Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Toward a New System of Corporate Governance in the European Union: An Integrative Model of the Anglo-American and Germanic Systems

  • Chapter
Politics and Institutions in an Integrated Europe

Part of the book series: European and Transatlantic Studies ((EUROPEANSTUDIES))

Abstract

The European Union (EU) aims to create a market without borders. In an effort to harmonize the various systems of corporate governance and corporate control currently represented in Europe, EU policymakers early on drafted proposals for a unionwide system, such as the corporate structure directive of 1972 and the takeover directive of 1989. None of these directives has yet been finalized, and it is not clear whether a single governance system will, in fact, result from these political efforts. However, there are also economic reasons that make a unified system desirable (e.g., transaction and information costs). Once a new system develops, the question is whether this system will be both politically viable and economically efficient.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 129.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 169.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 169.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  • Auerbach, Alan J. (ed.). Corporate Takeovers: Causes and Consequences. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988.

    Google Scholar 

  • Baums, Theodor. “Höchststimmrechte.” In Die Aktiengesellschaft No. 6, 1990: 221–242.

    Google Scholar 

  • Baums, Theodor. “Corporate Governance in Germany and the Role of the Banks.” American Journal of Comparative Law 1992, 40: 40–68.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Benzie, R.S. “Takeover Activity in the 1980s.” Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin 1989, 29(1): 78–85.

    Google Scholar 

  • Berger, David J. “A Comparative Analysis of Takeover Regulation in the European Community.” Law and Contemporary Problems 1992, 55(4): 53–75.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Blair, Margaret M. (ed.). The Deal Decade—What Takeovers and Leveraged Buyouts Mean for Corporate Governance. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1993.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bleicher, Knut, Leberl, Diethard, and Paul, Herbert. Unternehmensverfassung und Spitzenorganisation-Führung und Überwachung von Aktiengesellschaften im internationalen Vergleich. Wiesbaden: Gabler, 1989.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Braiotta, Louis, Jr., and Sommer, A. A., Jr. The Essential Guide to Effective Corporate Board Committees. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1987.

    Google Scholar 

  • Buxbaum, Richard. “Tensions Between Institutional Owners and Corporate Managers: An International Perspective.” Brooklyn Law Review 1991, 57(1): 1–53.

    Google Scholar 

  • Charkham, Jonathan. Keeping Good Company—a Study of Corporate Governance in Five Countries. Oxford, England: Clarendon Press, 1994.

    Google Scholar 

  • Commerzbank (ed.). Wer gehört zu wem? Handbuch über Beteiligungsverhältnisse in Deutschland. Frankfurt: Commerzbank, 1991.

    Google Scholar 

  • Depser, Ingrid. “Der Vorschlag der EG-Kommission zur Takeover-Richtlinie im Spiegel der amerikanischen Takeover-Erfahrung.” Recht der internationalen Wirtschaft 1992, 38(5): 351–361.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fama, Eugene. “Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm.” Journal of Political Economy 1980, 88(2): 288–307.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fama, Eugene, and Jensen, Michael C. “Separation of Ownership and Control” and “Agency Problems and Residual Claims.” Journal of Law and Economics 1983, 26: 301–325, 327-349.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Financial Times, various issues.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gottschalk, Arno. “Der Stimmrechtseinfluß der Banken in den Aktionärsversammlungen von Großunternehmen.” WSI Mitteilungen 1988, (May): 294–304.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hansen, Herbert. “Der Fall MG und die Rolle des Aufsichtsrates.” Die Aktiengesellschaft 1994, (February): R44–45.

    Google Scholar 

  • Harm, Christian. “The Role of Universal Banks and Majority Shareholders to Overcome Financial Constraints-Evidence from the German Balance Sheet Data.” Working Paper, New York University, 1994.

    Google Scholar 

  • Jensen, Michael C., and Meckling, William H. “Theory of the Finn: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure.” Journal of Financial Economics 1976, 3: 305–360.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Jensen, Michael C., and Ruback, Richard S. “The Market for Corporate Control.” Journal of Financial Economics 1983, 11: 5–50.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kester, W. Carl. Japanese Takeovers-the Global Contest for Corporate Control. Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1991.

    Google Scholar 

  • Köndgen, Johannes. “Duties of Banks in Voting their Clients’ Stock.” In Baums, Theodor, Buxbaum, Richard, and Hopt, Klaus (eds.), Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance. Berlin: DeGruyter, 1994.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kübler, Friedrich. Gesellschaftsrecht (3rd ed.). Heidelberg: CF. Müller/UTB, 1990.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lutter, Marcus. “Der Aufsichtsrat: Konstruktionsfehler, Inkompetenz seiner Mitglieder oder normales Risiko?” Die Aktiengesellschaft 1994, (April): 176–177.

    Google Scholar 

  • Main, Brian, O’Reilly, Charles, and Wade, James. “The CEO, the Board of Directors, and Executive Compensation: Economic and Psychological Perspectives.” forthcoming, Industrial and Corporate Change 1995

    Google Scholar 

  • Poensgen, Otto H., and Lukas, Andreas. “Fluktuation, Amtszeit und weitere Karriere von Vorstandsmitgliedern.” DBW 1982, 2(2): 177–195.

    Google Scholar 

  • Porter, Michael E. “Capital Disadvantage: America’s Failing Capital Investment System.” Harvard Business Review 1992, (Sept/Oct): 65–82.

    Google Scholar 

  • Scharfstein, David. “The Disciplinary Role of Takeovers.” Review of Economic Studies 1988, 55: 185–200.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Schleifer, Andrei, and Vishny, Robert W. “Management Entrenchment: The Case of Manager-Specific Investment.” Journal of Financial Economics 1989, 25: 123–139.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Statistisches Bundesamt (ed.). Statistisches Jahrbuch 1992 für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Wiesbaden: Metzler/Poeschel, 1992.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tirole, Jean. “Privatization in Eastern Europe: Incentives and the Economics of Transition.” In Blanchard, Olivier J., and Fisher, Stanley (eds.), NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1991. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991.

    Google Scholar 

  • Zöllner, Wolfgang, and Noack, Ulrich. “One share-one vote? Stimmrecht und Kapitalbeteiligung bei der Aktiengesellschaft.” Die Aktiengesellschaft 1991, 4: 117–131.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Authors
  1. Ulrike Schaede
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, University of California at Berkeley, Berkeley, CA, 94720, USA

    Barry Eichengreen

  2. University of California at Los Angeles, Los Angeles, CA, 90024-1472, USA

    Jeffry Frieden

  3. University of Mannheim, Seminargebäude A5, 68131, Mannheim, Germany

    Jürgen von Hagen

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 1995 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Schaede, U. (1995). Toward a New System of Corporate Governance in the European Union: An Integrative Model of the Anglo-American and Germanic Systems. In: Eichengreen, B., Frieden, J., von Hagen, J. (eds) Politics and Institutions in an Integrated Europe. European and Transatlantic Studies. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-57811-3_5

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-57811-3_5

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-63363-8

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-57811-3

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation