Abstract
It is sometimes instructive to start from the beginning. On the sixth day of creation, God created man, “in the image of God He created him; male and female He created them” (Gen. 1: 27). God’ choice is to create man in the generic sense (which reflects God’ own a-sexual nature). The split of male and female, that is the move from “him” to “them”, is only derivative, though necessary, since only by such a split can humans pro-create themselves, thereby reflecting God’s unlimited creative power [1]. But then there, is of course, the other version of the creation story. God first created Adam, “man” in a specifically male form, and only upon realizing that “it is not for man to be alone” he decided to make “a fitting helper for him” (Gen. 2: 18). If, as I read the biblical text, the image of God in which human beings are made amounts to the power of procreation, then the two versions of the creation of “man” suggest two alternatives for approaching the problem of sex selection.
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I have developed the interpretation of procreation as the very image of God in my, “Divine Creation and Human Procreation: Reflections on Genesis in the Light of Genesis,” in Nicholas Fotion and Jan C. Heller, eds., Contingent Future Persons: On the Ethics of Deciding Who Will Live, or Not, in the Future (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Press, 1997), pp. 57–70.
Section 14 in the Oviedo Convention of the Council of Europe prohibits sex selection for non-medical reasons. In the U.S. there is no regulation of the practice, but social sex selection is not “encouraged” (Recommendations of The Ethics Committee of the American Society of Reproductive Medicine in Fertility and Sterility 72 (1999): 599. In India, abortion for sex selection is a criminal offence. When this article went to the press, the British Human Fertilisation and Embryology Agency (HFEA) published its report “Sex Selection: Options for Regulation” in which the overwhelming majority of both individuals and institutions consulted expressed opposition to the practice of sex selection for non-medical reasons. See http://www.hfea.gov.uk/AboutHFEA/Consultations. The evidence for such a strong public objection to sex selection should be taken into account in the formation of regulatory policies, but it is not directly relevant to the critical normative discussion undertaken in this paper. See also John McMillan, “Sex Selection in the United Kingdom,” Hastings Center Report 32 (2002): 28–31. In Israel there has been so far only one case which was given a semi-legal attention (see below). There is not much discussion in Jewish rabbinical literature about the subject, but it is agreed that sex selection should not be practised just as a matter of personal preference. The main reason is that this goes against nature. But rabbis have no problem with sex selection by PGD when its purpose is of a medical nature. See Richard V. Grazi and Joel B. Wolowelsky, “Preimplantation Sex Selection and Genetic Screening in Contemporary Jewish Law and Ethics,” Journal of Assisted Reproduction 9 (1992): 318–322.
Babylonian Talmud, “Tractate Niddah,” p. 26a (London: Soncino Press, 1959).
This argument was suggested to me by Asa Kasher. It is interesting to note that the attitude of physicians to sex selection is deeply mixed, even confused. In an ESHRE PGD Consortium study, 15 centers expressed opposition to the practice and only 4 a favourable attitude (with 2 abstaining). See Human Reproduction 17 (2002): 244–245. Yet, it seems that there is a sufficient number of doctors who are willing to help parents choose the sex of their children in medically assisted pregnancies.
By the interests of the child I mean only those of an actual child, i.e. a child who was born and is killed if it belongs to an “unwanted” sex. One cannot ascribe to the child either the interest in being born a male or a female (or not being born male or female) since possible children do not have interests or rights. On this complex issue, often associated with “wrongful life” cases, see David Heyd, Genethics: Moral Issues in the Creation of People (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), Chapter 1.
For the Indian scene, see Kusum, “The Use of Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques for Sex Selection: The Indian Scene,” Bioethics 7 (1993): 149–165. Kusum argues that sex selection in India should not be permitted due to the particular current economic and cultural circumstances. But see a letter to the editor by Dr. Aniruddha Malpani, a famous doctor in a Bombay clinic, who openly defends the right of women to choose the gender of their child on liberal grounds. Human Reproduction 17 (2002): 517.
Marcia Guttentag and Paul F. Secord, Too Many Women? (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1983).
But then, as Alan Buchanan noticed, a problem of free rider is created: although all parents have an interest in leaving a world of balanced sex ratios to their children, they might have overriding personal interests in having a male child. If everybody had acted according to their personal interests, a Tragedy of the Commons would be created; if only few did so, they would be free riders. See, A. Buchanan et al. eds.,From Chance to Choice: Genetics and Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) pp. 184–186.
Thus, studies reveal that the number of parents who decide to have a third child after having two children of the same sex is significantly larger than the number of parents whose first two children are of different sexes. And even more important, there is no significant difference in the wish to have a third child between those who have two boys and those who have two girls.
The commandment to be fruitful and multiply was sometimes interpreted as being fulfilled by having at least one son and one daughter. Of course, there is value in having as many children as one can have beyond one boy and one girl, but then their sex becomes unimportant.
This is suggested in S. J. Fasouliotis and J. G. Schenker, “Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis: Principles and Ethics,” Human Reproduction 13 (1998): 2243.
Guttentag, Chapter 1. Guttentag, like others, has noticed the relative large number of men in Jewish Orthodox society. The general high regard for women in that society corroborates her hypothesis (including the values of monogamy and the domesticity of women). The causes of this unequal sex ratio in traditional Jewish communities is striking and has led to various attempts to explain it, mainly in terms of the rate and timing of sexual relations which are strictly regulated by rules of purity and the husband’ duty to sexually satisfy his wife. Since male babies have a smaller chance to survive childhood, the generally lower child mortality in Jewish society may also be a cause of this surplus of men. See Guttentag, Chapter 4.
Cf. B. M. Dickens, “Can Sex Selection Be Ethically Tolerated?,” Journal of Medical Ethics 28 (2002): 335–336; and Bonnie Steinbock, “Sex Selection: Not Obviously Wrong,” Hastings Center Report 32 (2002): 23–28. Steinbock correctly argues that the prohibition of sex selection will not reduce sexist attitudes in society, but adds that the existence of a discriminatory society might be a reason for parents not to bring a girl into the world. This argument is susceptible to the same criticism as are wrongful life claims, since it ascribes rights and interests to possible people.
Consider the analogical case of IVF treatment after a certain age. Society has definite interests in discouraging it, for both the financial cost involved and the risk of the birth of handicapped children who would be a burden on society. Most of us believe, however, that criminalizing these parental choices would violate liberal principles and the privacy of individuals.
For a strong defense of the liberal approach to sex selection, based on the distinction between the coerced and the un-coerced exercise of the mother’s choice in reproductive matters, see Mary Anne Warren, “Sex Selection: Individual Choice or Cultural Coercion?,” in Helge Kuhse and Peter Singer, eds., Bioethics (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999) pp. 137–142.
An Orthodox couple who needed sperm donation due to the infertility of the husband was concerned that due to the special religious status of Cohen (priest) of the husband, the whole community would become aware of the fact that he was not the “real” father once the child reached the age of 13 and the Bar Mitzvah ceremony. Only the biological sons of a Cohen become Cohanim with the distinct duty of making a special priestly blessing in the synagogue. A female child would spare the parents this embarrassment since girls are not called upon to make a blessing or read the Torah in this public ceremony. In 2002 the Israeli Ministry of Health granted permission to select the female pre-embryos but did so in a purely ad hoc manner. Nevertheless, it attracted some criticism and a fear of a slippery slope of other demands for sex selection for non-medical reasons.
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Heyd, D. (2009). Male or Female We Will Create Them: The Ethics of Sex Selection for Non-medical Reasons. In: Simonstein, F. (eds) Reprogen-ethics and the future of gender. International Library of Ethics, Law, and the New Medicine, vol 43. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-2475-6_13
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