Abstract
In these notes we deal with the so called “bargaining problem” (Nash, 1950). Our approach is axiomatic. We search for solutions satisfying some desirable properties (axioms).
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References
Nash, J.F. (1950), “The Bargaining Problem,” Econometrica 28, 155–162.
Kalai, E. (1977), “Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Solutions: Interpersonal Utility Comparisons,” Econometrica 45, 1623–1630.
Kalai, E. and M. Smorodinsky (1975), “Other Solutions to Nash’s Bargaining Problem,” Econometrica 43, 513–518.
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© 1997 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Thomson, W. (1997). Cooperative Theory of Bargaining I: Classical. In: Hart, S., Mas-Colell, A. (eds) Cooperation: Game-Theoretic Approaches. NATO ASI Series, vol 155. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-60454-6_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-60454-6_3
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-64413-9
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