Abstract
So far, the present study has argued that most of the criticism that is levelled at the Commission’s use of commitment decisions is not justified. In the view defended here, the recourse to the Article 9 instead of the Article 7 procedure entails only a modest relaxation of the link between harm and remedy and of the procedural safeguards; it entails also only a modest negative impact on legal certainty. It is submitted that these modest shortcomings are, from an abstract point of view, acceptable in view of the consensual nature of commitments and of their underlying goal of procedural economy. This conclusion applies without prejudice to the necessity to balance the respective costs and benefits of Article 7 and Article 9 in each individual case according to the circumstances of the case at hand.
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Notes
- 1.
For instance the following proposals will not further be discussed here:
McGeown/Orologas (2013), 4, suggest that “the most that can […] be asked of the Commission is that it communicates more extensively on Article 9 cases. […] there is surely room for senior officials or members of the case team to flesh out the Commission’s thinking in presentations or articles in the house magazine, Competition Policy Newsletter (especially once the two-month time limit for appeals to the General Court has elapsed)”.
Brenner (2010), 1336, suggests that there should be clearly defined criteria subject to unrestricted judicial control when the Commission is allowed to discontinue commitment negotiations.
Von Kalben (2018), 435f is of the view that the establishment of a European “Monopolies Commission” along the lines of the model of the German “Monopolies Commission” would be a reasonable complement to stricter procedural and judicial control of commitment decisions.
- 2.
- 3.
Merger Remedies Study (2005), 6f.
- 4.
See Sect. 3.4.1.2.2.1.2 with footnotes 912ff above.
- 5.
- 6.
- 7.
See Sect. 5.1.1.3 with footnotes 32ff above.
- 8.
See Sect. 4.1.1.2.2.2.2.1 with footnotes 39ff above.
- 9.
See Sect. 4.1.1.2.2.2.1 with footnote 25 above.
- 10.
- 11.
See Sect. 4.1.1.2.2.4 with footnotes 73ff above.
- 12.
Botteman/Patsa (2013), 370f.
- 13.
See Sect. 4.1.2.2 with footnote 99 above.
- 14.
Klees (2011), 20: “Denkbar wäre etwa, die Kommission in Art. 9 Abs. 1 VO Nr. 1/2003 ausdrücklich zur Prüfung der Geeignetheit und Erforderlichkeit abgegebener Zusagen zu verpflichten, unabhängig davon, ob alternative Zusagen der Unternehmen vorliegen oder nicht”; Cengiz (2011), 152: “[…] the Commission could accompany its commitment decisions with a proportionality analysis which would specify its concerns, the factual and economic context leading to those concerns and the proportionality of the commitments secured to those concerns”. Wagner-von Papp (2012), 968: “It would already help if, in its commitment decisions, the Commission set out in abstract terms, but in detail, which legal theories of harms it is pursuing as a major premise, what legal precedent supports these theories of harm and how the remedies chosen relate to these theories of harm – why they are deemed adequate, necessary and proportionate”; Mariniello (2014), 1 and 7 has suggested publishing “the full detail of the objections addressed by the European Commission to defendants”. He explains that “[t]he published commitment decision could resemble a non-confidential version of a Statement of Objections”. See also OECD (2016), 64.
- 15.
- 16.
See Sect. 5.1.1.4 above.
- 17.
See Manual of Procedures (2012), Module 16, 70.
- 18.
Eg CJ, C-280/08 P (Deutsche Telekom, 2010), 131; C-494/11 P (Otis, 2012), 94; Kerse/Khan (2012), 6-011.
- 19.
- 20.
See Sect. 2.2.2.2.2.2 with footnote 102 above.
- 21.
Wagner-von Papp (2012), 969.
- 22.
Schweitzer (2013), 507: “In competition law – fact intensive by nature and characterized by broad and open legal terms meant to enable the courts to translate economic theory into law – the lines between the evaluation of the facts, the interpretation of the law and an assessment whether the facts adduced suffice to substantiate a legal claim can easily blur. The frequently broad legal concepts gain their full meaning in interaction with economic theory and in their case-by-case application to a given set of situation-specific facts. The factual basis for a competition law infringement can thus easily turn into a question of law […]”.
- 23.
See Sect. 4.2.2.1.2.1.3.1 with footnotes 294ff above.
- 24.
- 25.
15 U.S.C.A. § 16.
- 26.
15 U.S.C.A. § 16(e).
- 27.
See Sam Fox Publishing v. US, 366 U.S. 683 (1961), 689: “Apart from anything else, sound policy would strongly lead us to decline appellants’ invitation to assess the wisdom of the Government’s judgment in negotiating and accepting the 1960 consent decree, at least in the absence of any claim of bad faith or malfeasance on the part of the Government in so acting”. See also Furse (2004), 6; Georgiev (2007), 1008 and D. Shapiro (2013), 14.
- 28.
- 29.
- 30.
US v. Microsoft, 56 F.3d 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
- 31.
See US v. Microsoft, 56 F.3d 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1995) at 1462; Massachusetts School of Law v. US, 118 F.3d 776 (D.C. Cir. 1997), at 783; US v. Pearson, 55 F. Supp. 2d 43 (D.D.C. 1999), at 45.
- 32.
- 33.
- 34.
US v. SBC Communications, 489 F. Supp. 2d 1, 9 (D.D.C. 2007), at 15f; Frankel (2008), 574.
- 35.
- 36.
Gerard (2013), 35. Bourgeois (1993), 99, raised similar concerns against the idea to subject informal undertakings under Regulation 17/62 to prior approval by the General Court: “In view of the U.S. practice, one could of course be tempted to suggest a procedure whereby such a decision is registered by the Court of First Instance of the E.C., which would then be required to ascertain whether the decision and the underlying undertaking are in the public interest. However, in the United States, the division of responsibilities between the Department of Justice and the judiciary is different. […] Protection of the public interest is thus in the E.C. essentially a matter of political accountability of the Commission and should probably remain so.” Sceptically also Kipiani (2014), 631: “Le contrôle juridictionnel effectué sur les consent decrees américains sur la base de l’intérêt public […] comme standard de référence, fait face à de nombreuses critiques. Ce critère de l’intérêt public n’est finalement pas entièrement satisfaisant”; careful also von Kalben (2018), 446.
- 37.
Lübking/von Koppenfels (2012), 81, express the opinion that the DoJ and the FTC enjoy larger “prosecutorial discretion” when negotiating consent decrees and orders than the EU Commission when it adopts a commitment decision. By contrast, Marsden (2013), 11, seems to be of the opinion that judicial control is more rigid in the US than in the EU.
- 38.
- 39.
- 40.
US v. SBC Communications, 489 F. Supp. 2d 1, 9 (D.D.C. 2007), at 14; Frankel (2008), 573.
- 41.
See Lübking/von Koppenfels (2012), 81.
- 42.
- 43.
See Gerard (2013), 27.
- 44.
Hennig (2010a), 384: “[…] weniger dem Anliegen geschuldet, eine weitere Rechtmäßigkeitskontrolle vor Erlass eines consent decrees durchzuführen als vielmehr der mangelnden Befugnis der Antitrust Division, selbst Anordnungen treffen zu können. Denn wäre ersteres der Fall, hätte man ein entsprechenden Verfahren wohl auch im Rahmen des consent order-Verfahrens der FTC implementiert”.
- 45.
See Jones/Sufrin (2014), 20.
- 46.
- 47.
See Jacob Siegel v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608, at 611ff: “The Commission has wide discretion in its choice of a remedy deemed adequate to cope with the unlawful practices in this area of trade and commerce. Here, as in the case of orders of other administrative agencies under comparable statutes, judicial review is limited. It extends no further than to ascertain whether the Commission made an allowable judgment in its choice of the remedy. […] The Commission is the expert body to determine what remedy is necessary to eliminate the unfair or deceptive trade practices which have been disclosed. It has wide latitude for judgment, and the courts will not interfere except where the remedy selected has no reasonable relation to the unlawful practices found to exist”; Areeda/Hovenkamp (2014), 302e; see also Frankel (2008), 602ff, for a detailed description of the standard of review of consent orders issued by the FTC.
- 48.
- 49.
- 50.
See Sturhahn (2009), Art. 83, 17: “Die Aufgaben der Kommission sind ebenso wie jene des Gerichtshofes bereits im Vertrag selbst weitgehend festgelegt. Durchführungsvorschriften nach Art. 83 Abs. 2 können an diesen primärrechtlichen Vorgaben nichts ändern. Spielraum für Abgrenzungen gem. Buchst. d) besteht daher nur, soweit der Vertrag ihn ausdrücklich eröffnet oder die Zuständigkeitszuweisungen des Primärrechts lückenhaft in dem Sinne sind, dass sie keine abschließenden Anordnungen treffen”; similarly Ehlermann (1997), 36; Rapp/Jung (2008), 2-16-028; Bechtold/Bosch/Brinker (2014), Art. 103, 15; Jung (2011), Art. 103, 34; Ludwigs (2014), Art. 103, 32; Stadler (2014), Art. 103, 33; Schröter (2014), Art. 103, 52.
- 51.
- 52.
Jung (2011), Art. 103, 34: “Durchführungsvorschriften nach Art. 103 können diese Aufgabenverteilung nur gestalten, sofern die Verträge organisationsrechtliche Lücken lassen. Dies ist lediglich im Bereich von Sanktionsentscheidungen der Fall. […] Im Ergebnis verweist daher Art. 103 Abs. 2 lit. d) nur auf Art. 261”; Stadler (2014), Art. 103, 33: “Bei Vorschriften nach Art. 103 Abs. 2 Buchst. d) kann es sich […] nur noch um die Aufgabenverteilung zwischen beiden Organen bei der Überprüfung von Sanktionsentscheidungen der Kommission durch den Gerichtshof handeln. […] Art. 103 Abs. 2 Buchst. d) verweist also im Grunde nur auf Art. 261”; similarly Schröter (2014), Art. 103, 52.
- 53.
Sturhahn (2009), Art. 83, 18: “Untersagungsentscheidungen im Bereich der Fusionskontrolle dürften zwar keine Zwangsmaßnahmen i. S. d. Art. [261 AEUV] darstellen. Soweit rechtspolitisch teilweise gefordert wird, die Untersagungsbefugnis nach US-amerikanischem Vorbild von der Kommission auf den Gerichtshof zu verlagern, um eine Trennung zwischen den für Ermittlung und den für die Festsetzung der Rechtsfolgen Zuständigen zu schaffen, ergibt sich aus dem Primärrecht jedoch auch kein Hindernis für eine solche Regelung. Das Rechtsstaatsprinzip gebietet eine derartige Aufgabenverteilung zwar nicht, steht ihr aber auch nicht entgegen”.
- 54.
- 55.
See Bueren (2011), 996 with fn 5302, who mentions that an EU Court involved closely with settlement procedures would have the same incentives to save resources as the Commission.
- 56.
Georgiev (2007), 1022f.
- 57.
See Schweitzer (2014), 345: “In Europa bleibt die öffentliche Durchsetzung […] auch mit der Richtlinie für wettbewerbsrechtliche Schadensersatzklagen dominant. Der Fokus der Richtlinie liegt auf Follow-on-Schadensersatzklagen bei Hardcore-Verstößen gegen Art. 101 AEUV, nicht auf einer autonomen privaten Durchsetzung des Wettbewerbsrechts insgesamt, und auf dem Schutz der öffentlichen Durchsetzung vor negativen Rückwirkungen privater Schadensersatzklagen. Die Richtlinie sichert im Ergebnis die Vorherrschaft der öffentlichen Durchsetzung in Europa ab”.
- 58.
See more generally for the instrumental attribution of individual rights in order to enforce public law the references in Sect. 5.1.4.4.1.3.4 with footnote 189 above.
- 59.
See Sect. 4.1.3.3 with footnotes 138ff above.
- 60.
Wagner-von Papp (2012), 966.
- 61.
Hjelmeng (2013), 1036.
- 62.
See Sect. 3.3 with footnote 137 and Sect. 3.3.1.3.2.1 with footnote 165 above.
- 63.
See Sect. 3.3 with footnote 139 above.
- 64.
See Sect. 1.1.3 with footnote 31 above.
- 65.
See also the criticism of Georgiev (2007), 1024f, according to whom the “statutory limitation” that Article 9 decisions can be used only in cases where fines are not appropriate imposes a “distortionary effect on antitrust enforcement in the European Union”.
- 66.
Botteman/Patsa (2013), 374.
- 67.
Botteman/Patsa (2013), 368.
- 68.
Notice on the conduct of settlement procedures (2008), 1.
- 69.
- 70.
Kroes (2007), 4.
- 71.
Metha/Centella (2010), 400f.
- 72.
- 73.
- 74.
- 75.
- 76.
- 77.
- 78.
See Sect. 2.1.3 with footnote 8 above.
- 79.
See Metha/Centella (2010), 398f: “Possible commitments to terminate cartel behaviour normally consist of simple abstention from contracts, exchanges of information and concerted or agreed action. As a rule, cartels are interrupted from the moment that parties become aware of the Commission investigation. Moreover, since cartels are multilateral infringements by nature, they are unlikely to terminate through individual unilateral commitments to act or abstain from acting (that would require all members to unilaterally decide to defect from the cartel”; Colombani/Kloub/Sakkers (2014), 8.715: “Article 9 […] provides for decisions with commitments, intended to conclude an investigation by an acceptable engagement by parties to alter their commercial practices and bring them in line with the competition rules. […] In the case of cartels, however, the only possible remedy is an immediate halt to the illegal behaviour”.
- 80.
See Metha/Centella (2010), 407f; Laina/Laurinen (2013), 303; Colombani/Kloub/Sakkers (2014), 8.714 and 8.717; sceptically Bueren (2011), 584f, who emphasises that in the absence of institutional checks it is likely that the Commission will in reality investigate cases which are going to be settled to a lesser extent.
- 81.
- 82.
See Colombani/Kloub/Sakkers (2014), 8.714 together with 8.722.
- 83.
See Metha/Centella (2010), 397.
- 84.
- 85.
- 86.
See Sect. 6.2.3.1.1 with footnote 72 above.
- 87.
See in particular Waelbroeck (2009), 241ff.
- 88.
See the Notice on the conduct of settlement procedures (2008), 41.
- 89.
Eg Wils (2008), 340; Soltész/Von Köckritz (2011), 263f; Whish/Bailey (2012), 264; Brenner (2012), 311; Laina/Laurinen (2013), 311. See also Laina/Bogdanov (2014), 717 and 722, who report that out of 14 settlement decisions adopted until July 2014, only one has been appealed to the General Court: see GC, T-98/14 (Société Générale, pending).
- 90.
- 91.
For the details of the access to the file and hearings in settlement procedures see eg Kellerbauer/Ortiz Blanco/Jörgens/Centella (2013), 10.138ff.
- 92.
Article 10a(2)(b) Regulation 773/2004; Notice on the conduct of settlement procedures (2008), 16; see also Laina/Bogdanov (2014), 720.
- 93.
Article 6(1) Regulation 773/2004 provides that, in cases where the settlement procedure applies, complainants do not receive a non confidential version of the statement of objections, but are merely informed in writing of the nature and subject matter of the procedure; see Bueren (2011), 629.
- 94.
- 95.
- 96.
Bueren (2011), 989: “Verständigungen im Bußgeldverfahren würden die nötige Fortbildung des materiellen Rechts noch stärker behindern, als es durch Verpflichtungszusagen bereits geschieht”.
- 97.
CJ, C-6/73 (Commercial Solvents, 1974), 45; see eg COMP/40.208 (ISU, 2017), 338ff; COMP/39.740 (Google Search, 2017), 694 and 702; COMP/39.813 (Baltic Rail, 2017), 392 and 394ff; see also Sects. 3.3.1.4.1.1.2.2.4 and 3.3.1.4.2 above.
- 98.
Lugard/Möllmann (2013), 11.
- 99.
OJ 1985 L 85/1 (Woodpulp, 1984), 149; OJ 1988 L 65/19 (Hilti, 1987), 103; OJ 1988 L 284/41 (Napier Brown, 1988), 85f; OJ 1992 L 366/47 (Distribution of railway tickets by travel agents, 1992), 112; COMP/37.685 (GVG, 2003), 164; see also OJ 1993 L 20/1 (Ford Agricultural, 1992), 23; Temple Lang (1993), 368f; van Bael (1995), 241; Rachwol (2010), 26; Hennig (2010a), 340.
- 100.
COMP/39.759 (ARA, 2017); for a discussion Wollmann (2017), 167.
- 101.
Guidelines on the method of setting fines (2006), 29.
- 102.
Sauer (2013), 11.63, rightly explains that “[w]here the undertaking terminated its participation prior to the intervention by the Commission, this is sufficiently taken into account through the (lower) factor for duration”.
- 103.
Sauer (2013), 11.63(i) with references.
- 104.
Sauer (2013), 11.63(iv) with references.
- 105.
COMP/39.759 (ARA, 2017), 161f. For a more detailed presentation of the decision see also Sect. 3.4.1.2.1.2.1 above.
- 106.
- 107.
COMP/39.740 (Google Search, 2017), 123ff.
- 108.
See Best Practices (2011), 121: “Once the Commission is convinced of the undertakings’ genuine willingness to propose commitments which will effectively address the competition concerns, a Preliminary Assessment will be issued”; Manual of Procedures (2012), Module 16, 23: “Once the case team is convinced that the commitments informally proposed by the undertaking may address the competition concerns and that the undertaking is seriously interested in submitting adequate formal commitments, it should propose to draft a Preliminary Assessment”.
- 109.
Best Practices (2011), 129; Manual of Procedure (2012), Module 16, 55.
- 110.
Manual of Procedure (2012), Module 16, 22.
- 111.
Best Practices (2011), 126; Manual of Procedure (2012), Module 16, 39.
- 112.
Manual of Procedure (2012), Module 16, 53: “Once the case team considers the commitments offered are adequate to address the competition concerns, it should draft a note to the Competition Commissioner to ask for his/her approval to market test the commitments […]. The note should also draw attention to any areas where doubts remain as to the appropriateness of the commitments that the market test is envisaged to clarify”.
- 113.
Best Practices (2011), 133; Manual of Procedure (2012), Module 16, 67.
- 114.
See Best Practices (2011), 133.
- 115.
See Sect. 5.1.1.1 with footnote 12 above.
- 116.
- 117.
Manual of Procedures (2012), Module 16, 26, 29 and 31.
- 118.
Manual of Procedures (2012), Module 16, 53.
- 119.
Manual of Procedures (2012), Module 16, 21 and 73; Hennig (2010a), 221.
- 120.
Manual of Procedures (2012), Module 16, 21.
- 121.
- 122.
See Muguet-Poullennec/Barbier de la Serre (2010), 40: “Dès lors que la Commission dispose d’une grande marge d’appréciation pour constater des infractions et imposer des amendes, l’alternative à la proposition d’engagements, c’est à dire l’imposition d’une amende, est-elle toujours abandonnée de façon volontaire? Est-il pleinement réaliste de considerer que l’entreprise poursuivie s’engage toujours volontairement si ne pas s’engager résulte en une décision aux effets particulièrement délétères et sur laquelle le Tribunal n’exercera qu’un contrôle restreint? La seule manière de garantir pleinement la liberté qu’ont les entreprises à proposer des engagements consiste donc, pour les juridictions de l’Union, à assurer un contrôle approfondi des décisions constatant une infraction et imposant une sanction”. Similarly Gerard (2013), 11ff, 28 and 35f; Waelbroeck/Frisch (2013), 683; Jenny (2015), 766f. See also, albeit in a slightly different context, Dunne (2014), 425: “the significant margin of discretion granted to the Commission in respect of its economic assessments suggests that even weak cases pursued under [Article 7] might survive judicial review”; Wollmann (2017), 168f, who points out that in COMP/39.759 (ARA, 2017), ARA cooperated with the Commission and proposed a structural remedy only due to its fear of the marginal review exercised by the General Court.
- 123.
Gerard (2013), 35; similarly Waelbroeck/Frisch (2013), 683; more carefully Muguet-Poullennec/Barbier de la Serre (2010), 44: “[…] la rigueur du contrôle exercé par les juridictions de l’Union sur les décisions de la Commission constatant une infraction et imposant une sanction apparaît comme une condition essentielle du libre consentement exprimé dans la procédure d’engagements”.
- 124.
- 125.
- 126.
See for a further discussion the references in Sect. 4.2.2.1, footnote 233 above.
- 127.
See Sect. 4.2.2.1.2.1.3.2 with footnote 318 above. The intensity of the judicial control required as regards the imposition of a fine is well illustrated by CJ, C-99/17 P (Infineon, 2019), 191ff.
- 128.
Podszun (2012), 64: “Dass ein Drohpotential überhaupt besteht, liegt zum Teil weniger an den zu fürchtenden kartellrechtlichen Sanktionen, als vielmehr an den langwierigen und aufwendigen Verfahren, die ein Unternehmen betreiben müsste, um letztlich doch Recht zu bekommen. Eine Verkürzung und Entbürokratisierung von Gerichtsverfahren würde die Nötigungssituation entschärfen”.
- 129.
Articles 278f TFEU and 104ff Rules of Procedure of the General Court.
- 130.
Article 76a Rules of Procedure of the General Court.
- 131.
Article 55(2) Rules of Procedure of the General Court.
- 132.
Practice directions to parties before the General Court, 15.
- 133.
According to the Annual Report of the Court of Justice (2013), 182, from 2009 until 2013, the average duration of competition procedures was between 46.2 and 50.5 months.
- 134.
Eg CJ, C-385/07 P (Duales System Deutschland, 2009), 188; C-58/12 (Gascogne, 2013), 96.
- 135.
- 136.
Pursuant to Article 19(2) TEU, the General Court shall include at least one judge per Member State. Article 254(1) TFEU provides that the number of judges of the General Court shall be determined by the Statute of the Court of Justice.
- 137.
Van der Woude (2012), 124f, has suggested in particular to introduce a registration fee for appeals in trademark cases; to transform the procedure before the Ombudsman into a precondition for any appeal in access to documents cases; and that EU institutions should abstain from conferring jurisdiction in contractual matters to the General Court by virtue of Article 272 TFEU.
- 138.
House of Lords (2007).
- 139.
Court of Justice (2011).
- 140.
- 141.
For a brief overview of the reform see Hoffmann (2016).
- 142.
For a criticism of the reform see Dehousse/Marsicola (2016).
- 143.
According to the Annual Report of the Court of Justice (2018), 255, the average length of competition appeals went from 45,8 in 2014 to 21,6 in 2017 but reincreased to 38,3 in 2018.
- 144.
See Ortiz Blanco/Jörgens (2013), 1.110.
- 145.
See Brinker (2014), 82, who attributes the “bonmot” that “the essence of a lawyer is brevity and pertinence” to Bellamy, former judge at the General Court and later President of the UK CAT.
- 146.
Sharpston (2013), 454.
- 147.
- 148.
- 149.
See eg IP/04/1314 (Hollywood Studios, 2004); IP/05/195 (OMV, 2005); IP/05/710 (E.On, 2005); IP/05/519 (Fifa, 2005); IP/06/139 (Philips CD-R-Licenses, 2006); IP/06/302 (BMW, 2006); IP/06/303 (GM, 2006); IP/07/122 (DeBeers, 2007); IP/08/22 (iTunes, 2008); MEMO/09/549 (IPCom, 2009); IP/09/515 (Mastercard, 2009); IP/10/1175 (iPhone, 2010); IP/11/842 (Boehringer Ingelheim, 2011); Hennig (2010a), 355ff; Bueren (2011), 477ff; Ortiz Blanco/Jörgens/Kellerbauer (2013), 13.03 fn 9.
- 150.
But see Kipiani (2014), 50, who states that the use of the informal closure of the procedure should remain limited to exceptional cases (“La référence aux engagements informels post procédure d’engagements, si elle peut s’avérer utile dans certaines circonstances, doit rester marginale”).
- 151.
- 152.
Klees (2010), 693: “Bevor man sich aber im Interesse der Verfahrensökonomie und einer effektiven Kartellrechtsdurchsetzung von tragenden Grundsätzen des Kartellrechts verabschiedet oder sie bis zur Unkenntlichkeit verstümmelt, ist zu berücksichtigen, dass die Kommission mit der formlosen Einstellung eines Verfahrens nach der Abgabe geeigneter (aber möglicherweise zu weit gehender) Zusagen eine weitere Option zur schnellen Lösung von Wettbewerbsproblemen an der Hand hat […]. Die formlose Einstellung mag zwar mit gewissen Nachteilen verbunden sein […]; sie hat aber gerade den Vorteil, dass die Kommission hier mangels belastender Entscheidung weitergehende Freiheiten genießt”. Bueren (2011), 477, points out that an Article 9 decision is more burdensome for the concerned undertaking than an informal closure of the procedure.
- 153.
Wagner-von Papp (2012), 954.
- 154.
Temple Lang (2006), 295, suggests that a fine imposed subsequent to the violation of an informal commitment would be higher than it would otherwise have been.
- 155.
Lugard/Möllmann (2013): “[…] if the concern of the Commission […] is to put an end as swiftly as possible to the infringement, one may legitimately ask why it has so far never made use of interim measures under Article 8 of Regulation 1/2003. Indeed, it has been argued that interim measures may very well address the necessity of a prompt reaction to safeguard competition on markets” (7); “In addition to taking interim measures seriously, revamping Article 9 proceedings could very well be compensated by […]” (11).
- 156.
For an overview of the Commission’s practice prior to the entry into force of Regulation 1/03 see eg Sauer/Ortiz Blanco/Jörgens (2013), 14.01.
- 157.
- 158.
- 159.
I follow the description of the procedure in Sauer/Ortiz Blanco/Jörgens (2013), 14.12f.
- 160.
See Commission’s staff working document accompanying the report on the functioning of Regulation 1/03, COM(2009)206 final, 111; De Smijter/Sinclair (2014), 2.117.
- 161.
Commission Notice on the handling of complaints, 80.
- 162.
Commission Notice on the handling of complaints, 16 with fn 18.
- 163.
See Lowe/Maier-Rigaud (2008), 610: “[…] there is scope for an increase in the use of interim measures in antitrust procedures in appropriate cases”.
- 164.
De Bronnet (2012b), Art. 9, 7, is of the opinion that the Commission’s obligation to investigate reaches less far under Article 9 than under Article 8 inasmuch as the former provision does not require the Commission to take a definite stance as regards the legal qualification of the practice. For a discussion of the question see also Hennig (2010a), 135ff, who is however of the opinion that the Commission’s obligation to investigate under Article 8 Regulation 1/03 can serve only as a minimum benchmark for the Commission’s obligation to investigate under Article 9; Lowe/Maier-Rigaud (Sect. 3.1.3.1.2, footnote 58 above).
- 165.
- 166.
- 167.
But see Temple Lang (2006), 294, who points out that “interim measures in practice often need to be discussed and negotiated”.
- 168.
- 169.
See GC, T-23/90 (Peugeot, 1991), 21, where the General Court held that in order to examine the legality of an interim measure, it had to assess whether the Commission was entitled to make a prima facie finding of an infringement. If an application for a suspension of an interim measure is made pursuant to Article 278 TFEU, the President of the General Court examines only whether the concerned undertaking can demonstrate a prima facie illegality of the Commission’s interim measures decision. See Sauer/Ortiz Blanco/Jörgens (2013), 14.20.
- 170.
- 171.
Andreangeli (2008), 240ff, suggested that the investigative and prosecutorial powers should be transferred to an independent unit along the model of OLAF; the decision making powers would remain with the College of the Commission.
- 172.
Wernicke (2009), cited in Temple Lang (2011), 215 fn 25; Killick/Dawes (2010), 212, suggest that the independence of the Hearing Officers should be strengthened by detaching them from the Commissioner responsible for competition and granting them a status similar to that of the Legal Service. Moreover, they propose that Hearing Officers should be “the primary decision maker in relation to all procedural issues such as confidentiality or legal professional privilege claims”. See also Jones/Sufrin (2011), 1081.
- 173.
Forrester (2009), 840ff; Riley (2010), 201; Nazzini (2012), 1001f: They all suggest in essence that the drafting of the final decision should be conferred on a panel that is separate from the unit charged with the investigation and prosecution of the case; the College of the Commission would retain the power to endorse or reject the draft by reasoned decision that would be subject to judicial review.
- 174.
The discussions about the creation of a European Competition Agency date back at least to the 1960s. The 1965 Treaty merging the institutions of the then three European Communities provided that that the location of a potential future European Competition Agency was to be in Luxemburg. The discussions peaked in the mid-1990s, when in particular Germany was pressing for the establishment of a European Competition Agency in order to shield the enforcement of EU competition law from unwanted political influence. For summaries of the debate see eg Rodger (2000), 308; Andreangeli (2008), 239f; Monti (2007), 400f and 419; Temple Lang (2011), 220; von Kalben (2018), 430ff, all with further references.
- 175.
See Temple Lang (2011), 219.
- 176.
See Ehricke (2008); Hennig (2010a), 385. Already with a view to the Commission’s commitment practice under Regulation 17/62 Bourgeois (1993), 101, stated that there was “something to be said for entrusting the negotiations of an undertaking to an official other than the official investigating the case”. At the same time, he rightly opposed the suggestion made by Van Bael (1986), 84f, to entrust separate entities with the negotiation of a commitment and the adoption of an infringement decision in case the commitment negotiations failed as “needlessly cumbersome”. Both Van Bael and Bourgeois argued also in favour of the strengthening of the – then more limited – mandate of the Hearing Officer to oversee the adoption of informal commitments.
- 177.
Lowe (2008), 1.
- 178.
Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and merger control.
- 179.
Article 106 TFEU and state aid.
- 180.
- 181.
- 182.
Kellerbauer (2013), 14: “Die Schaffung eines “administrative law judge” nach US-amerikanischem Vorbild, der die Gesamtheit der rechtlichen und tatsächlichen Grundlagen einer Verwaltungsentscheidung in unabhängiger Stellung prüft, würde einen Fremdkörper in das EU-Wettbewerbsverfahren einführen, der letztlich die Grenzen zu den Unionsgerichten verwischen und die abschließende Entscheidungsfindung erheblich verzögern könnte”.
- 183.
- 184.
See also Commission, Ten Years of Antitrust Enforcement under Regulation 1/2003, SWD(2014) 231/2, 10f: The majority of the Member States have in the mean time opted for an administrative enforcement model, where a single administrative authority investigates a case and takes enforcement decisions subject to judicial control. About half of the Member States that follow the administrative model separate the decision-making from the investigation. Only few Member States operate a judicial model, where an administrative authority carries out the investigation and then brings the case before a court for a decision on substance.
- 185.
See Commission, Ten Years of Antitrust Enforcement under Regulation 1/2003, SWD(2014) 231/2, 12-40; Italianer (2014).
- 186.
- 187.
As was explained above (see Sect. 3.5.3.2.2.1.1 with footnotes 1334ff), the Meroni-doctrine has evolved over time. It does not preclude the delegation of decision-making powers as long as these are sufficiently circumscribed. The Treaty of Lisbon acknowledges in Article 263 TFEU that decision-making powers may be conferred on bodies, agencies and offices of the Union.
- 188.
See Sect. 6.1.4.2.2.2 with footnote 55 above.
- 189.
- 190.
- 191.
See Directive on antitrust damages actions, N° 2014/104/EU.
- 192.
- 193.
Schweitzer (2014), 336.
- 194.
See Sect. 5.1.4.5.2 with footnote 216 above.
- 195.
- 196.
Rodger (2014), 125.
- 197.
Peyer (2012), 357, mentions that less than 10% of litigated German private enforcement cases relate to cartels.
- 198.
Schweitzer (2012), 19.
- 199.
See the references in Sect. 5.1.5.2, footnote 255 above.
- 200.
- 201.
See also Recital 48ff of the Directive on antitrust damages actions, N° 2014/104/EU.
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Reiter, K. (2020). Outlook: Discussion of Reform Proposals. In: Market Design Powers of the European Commission?. Munich Studies on Innovation and Competition, vol 13. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-60711-4_6
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