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The Function of Weak Phantasy in Perception and Thinking

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Handbook of Phenomenology and Cognitive Science

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At first glance phantasy seems to be an unessential part of our conscious life, and if we limit ourselves to a purely empirical view of consciousness, it may be difficult to recognize the powerful and central performance of imagination. Thus phenomenology as a descriptive analysis of the essential traits of our conscious life has to analyze phantasy and its functions. I will delineate some of the ways of analysis and also make clear how we can relate phenomenological and transcendental reasoning to empirical research and cognitive science. My aim is to establish the transcendental function of phantasy in perception and in higher cognitive acts directed at states of affairs and the intentions of others by showing that humans apprehend these cognitive contents phantasmatically.

My first main thesis is that weak phantasmata perform a decisive function in human and animal perception. More precisely, I view these “helping phantasmata” as performing a “transcendental function” of perception. Without such a function of imagination, perception would not be possible. Thus in the first part, I argue for the factuality and necessity of phantasmata in perception, drawing on Kant’s remark concerning the existence of weak phantasmata in perception. Then we will see that there are phantasmata accompanying our perception in every field of sensuality. To understand the function of phantasma in perception, it will be necessary to discuss the essential traits of apperception with the help of a type (Typus).

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Notes

  1. 1.

     Most of the theses proposed here are also to be found in Lohmar (2008). I would like to express my gratitude to Saulius Geniusas for his kind help with the English text.

  2. 2.

     I have mentioned only the classical five senses, but there are more, for example, the sense of movement (or being moved), cf. Berthoz (2002). We might also regard our feelings as something produced by our imagination (in a very broad sense), because there is no simple causal explanation for our feelings. Nevertheless feelings are felt and experienced by us as something which is unwillingly given to us (like sensuality). Thus feelings may be also regarded as phantasmata.

  3. 3.

     The descriptions are to be found in Kant (1764) and Kant (1766). Already Aristoteles has a theory of phantasmata, as well as Th. Aquinus.

  4. 4.

     Husserl would prefer to speak of prominances (Abgehobenheiten).

  5. 5.

     Cf. Kant (1764), 265 and Kant (1766), 346, Anm.*

  6. 6.

     Cf. Kant (1764), 264 f. But this ability of the human mind is also the basis for sensual self-deception (“Selbstbetrug in den Sinnen”, ibid.). But Kant emphasizes that it is an activity of the mind that “commonly happens and even should happen in healthy humans” (my transl. of “die in gewöhnlicher Weise bei gesunden Menschen geschieht und auch geschehen soll”, Kant (1766), 340, cf. also 344).

  7. 7.

     We can realize that the type changes slowly by observe our slight astonishment when I see him the next time after he has shaved. He appears to us as something which should have a beard but has not. But the type slowly changes and in the end we expect him as beardless. This is only an example, you can use every singular object that changes his qualities or properties, like cars, pencils, the kitchen cooker etc. In observing carefully our attitude to the changing typical expectations we realize that the type changes only slowly in several equal experiences.

  8. 8.

     There are some further aspects of what we call “similarity” which can be analyzed phenomenologically, cf. Lohmar (2004), 123-137.

  9. 9.

     Cf. Pessoa et al. (1998), 723-802.

  10. 10.

     Cf. Bonnet (1760). Some of the most recent systematic studies are: Teunisse et al. (1994, 1996); Podoll et al. (1989); Schwarz and Vaghei (1998); Schulz and Melzack (1991). Cf. also the interpretation of CBS in Ramachandran and Blakeslee (2002).

  11. 11.

     Cf. Schulz and Melzack (1991), 813.

  12. 12.

     Cf. Hosty (1994), 29, Griffith (2000), 2065-2076 and Berios (1991), 356-360.

  13. 13.

     This example is used by Husserl in his Logical Investigations (Hua XIX, B 40).

  14. 14.

     The same argument holds for preferred food and sites.

  15. 15.

     For Husserl’s theory of meaning cf. I. and VI. Logical Investigation. For the theory of categorial intuition cf. Ch. 6. of the VI. Logical Investigation and Lohmar (2002), 125-145.

  16. 16.

     Cf. Hua XIX/1, 313.

  17. 17.

     Cf. Hua XVII, §46.

  18. 18.

     Cf. Corballis (1999), 138-145. This thesis was proposed already by Condillac and Gorden W. Hewes.

  19. 19.

     Cf. on the aspect of co-feeling and our way of understanding others, Lohmar (2006), 5-16.

  20. 20.

     Cf. The contributions of Wason (1975), 141-154; Evans (1982), Ch. 12; Evans (2003), 454-459. A good overview about the different dual-process theories offers Stanovich and West (2000), 645-726, Ch. 6 (“Dual Process Theories and Alternative Task Construals.”).

  21. 21.

     Cf. Mercader et al. (2007), 3043-3048.

  22. 22.

     Cf. Fouts (1997) and Savage Rumbaugh and Lewin (1994).

  23. 23.

     Cf. Whiten and Bryne (1986), Whiten and Bryne (1988a), Whiten (1988b) and Sommer (1992).

  24. 24.

     Cf. Frans de Waal’s writings on the social life of primates, de Waal (1982, 1989, 1996).

  25. 25.

     This is reported by Frans de Waal, cf. Bryne and Whiten (1990), 1-101, episode 238.

  26. 26.

     Cf. Tomasello and Call (1997), Tomasello (1999).

  27. 27.

     We might object that our daydreams are completely free and arbitrary, but this is not the case as is shown by endless repetitions of the same motives in daydreams expressing fears. Cf. Lohmar (2008), Kap. 9.

  28. 28.

     Cf. Cameron and Biber (1973), 144-147.

  29. 29.

     This is also true for nightly dreams, cf. Symons (1993), 181-217.

  30. 30.

     Cf. on co-feeling and our way of understanding others Lohmar (2006), 5-16.

  31. 31.

     Logical operators belong to the second class of objects that primates must be able to think about: Present and future events, with their value for us together with their probable consequences.

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  1. University of Cologne, Philosophisches Seminar, Cologne, Germany

    Dieter Lohmar

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  1. FB Philosophie und Philologie, Universität Mainz, Jakob Welder-Weg 18, Mainz, 55128, Germany

    Daniel Schmicking

  2. Dept of Philosophy & Cognitive Sciences, University of Central Florida, Colbourn Hall 411, Orlando, 32816-1352, U.S.A.

    Shaun Gallagher

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Lohmar, D. (2010). The Function of Weak Phantasy in Perception and Thinking. In: Schmicking, D., Gallagher, S. (eds) Handbook of Phenomenology and Cognitive Science. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-2646-0_9

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