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Active Linking Attacks

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Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science 2015 (MFCS 2015)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNTCS,volume 9235))

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Abstract

We study linking attacks on communication protocols. We observe that an active attacker is strictly more powerful in this setting than previously-considered passive attackers. We introduce a formal model to reason about active linking attacks, formally define security against these attacks and give conditions for both security and insecurity of protocols. In addition, we introduce a composition-like technique that allows to obtain security proofs by only studying small components of a protocol.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    The purpose of the value t is only to give the adversary complete information about his actions in the protocol run so far in the function \( view \left( .\right) \) (see below).

  2. 2.

    Whether wait is available does not follow from \( view \left( s,\sigma \right) \). We can extend \( view \left( s,\sigma \right) \) with a flag for the availability of wait, for simplification we omit this.

  3. 3.

    One can without loss of generality assume that there is no variable x and an edge \(x\rightarrow g\) for the output node g of a flat protocol.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Institut Für Informatik, Christian-Albrechts-Universität Kiel Olshausenstraße 40, 24098, Kiel, Germany

    Henning Schnoor & Oliver Woizekowski

Authors
  1. Henning Schnoor
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  2. Oliver Woizekowski
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Correspondence to Henning Schnoor .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of Rome "Tor Vergata", Rome, Italy

    Giuseppe F. Italiano

  2. Università degli Studi di Milano, Milan, Italy

    Giovanni Pighizzini

  3. University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, United Kingdom

    Donald T. Sannella

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Schnoor, H., Woizekowski, O. (2015). Active Linking Attacks. In: Italiano, G., Pighizzini, G., Sannella, D. (eds) Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science 2015. MFCS 2015. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 9235. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48054-0_46

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48054-0_46

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-662-48053-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-662-48054-0

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