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Evolution of Compassion Under Un-Repeated Interaction

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Advancing Social Simulation: The First World Congress

Abstract

Altruistic behaviors from the haves to the have-nots are often observed in human societies and ecosystems (e.g. assistance among dolphins, and food sharing among vampire bats and among human beings). In this paper, we investigate how the altruistic behaviors, which we call “compassion”, evolve in the situation where pairs of individuals do not repeatedly interact. The results of the computer simulation show the following two results: (1) There exist three types of evolutionary dynamics: (i) the dominance of unconditional non-helpers who never help others; (ii) the coexistence of compassionate individuals who help others who are worse off than themselves and unconditional helpers who always help others; and (iii) the cyclical dominance of unconditional helpers and unconditional non-helpers. (2) Under some parameter settings, cooperative societies where about 60~70% of actions are altruistic are stably realized.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Graduate School of Systems & Information Engineering, University of Tsukuba, Japan

    Shinsuke Suzuki & Eizo Akiyama

Authors
  1. Shinsuke Suzuki
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  2. Eizo Akiyama
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Waseda University, 3-4-1 Okubo, Shinjuku, Tokyo, 169-8555, Japan

    Shingo Takahashi (Professor) (Professor)

  2. Center for Complex Adaptive Agent Systems Simulation, Argonne National Laboratory, 9700 South Cass Avenue, Bldg. 900, Argonne, IL, 60439-4832, USA

    David Sallach (Associate Director) (Associate Director)

  3. GREQAM, 2 rue de la charite, 13236, Marseille cedex 02, France

    Juliette Rouchier

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© 2007 Springer

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Suzuki, S., Akiyama, E. (2007). Evolution of Compassion Under Un-Repeated Interaction. In: Takahashi, S., Sallach, D., Rouchier, J. (eds) Advancing Social Simulation: The First World Congress. Springer, Tokyo. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-4-431-73167-2_25

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-4-431-73167-2_25

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Tokyo

  • Print ISBN: 978-4-431-73150-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-4-431-73167-2

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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