Abstract
What I term the “collective handover procedure” refers to the turnover of the leadership of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and the selection, vetting, and confirmation of the new group leadership. As such, it stands in contrast to the leadership being passed on to some nominated individual successor. This collective handover procedure is an institutional arrangement, whereby governance of the CPC and state power are smoothly transferred from one collective leadership group to their successors. This arrangement is thus markedly different from the feudalistic approach that existed in the Mao Zedong era, in which an individual leader possessing supreme power was able to designate his successor. At the heart of the collective handover procedure is risk diversification in the transfer of power. The system requires that any CPC member aspiring to rise to the collective leadership must first gain experience as provincial secretary or leader. They then need to serve as assistants to members of the collective leadership, receiving in the process the pertinent training and skills. Only after they have demonstrated expertise in this capacity can they themselves be considered possible members of the leadership. This process is a vital institutional guarantee for ensuring a smooth transfer of power. It also guarantees the continuity of a stable collective presidency characterizing the leadership of the party and state power in China. The collective handover is thus achieved through standardized, institutionalized procedures by which the old leadership is changed for the new.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
Professor Fei Zhengqing once commented that during his 27-year rule, Mao Zedong often admonished his comrades, and in his efforts to halt bureaucracy and revisionist tendencies, he almost ruined the CPC (R Maikefanaier 1998).
- 2.
During the period from November 1978 to December 1981, Deng Xiaoping remarked that, following the Eleventh Plenary Meeting, the guidelines and policies regarding collective discussion and decision making do not, of course, deny the role of the individual. For example, he said: I am personally playing my own role. Yet many of the specific policies proposed and problems raised have been done so by other comrades rather than by me. Thus, it is apparent that problems are discussed and finally resolved by the collective. We do not believe in too much personal intervention into matters arising either. In a sense, Mao Zedong’s mistakes in his later years are relevant to this issue. (The Central Committee of the Communist Party Literature Research Centre 2004.)
- 3.
Chen Yun (1995). Chen Yun is clearly against the idea of a single leader and believes that collective leadership should be adopted.
- 4.
Bai Juyi: “Speak,” see “Full Tang Poems” v 438. According to the poem, “It takes three days of burning to test jade and a period of seven years to determine whether Wang Mang didn’t betray Duke Zhou. If I die, who knows the truth of my life?”
- 5.
Source: China Communist Party News: http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64093/64094/10080626.html
- 6.
“China Statistical Yearbook 2011”: http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2011/indexch.htm
- 7.
CIA, The World Factbook, CIA Web site.
- 8.
In his discussion of the “Nine Commentaries,” Mao Zedong said that Khrushchev revisionist groups in the Soviet Union had engaged in peaceful evolution. This sounded the alarm bell to all socialist countries, including China, and to all communist parties, including the Communist Party of the USA (Wu Lengxi 1999). “The imperialist prophets change according to the Soviet Union, the “peaceful evolution”, and the third or fourth generation in China. We must make the prophecy of the imperialist a complete bankruptcy. Mao Zedong’s way is too general, constantly paying attention to training and bringing up the revolutionary cause of the proletariat successors from top to bottom. It is our party and national destiny that are of vital importance. This is the revolutionary cause of the proletariat; a millennium development for a million years.” People’s Daily, July 14, 1964.
- 9.
A detailed analysis appears in Hu Angang (2010).
- 10.
Deng Xiaoping pointed out in one of his southern tour speeches: “If we rely on the old generation, we cannot solve the problem of long-term stability. So we need to think in terms of other people. We really need to look for the third generation. But efforts in that direction didn't solve the problem: two individuals have failed—and not because of economic problems. We’re in a struggle against the bourgeois liberalization of the croppers (Xiaoping Deng 1993).
- 11.
For example, before becoming president, George W. Bush served as governor of Texas for only six years (1995–2000).
- 12.
2012 can be considered a “political transition year” with expected changes to the leadership in countries including the United States, China, Russia, France—four permanent members of the UN Security Council—Mexico and elsewhere. Costs associated with political elections are believed to equal nearly half of the global GDP. The two most important political transitions occurred in China and the United States. China will have a new generation of leaders; this new group will begin to implement a new strategic plan. Only the US over the past 5 years has seen a progressive change of situation. This constitutes a major headline. Eurasia Group (United States) January 3, 2012.
References
Chen Yun (1995) The establishment of the secretariat of the central committee is an important measure of the party (February 24, 1980). In: Chen Yun anthology, vol 3. People’s Publishing House, Beijing, pp 269–270
Deng Xiaoping (1993) Talking points in Wuchang, Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shanghai, and other places (January 18–February 12, 1992). In: Deng Xiaoping anthology, vol 3. People’s Publishing House, Beijing, p 380
Deng Xiaoping (1994a) Implementation of the ideological and political lines relies on organizational line guarantees (July 29, 1979). In: Deng Xiaoping Anthology, vol 2. People’s Publishing House, Beijing
Deng Xiaoping (1994b) Party and state leadership system reform (August 18, 1980). In: Deng Xiaoping anthology, vol 2, 2nd edn. People’s Publishing House, Beijing, p 321
Deng Xiaoping (1994c) Answer to an Italian Journalist Oriana Fallaci (August 21, 1980). In: Deng Xiaoping Anthology, vol 2. People’s Publishing House, Beijing, p 347, 1994 edition
Hu Angang (2002) The 16th National Congress of the CPC and the power transfer from the old to the new leadership, China Study Report, Special Issue 1, pp 1–21
Hu Angang (2010) Mao Zedong and the great cultural revolution, Institute for Contemporary China studies, 2nd edn. Tsinghua University, Beijing, China
Jiang Zemin (1997) Senior cadre requirements and hopes (September 19, 1997). In: On the construction of the party. Central Party Literature Press, Beijing, p 269
Jiang Zemin (2006a) Letter to the CPC Central Committee Political Bureau (September 1, 2004). In: Jiang Zemin anthology, vol 3. People’s Publishing House, Beijing
Jiang Zemin (2006b) My heart will always be together with the people’s army (September 20, 2004). In: Jiang Zemin anthology, vol 3. People’s Publishing House, Beijing, p 603
Jiang Zemin (2006c) Leaders must talk politics (September 27, 1995). In: Selected works of Jiang Zemin, vol 1. People’s Publishing House, Beijing, 2006 edition
Maikefanaier R (1998) In: Fei Zhengqing (ed) The Cambridge history of China: the emergence of revolutionary China (1949–1965). Chinese Social Science Press, Chinese edition, Beijing, China
The Central Committee of the Communist Party Literature Research Centre (2004) Deng Xiaoping (1975–1997). The Central Literature Publishing House, Beijing, p 784
Wu Lengxi (1999) Ten years of controversy: the memoirs of 1956–1966 Sino-Soviet relations. The Central Literature Publishing House, Beijing, pp 77–81
Yang Mingwei (2005) Chen Yun’s last years. People’s Publishing House, Beijing, p 67
Ye Jianying (1982a) Speech at the eleventh session of the fifth plenary (February 24, 1980). In: The Central Committee of the Communist Party Literature Research Centre (ed) Since the third plenary session assembly, vol 1. People’s Publishing House, Beijing, pp 480–481
Ye Jianying (1982b) Speech at the first conference of the eleventh plenary secession (February 24, 1980). In: Important documents since the third plenary session, vol 1. People’s Press, Beijing, pp 386–391
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2014 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Hu, A. (2014). The Collective Handover Procedure. In: China’s Collective Presidency. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-55279-3_4
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-55279-3_4
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-55278-6
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-55279-3
eBook Packages: Humanities, Social Sciences and LawPolitical Science and International Studies (R0)