examine the classical Cournot problem from this viewpoint.
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References
S. Smale, The Prisoner’s Dilemma and Dynamical Systems Associated to Non-Cooperative Games, Econometrica, 1981.
Y.H. Wan, Nash solutions for games with bounded memory. Mathematical Modelling, Vol. 2, p. 1–18, 1981.
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© 1986 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Wan, YH. (1986). The Cournot Problem with Bounded Memory Strategies. In: Sonnenschein, H.F. (eds) Models of Economic Dynamics. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 264. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-51645-0_10
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-51645-0_10
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
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