Abstract
So far, we discussed why Member States might breach agreements they entered into and a performed a first simple analysis of state liability law in the framework of the classical law and economics literature. However, we remain with the question whether there now is a need for action upon such breaches. In other words: once an agreement (in this case, the agreement is a legal provision) exist, the elementary question will arise what one should do in case of a conflict. Should one stubbornly stick to the agreement or should one allow for breaches? This short chapter is a brief economic analysis of the preferability of breaches of European law. Due to the special nature of the agreement, we thus discuss a situation with characteristics of both contract law and law enforcement.
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© 2007 Deutscher Universitäts-Verlag | GWV Fachverlage GmbH, Wiesbaden
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(2007). Are Breaches really that Bad? A Rationale not to allow Breaches. In: State Liability for Breaches of European Law. DUV. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-8350-9494-9_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-8350-9494-9_6
Publisher Name: DUV
Print ISBN: 978-3-8350-0653-9
Online ISBN: 978-3-8350-9494-9
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