Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Two Stage Games

  • Chapter
Theories of Imperfectly Competitive Markets

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems ((LNE,volume 442))

  • 72 Accesses

Abstract

Games with Stages: Introduction and Examples. The Notion of Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium. Applications: Entry Deterrence and Stackelberg Equilibrium (Proposition 5.1). Contestable Markets: Existence, Uniqueness and Optimality of Sustainable Prices (Proposition 5.2). Optimal Rules for Public Firms (Proposition 5.3). Effects of Divisionalization (Proposition 5.4). Revelation Games: Effects of Manipulation (Propositions 5.5–6). Indeterminacy of Equilibria (Proposition 5.7). Choice of Technique (Proposition 5.8).

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 44.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  • ALKAN, A. and SERTEL, M.R. (1981). “The Pretend-but-Perform Mechanism in Sharecropping”, Discussion Paper IIM/IP 81–3, International Institute of Management, West Berlin.

    Google Scholar 

  • ANTELO, M. (1996). “The Importance of Complementarities between Advertisment and R & D”, Working Paper, Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona, April

    Google Scholar 

  • AUMANN, R. (1985). “On the N.T.U. Value: A Comment on the Roth-Shafer Examples”, Econometrica, vol. 53, 3, pp. 667–677.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • AUMANN, R. (1986). “Rejoinder”, Econometrica, 54, 4, pp. 985–990.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • BAIN, J.S. (1956). Barriers to New Competition, Cambridge, Mass, Harvard U. Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • BAUMOL, W.J., PANZAR, I.E. and WILLIG, R.D. (1982). Contestable Markets and the Theory of Industrial Structure, New York, Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich.

    Google Scholar 

  • BAYE, M., CROCKER, K. and JU, J. (1993). “Divisionalization and Franchising Incentives in Oligopoly: Nash Equilibrium and Implications for Social Welfare”. Dpt. of Economics, Pennsylvania State U.

    Google Scholar 

  • BEATO, P.and MAS-COLELL, A. (1984). “The Marginal Cost Pricing Rule as a Regulation Mechanism in Mixed Markets” in The Performance of Public Enterprises Merchand, Pestieau, Tulkens (eds.). North Holland, 1984.

    Google Scholar 

  • BLACKMON, G. and ZECKHAUSER, R. (1990). “Fragile Commitments and the Regulatory Process”. J.F.Kennedy School of Government. Mimeo, Harvard University.

    Google Scholar 

  • BOYER, M. and MOREAUX, M. (1986). “Perfect Competition as the Limit of a Hierarchical Market Game”. Economics Letters, vol. 22, pp. 115–118.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • BRANDER, J. and SPENCER, B. (1983). “Strategic Commitment with R & D. The Symmetric Case”. Bell Journal of Economics, vol. 22, pp. 225–235.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • CORCHON, L. (1991). “Oligopolistic Competition among Groups”. Economics Letters 36, pp. 1–3.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • CORCHON, L. and MARCOS. F. (1988). “Entry, Stackelberg Equilibrium and Reasonable Conjectures”, International Journal of Industrial Organization, vol. 6, pp. 441–452.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • CORCHON, L. and SILVA, J.A. (1990). “Manipulation in Oligopoly”. Mimeo, Universidad de Alicante. Revised, 1995.

    Google Scholar 

  • CORCHON, L. and GONZALEZ-MAESTRE, M. (1994). “On the Competitive Effects of Divisionalization”. Working Paper WP-AD 94–10, Universidad de Alicante.

    Google Scholar 

  • CORCHON, L. and WILKIE, S. (1994). “Computers, Productivity and Market Structure”. Working Paper WP-AD 94–17, Universidad de Alicante.

    Google Scholar 

  • DASGUPTA, P. and USHIO, Y. (1981). “On the Rate of Convergence of Oligopoly Equilibria in Large Markets: An Example”: Economic Letters, 8, pp. 217–220.

    Google Scholar 

  • d’ASPREMONT, C., JACQUEMIN, A., GABSZEWICZ, J. and WEYMARK, J. (1981). “On the Stability of Collusive Price Leadership”. Canadian Journal of Economics, vol. 16, n. 1, pp. 17–25.

    Google Scholar 

  • DAVIDSON, C. and DENECKERE, R. (1986). “Long-Run Competition in Capacity, Short-Run Competition in Price, and the Cournot Model”, Rand Journal of Economics, vol. 17, n° 3, pp. 404–415.

    Google Scholar 

  • DIXIT, A. (1979). “A Model of Duopoly Suggesting a Theory of Entry Barriers”, The Bell Journal of Economics, vol. 10, n 1, pp. 20–32. DIXIT, A. (1980).

    Google Scholar 

  • DIXIT, A. (1980). “The Role of Investment in Entry-Deterrence”, The Economic Journal, vol. 90, pp. 95–106.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • DIXIT, A. and NALEBUFF, B. (1991). Thinking Strategically. W. W. Norton, New York.

    Google Scholar 

  • DIXON, H. (1985). “Strategic Investment with Competitive Product Markets”, Journal of Industrial Economics, 33, pp. 483–500.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • DIXON, H (1986). “The Cournot and Bertrand Outcomes as Equilibria in a Strategic Metagame”. Economic Journal, vol. 96, supplement, pp. 59–70.

    Google Scholar 

  • FAULI-OLLER, R. and GIRALT, M. (1995). “Competition and Cooperation Within a Multidivisional Firm”. The Journal of Industrial Economics, XLIII (March) pp. 77–99.

    Google Scholar 

  • FERSHTMAN, C. and JUDD, K.L. (1987). “Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly”, The American Economic Review, vol. 77, n-° 5, pp. 927–940.

    Google Scholar 

  • FRIEDMAN, J.W. (1988). “On the Strategic Importance of Prices versus Quantities”. Rand Journal of Economics, vol. 19, n. 4, pp. 607–622.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • FUDENBERG, D., TIROLE, J. (1991). Game Theory. MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

    Google Scholar 

  • GILBERT, R. (1986). “Pre-empive Competition” in J. Stiglitz and G.F. Mathewson New Developments in the Analysis of Market Structure, MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • GILBERT, R. and VIVES, X. (1986) “Entry Deterrence and the Free Rider Problem”, Review of Economics Studies, vol. 53, pp. 71–83.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • GONZALEZ-MAESTRE, M. (1993). “Divisionalization in Markets with Heterogeneous Goods”. Working Paper WP-AD 93–12, Universidad de Alicante.

    Google Scholar 

  • GRAHAM, D.R., KAPLAN, D.S. and SIBLEY, D.S. (1983). “Efficiency and Competition in the Airline Industry”, Bell Journal of Economics, vol. 14, no 1, pp. 118–137.

    Google Scholar 

  • HAGEN, K. (1979). “Optimal Pricing in Public Firms in an Imperfect Market Economy”. Scandinavian Journal of Economics, pp. 475–493.

    Google Scholar 

  • HARRIS, R. and WIENS, E. (1980). “Government Enterprise: An Instrument for the Internal Regulation of the Industry”.Canadian Journal of Economics, 13 pp. 125–132.

    Google Scholar 

  • HELLWING, M. and LEININGER, W. (1987). “On the Existence of Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium in Infinite Action Games of Perfect Information”, Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 43, pp. 55–75.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • KALAI, E., FERSHTMAN, C., and JUDD, K. (1988). “Cooperation through Delegation”. Mimeo, Northwestern University

    Google Scholar 

  • KAMIEN, M. and ZANG, I. (1990). “The Limits of Monopolization through Acquisition”. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 105, pp. 465–499.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • KLEMPERER, P.D. and MEYER, M.A. (1986). “Price Competition vs. Quantity Competition: the Role of Uncertainty”. Rand Journal of Economics, 17, 4, pp. 229–261.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • KLEMPERER, P.D. and MEYER, M.A. (1989). “Supply Function Equilibria in Oligopoly under Uncertainty”, Econometrica, vol. 57, no 6, pp. 1243–1277.

    Google Scholar 

  • KORAY, S. and SERTEL, M.R. (1988). “Regulating a Duopoly by a Pretend-but- Perform Mechanism”, pp. 95–115, in M. Holler and R. Rees (eds.), Economics of Market Structure, European Journal of Political Economy, vol. 4, n2 1.

    Google Scholar 

  • KREPS, D. and SCHEIKMAN, J. (1983). “Cournot Precommitment and Bertrand Competition Yield Cournot Outcomes”. Bell Journal of Economics, vol. 14, pp. 326–337.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • MACHO, I. and VERDIER, T. (1991). “Strategic Managerial Incentives and Cross Ownership Structure: A Note”. Journal of Economics, 53, pp. 285–297.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • MILGROM, P. and J. ROBERTS (1992). Economics, Organization and Management. Prentice Hall Inc..

    Google Scholar 

  • MODIGLIANI, F. (1958). “New Developments on the Oligopoly Front”, Journal of Political Economy, vol. 66, pp. 215–232.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • MOORE, J. and REPULLO, R. (1988). “Subgame Perfect Implementation”, Econometrica vol. 56 pp. 1191–1220.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • OMORI, T. and YARROW, G. (1982). “Product Diversification, Entry Prevention and Limit Pricing”, The Bell Journal of Economics, pp. 242–248.

    Google Scholar 

  • OSBORNE, D.K. (1973). “On the Rationality of Limit Pricing”, Journal of Industrial Economics, vol. 22, 1, pp. 71–80.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • PERRY, M. (1984). “Sustainable Positive Profit Multiple-Price Strategies in Contestable Markets”. Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 32, pp. 246–65.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • POLASKY, S. (1992). “Divide and Conquer: On the Profitability of Forming Independent Rival Divisions”. Economics Letters, vol. 40, pp. 365–371.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • ROGERSON, W.P. (1984). “A Note on the Incentive for a Monopolist to Increase Fixed Costs as a Barrier to Entry”, Quarterly Journal of Economics pp. 399–402.

    Google Scholar 

  • SALAS, V. (1992). “Relative Performance Evaluation of Managers: The Effects of Industrial Competition and Risk Sharing”. International Journal of Industrial Organization, September, pp. 473–489.

    Google Scholar 

  • SALOP, S.0 (1979). “Strategic Entry Deterrence”. American Economic Review, pp 335–338.

    Google Scholar 

  • SALOP, S.C. (1986). “Practices that (Credibly) Facilitate Oligopoly Coordination” in J. Stiglitz and G.F. Mathewson (eds.) New Developments in the Analysis of Market Structure, MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • SCHELLING, T. (1960). The Strategy of Conflict. Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • SCHWARTZ, M. and THOMSON, E.A. (1986). “Divisionalization and Entry Deterrence”. Quarterly Journal of Economics. pp. 307–321.

    Google Scholar 

  • SELTEN, R. (1975). “A Re-examination of the Perfection Concept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive Games”. International Journal of Game Theory, pp. 25–55.

    Google Scholar 

  • SELTEN, R. (1978). “The Chain-Store Paradox”. Theory and Decision, 9, pp. 127–159.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • SHAPIRO, C. (1986). “Theories of Oligopoly Behavior” in R. Schmalansee and R. Willig (eds) Handbook of Industrial Organization. North Holland.

    Google Scholar 

  • SHARKEY, W. (1982). The Theory of Natural Monopoly, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • SHESHINSKY, E. (1986). “Positive Second best Theory”, chp. 25, vol. III in Arrow and Intrilligator (eds.) Handbook of Mathematical Economics, North-Holland.

    Google Scholar 

  • SINGH, N. and VIVES, X. (1984). “Price and Quantity Competition in a Differentiated Duopoly”. The Rand Journal of Economics, 15, 4, pp. 546–554.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • SKLIVAS, S. (1987). “The Strategic Choice of Managerial Incentives”, The Rand Journal of Economics, Vol. 18 (3), pp. 452–458.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • SPENCE, M. (1977). “Entry, Capacity, Investment and Oligopolistic Pricing”. The Bell Journal of Economics, 8, pp. 534–44.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • SPENCE, M. (1984). “Cost Reduction, Competition and Industry Performance”. Econometrica, 52 (1), pp. 101–21.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • SYLOS-LABINI, P. (1962). Oligopoly and Technical Progress, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • TIROLE, J. (1988). The Theory of Industrial Organization. The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.

    Google Scholar 

  • VICKERS, J. (1985). “Delegation and the Theory of the Firm”, The Economic Journal, Supplement, pp. 138–147.

    Google Scholar 

  • VIVES, X. (1986). “Commitment, Flexibility and Market Outcomes” International Journal of Industrial Organization, pp. 217–230.

    Google Scholar 

  • VIVES, X. (1988). “Sequential Entry, Industry Structure and Welfare”. European Economic Review, vol. 32, pp. 1671–1687.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • VON UNGERN-STERNBERG, T. (1987). “Free Entry, Perfect Equilibrium”. Working Paper, University of Lausanne.

    Google Scholar 

  • WARE, R. and WINTER, R. A. (1986). “Public Pricing under Imperfect Competition”. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 4, pp. 87–97.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Dept. Fundamentos del Análisis Económico and Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, University of Alicante, Ap. Correus 99, 03071, Alicante, Spain

    Prof. Luis Corchón

Authors
  1. Prof. Luis Corchón
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 1996 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Corchón, L. (1996). Two Stage Games. In: Theories of Imperfectly Competitive Markets. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 442. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-22531-8_6

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-22531-8_6

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-61553-8

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-662-22531-8

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation