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Theoretische Grundlagen und Literaturüberblick

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Absatzkanalkoordination durch Hersteller-Handels-Konditionen

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Die Koordination eines Absatzkanals ist trotz intensiver Bemühungen der Marketing-Praxis und einer ganzen Reihe von Handlungsempfehlungen der Wissenschaft immer noch eine problembehaftete Aufgabe. Offenbar kennen Praktiker die brachliegenden Wertschöpfungspotenziale einer vertikalen Verhaltensabstimmung,1 vermögen diese aber nicht zu realisieren2 und suchen daher nach wie vor nach geeigneten Instrumenten zur Koordination eines Absatzkanals.3

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(2009). Theoretische Grundlagen und Literaturüberblick. In: Absatzkanalkoordination durch Hersteller-Handels-Konditionen. Gabler. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-8349-9412-7_3

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