Abstract
The second response to the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem we consider is to become resigned to the fact that our social choice rules will all have some occurrences of manipulability and so direct our search for rules that have few such occurrences.
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Further Reading
The recommendation here is easy: Approval Voting by Steven J. Brams and Peter C. Fishburn (Boston: Birkhuser, 1983). This short paperback contains a wealth of information not only about theoretical properties of approval voting but also about empirical evidence drawn from those organizations that have adopted the system. Included also are “semi-empirical” studies about how certain elections, like recent Presidential races, would have turned out if approval voting had been used.
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© 1988 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Kelly, J.S. (1988). Approval Voting. In: Social Choice Theory. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-09925-4_13
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-09925-4_13
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-662-09927-8
Online ISBN: 978-3-662-09925-4
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