Abstract
The purpose of this article is to demonstrate that altruism, conceived as “generalized exchange, ”can evolve within a society of egoists. I define the “evolutionary giving game, ”in which each player holds some resource as its budget and can give any portion of it to any player. This game enables us to analyze the emergence of various kinds of social exchange, including generalized exchange. The results of computer simulations based on this game show the following. Though an unconditional altruist strategy is quickly beaten by nonaltruistic one, a kind of conditional altruist strategy, “in-group altruist strategy, ”will robustly evolve. The in-group altruist strategy dictates that the player gives only to “in-group members. ”Here in-group members are those who contribute sufficiently. Those who contribute sufficiently, but give even to “out-group members ”are also defined as out-group members. This strategy is consistent with in-group favoritism, observable in a variety of settings. The simulation results also show that the evolution of altruism based on this strategy is dependent on prospects of future contact, visibility, and risks.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Alexander, R. D. (1979). Natural selection and social exchange. In R.L. Burgess & T.L. Huston (Eds.) Social Exchange in Developing Relationships. N.Y.: Academic Press.
Allison, P. D. (1992). The cultural evolution of beneficent norms. Social Forces, 77, 279–301.
Austin, W., Walster, E. & Utne, M. K. (1976). Equity and the law. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 9, 163–190.
Axelrod, R. (1984). The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books.
Axelrod, R. (1986). An evolutionary approach to norms. American Political Science Review, 80, 1095–1 111.
Batson, C. D. (1987). Prosocial motivation: Is it ever truly altruistic? Advances of Experimental Social Psychology, 20, 65–122.
Befu, H. (1977). Social exchange. Annual Review of Anthropology, 6, 255–281.
Blau, P. M. (1964). Exchange and Power in Social Life. New York: Wiley.
Brewer, M. B. & Kramer, R. M. (1985). The psychology of intergroup attitudes and behavior. Annual Review of Psychology, 36, 219–243.
Cashdan, E. A. (1980). Egalitarianism among hunters and gatherers. American Anthropologists, 82, 116–120.
Cashdan, E. A. (1985). Coping with risk: Reciprocity among the Basarwa of Northern Botswana. Man (N.S.), 20, 454–474.
Debreu, G. & Scarf, H. (1963). A limit theorem on the core of an economy. International Economic Review, 4, 235–246.
Durkheim, E. (1950). Les regies de la methode sociologique. Paris: Press Universitaires de France.
Ekeh, P. P. (1974). Social Exchange Theory. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press.
Emerson, R. M. (1972a). Exchange theory, Part I. In J. Berger, M. Zelditch, Jr. & B. Anderson (Eds.) Sociological Theories in Progress. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, Pp.38–57.
Emerson, R.M. (1972b). Exchange theory, Part II. In J. Berger, M. Zelditch, Jr. & B. Anderson (Eds.) Sociological Theories in Progress. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
Emerson, R. M. (1976). Social Exchange theory. Annual Review of Sociology, 2, 335–362.
Essock-Vitale, S. M. & McGuire, M. T. (1980). Predictions derived from the theories of kin selection and reciprocation assessed by anthropological data. Ethology and Sociobiology, 1, 233–243.
Essock-Vitale, S. M. & McGuire, M. T. (1985). Women’s lives viewed from an evolutionary perspective.II. Patterns of helping. Ethology and Sociobiology, 5, 155–173.
Friedman, J. W. (1986). Game Theory with Applications to Economics. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press.
Hames, R. (1990). Sharing among the Yanomamo: Part I, The effect of risk. In E.A. Cashdan (Ed.) Risk and Uncertainty in Tribal and Peasant Economies. Boulder: Westview.
Hamilton, W. D. (1964). The genetic theory of social behavior. I and II. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 7, 1–52.
Hardin, G. (1982). Discriminating altruisms. Zygon, 17, 163–186.
Homans, G. C. (1961). Social Behavior. New York: Harcourt-Brace.
Homans, G. C. (1967). Fundamental social processes. In N. J. Smelser (Ed.) Sociology: An Introduction. New York: Wiley.
Homans, G. C. (1974). Social Behavior (Revised Edition). New York: Harcourt-Brace.
Kaplan, H., Hill, K. & Hurtado, A. M. (1990). Risk, foraging and food sharing among the Ache. In E. A. Cashdan (Ed.) Risk and Uncertainty in Tribal and Peasant Economies. Boulder: Westview.
Kent, S. (1993). Sharing in an egalitarian Kalahari community. Man (N.S.), 28, 479–514.
Koenig, W.D. (1988). Reciprocal altruism in birds: A critical review. Ethology and Sociobiology, 9, 73–84.
Latane, B. & Nida, S. (1981). Ten years of research on group size and helping. Psychological Bulletin, 89, 308–324.
Levi-Strauss, C. (1949). Les Structures Elementaire de la Parente. Paris: Press Universitaires de France.
Messick, D. M. (1991). On the evolution of group-based altruism. In R. Selten (Ed.) Evolution and Game Dynamics. New York: Springer-Verlag.
Messick, D. M. & Mackie, D. M. (1991). Intergroup relations. Annual Review of Psychology, 40, 45–81.
Morgan, C. J. (1985). Natural selection for altruism in structured populations. Ethology and Sociobiology, 6, 211–218.
Nielsen, F. (1994). Sociobiology and sociology. Annual Review of Sociology, 20, 267–303.
Peterson, N. (1993). Demand sharing: Reciprocity and the pressure for generosity among foragers. American Anthropologist, 95, 860–874.
Ring, K. & Kelley, H. H. (1963). A comparison of augmentation and reduction as modes of influence. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 66, 95–102.
Rushton, J. P. (1987). Evolution, altruism and genetic similarity theory. Mankind Quarterly, 27, 379–396.
Rushton, J. P. (1995). Race, Evolution, and Behavior. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction.
Segal, N. L. (1984). Cooperation, competition, and altruism within twin sets: A reappraisal. Ethology and Sociobiology, 5, 163–177.
Sahlins, M. D. (1965). On the sociology of primitive exchange. In M. Banton (Ed.) The Relevance of Models for Social Anthropology. New York: Praeger.
Sahlins, M. D. (1972). Stone Age Economics. Chicago: Aldine.
Simmons, R. G. (1991). Presidential address on Altruism and Sociology. Sociological Quarterly, 32, 1–22.
Smith, E.A. (1988). Risk and uncertainty in the ‘original affluent society’: Evolutionary ecology of resource-sharing and land tenure. In T. Ingold, D. Riches & J. Woodbura. (Eds.) Hunters and Gatherers: History, Evolution, and Social Change. Oxford: Berg.
Tajfel, H. (1982). Social psychology of intergroup relations. Annual Review of Psychology, 33, 1–39.
Takagi, E. (1994). The evolutionary giving game: A computer simulation paradigm for the study of social exchange (in Japanese). Reports of Saitama University, 30, 23–55.
Takagi, E. (1995). The group-centrism puzzle (in Japanese). Reports of Saitama University, 31, 17–40.
Tanaka, J. (1980). The San, Hunter-gatherers of the Kalahari: A Study in Ecological Anthropology. Tokyo: Univ. of Tokyo Press.
Taylor, C. E. & McGuire, M. T. (1988). Reciprocal altruism: 15 years later. Ethology and Sociobiology, 9, 67–72.
Trivers, R. L. (1971). The evolution of reciprocal altruism. Quarterly Review of Biology, 46, 35–57.
Uzawa, H. (1960). ‘Walras’ tatonnement in the theory of exchange. Review of Economic Studies, 27, 182–194.
Winterhaider, B. (1986). Diet choice, risk, and food sharing in a stochastic environment. Journal of Anthropological Archaeology, 5, 369–392.
Wiessner, P. (1982). Risk, reciprocity and social influences on !Kung San economics. In E. Leacock & R. Lee (Eds.) Politics and History in Band Societies. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press.
Woodburn, J. (1982). Egalitarian societies. Man (N.S.), 17,431–451.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1996 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this paper
Cite this paper
Takagi, E. (1996). The Generalized Exchange Perspective on the Evolution of Altruism. In: Liebrand, W.B.G., Messick, D.M. (eds) Frontiers in Social Dilemmas Research. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-85261-9_17
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-85261-9_17
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-85263-3
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-85261-9
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive