Abstract
Current discussions in global justice are often marked by the conceptual divide between communitarianism and cosmopolitanism. Both positions start from an ideal theory of justice – justice as dependent on the social context of a particular society on the one hand and justice as Kantian impartiality on the other. Both conceptions have repercussions on how people’s moral responsibilities in a global context are conceptualized. The problem with ideal theories, however, is that their ontological and epistemological foundationalism neglects the impact of historical, cultural and social contingencies on human reflection. Therefore, the communitarian-cosmopolitan debate on global justice ends up in an impasse within liberalism, offering little help in dealing with concrete ethical dilemmas. In order to move from ideal theory to non-ideal praxis, this paper argues for a “third way” approach that focuses on the lived reality of people. This “third way” aims at tackling the tension between the universalizing trend of moral principles and the particularizing trend of institutions, cultures and practices through a contextual, action-oriented method of “moving back and forward” between those two opposites. This method is based on the dialogical philosophy of Emmanuel Lévinas and Martin Buber, both of which defend an ethics of responsibility as generosity and hospitality towards the other. The paper explores how the dialogical approach can avoid the communitarian-cosmopolitan deadlock within practical ethics.
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Notes
- 1.
Bader, Veit. 2005. The Ethics of Immigration. Constellations 12/3: 331–361.
- 2.
Teitelbaum, Michael S. 1980. Right Versus Right: Immigration and Refugee Policy in the United States. Foreign Affairs 50/1: 21–59.
- 3.
Universalism can (and often does) result in impartiality, though it does not need to. We can image for instance a universal rule to be partial. Particularism, on the other hand, can be formulated in such a way that it involves a qualified “reasonable” partiality, taking into account more impartial considerations of equality.
- 4.
Rawls, John. 1971. A Theory of Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press. See also Miller, David. 1988. The Ethical Significance of Nationality. Ethics 98/4: 647–662.
- 5.
For a particularist and communitarian form of virtue ethics, see van Hooft, Stan. 2006. Understanding Virtue Ethics. Chesham: Acumen.
- 6.
This is not to say that the moral domain is completely particularistic. Particularists argue that there can be some universalist principles that apply to all human beings, but they do not exhaust the moral domain.
- 7.
Miller, David. 1988. op. cit.
- 8.
Bader, Veit. 2005. op. cit.
- 9.
Warnock, Geoffrey James. 1971. The Object of Morality. London: Methuen.
- 10.
Nagel, Thomas. 1991. Equality and Partiality. New York: Oxford University Press.
- 11.
Goodin, Robert. 1988. What is So Special about Our Fellow Countrymen? Ethics 98/4: 663–686.
- 12.
Which does not mean that partialists claim that there are no obligations at all towards “outsiders”.
- 13.
Nagel, Thomas. 2005. The Problem of Global Justice. Philosophy and Public Affairs 33/2: 113–147.
- 14.
The terms “special” and “general” duties are borrowed from Herbert Lionel Adolphus Hart. 1955. Are There Any Natural Rights? Philosophical Review 64: 175–191.
- 15.
Bader, following Raz and Habermas, makes a very instructive classification of practical reason into (1) moral arguments, (2) prudential arguments, (3) realist arguments and (4) ethical-political arguments. I think Bader’s moral arguments reveal the impartial component of our practical judgement, while his ethical-political arguments refer to the partial tendencies within it. Prudential and realist arguments are captured within a realistic normative approach. See Bader, Veit. 1995. Citizenship and Exclusion. Radical Democracy, Community, and Justice. Or, What is Wrong with Communitarianism? Political Theory 23/2: 211–246; Bader, Veit. 2005. op. cit.
- 16.
I agree with Bader and Saharso that a contextual turn is prompted by (1) the reality of moral pluralism, (2) the in- or at least under-determinacy of practical judgements and interpretation and (3) the complexity of practical reason and judgement. See Bader, Veit and Sawitri Saharso. 2004. Introduction: Contextualized Morality and Ethno-religious Diversity. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. 7/2: 7–115.
- 17.
Walzer, Michael. 1983. Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality. Oxford: Blackwell; Walzer, Michael. 1994. Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad. Notre Dame: Notre Dame Press; MacIntyre, Alasdair. 1988. Whose Justice? Which Rationality? Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press.
- 18.
Dewey, John. 1922. Human Nature and Conduct. An Introduction to Social Psychology. New York: Modern Library; Dewey, John. 1939. Theory of Valuation. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; Barber, Benjamin R. 1989. The Conquest of Politics: Liberal Philosophy in Democratic Times. Princeton: Princeton University Press; Putnam, Hilary. 1992. Renewing Philosophy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; Shapiro, Ian. 1999. Democratic Justice. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- 19.
Carens, Joseph. 2000. Culture, Citizenship and Community. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Bader, Veit. 1995. op. cit.
- 20.
Nagel, Thomas. 1986. The View From Nowhere. New York: Oxford University Press; Nagel, Thomas. 1991. Equality and Partiality. New York: Oxford University Press.
- 21.
Nagel, Thomas. 1979. Mortal Questions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- 22.
In Nagel’s view, trying to lessen the tension between the personal and the impersonal standpoint is the central problem of political philosophy. Two important other problems arise out of it – the problem of legitimation and that of utopianism – which lead him to the universalizability test, in which he seems not to believe so strongly after all. See Nagel, Thomas. 1991. Op. cit. 48–49, 129.
- 23.
For example, Fishkin, James S. 1982. The Limits of Obligation. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.
- 24.
For example: the distinction between idealist and realist theories, between cosmopolitanism and communitarianism, between deontological and utilitarian approaches.
- 25.
Some authors, e.g. Bader, refer to the concept of mediating duties. A similar account is that of Robert Goodin, who claims that all special duties are derived from general duties. Richard Miller differentiates between equal respect for the basic needs of others and equal concern for them and argues that general duties are limited by the demands of the worthwhile goals with which people identify. Others, e.g. David Miller, defend priority to compatriots by making an analogy between families and nations. Yael Tamir justifies her national liberalism by stating that “we are affiliated and therefore morally obligated”, rather than the other way around. For her, feelings of communal membership provide individuals with a reason to attend first to the needs and interest of their fellows. See Bader, Veit. 2005. Reasonable Impartiality and Priority for Compatriots: A Criticism of Liberal Nationalism’s Main Flaws. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 8/1–2: 83–103; Goodin, Robert. 1988. op. cit.; Miller, David. 1995. On Nationality. Oxford: Clarendon Press; Miller, Richard W. 1998. Cosmopolitan Respect and Patriotic Concern. Philosophy and Public Affairs 27/3: 202–222; Tamir, Yael. 1993. Liberal Nationalism. Princeton: Princeton University Press. However, it remains doubtful whether these authors really succeed in proving the moral relevance of special obligations, because (1) the arguments for privileging one’s own national culture or giving priority to one’s own national community are not consistent with liberal principles, (2) some make use of very idealized conceptions of community, nationality or cultural identity that do not correspond with actual circumstances, and (3) some arguments seem to have a more empirical, instrumental or pragmatic character (e.g. our global obligations can best be implemented through, and thus mediated by, special – national – obligations) rather than an inherent moral one.
- 26.
Boltuc, Peter. 2005. Is There an Inherent Moral Value in The Second-Person Relationships? In Inherent and Instrumental Value, ed. G. John Abbarno, 153–178. University Press of America.
- 27.
Nagel seems to grasp this problem only partially. For instance, he acknowledges ‘claims of immediacy’, which make distress at a distance different from distress in the same room, as an example of special obligations, but he judges it to be only visible from the first-personal point of view. See Nagel, Thomas. 1979. op. cit.
- 28.
Boltuc, Peter. 2005. op. cit.; Cottingham, John. 1986. Partiality, Favoritism and Morality. Philosophical Quarterly 36: 357–373; Darwall, Stephen. December 2005. “Responsibility within Relations”. Paper read at a conference on Impartiality and Partiality in Ethics, The University of Reading, Philosophy Department.
- 29.
John Cottingham makes a very instructive distinction between (1) agent-related partiality, legitimating preference for one’s own plans and projects, (2) self-directed partiality, legitimating preference for one’s own personal welfare (which is difficult to justify, but appears to be deeply ingrained into our psychological make-up) and (3) philophilic partiality, legitimating according special weight to loved ones (which is of central structural importance for the welfare of every individual). Any ethical blueprint which eliminates those three kinds of partiality would be self-defeating in Cottingham’s view. While the first two kinds of partiality can be captured under Nagel’s first-person perspective, the latter refers to the second-person perspective. See Cottingham, John. 1986. op. cit.
- 30.
Korsgaard, Christine. 1996. The Reasons We Can Share: An Attack on the Distinction Between Agent-Relative and Agent Neutral Values. In Creating the Kingdom of Ends, ed. Christine Korsgaard, 275–310. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- 31.
Kolodny, Niko. 2002. Do Associative Duties Matter? Journal of Political Philosophy 10/3: 250–266.
- 32.
Scheffler, Samuel. 1997. Relationships and Responsibilities. Philosophy & Public Affairs 26/3: 189–209. Scheffler emphasizes that his non-reductionist account only states a sufficient but not a necessary condition for special responsibilities and therefore does not deny that promises or other kinds of voluntary interactions can also give rise to special obligations.
- 33.
Some useful attempts have been made by Christine Korsgaard and Stephen Darwall, although the essential (meta-ethical) question of what the sources are of the basic intuition of personal responsibility arising from human closeness, is left unanswered by their writings. The question why the empathic distress experienced in the encounter with other persons is a source of normative responsibilities, remains open. See Korsgaard, Christine. 1996. op. cit.; Darwall, Stephen. December 2005. op. cit.; Darwall, Stephen. 2006. The Second-Person Standpoint: Respect, Morality, and Accountability. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- 34.
I describe the Judaic tradition as the philosophical tradition that is inspired by the texts, traditions and experiences of the Jewish people. Although it shares the same concerns as general (Western) philosophy, it distinguishes itself by its steady recourse to the resources of the tradition and its critical receptivity and creative appropriation of external ideas and values. The Judaic philosophical tradition is characterized by the confidence of its practitioners – even under the worst circumstances of oppression and persecution – in the conceptual vitality and continually renewed relevance of its insights and values. The Judaic heritage is also of particular importance for the ethical treatment of migrants: many times in the Hebrew Bible, readers are challenged to remember that “we were strangers in the land of Egypt”, and therefore are assigned to be kind to the stranger in their midst. Unfortunately, the teachings of the Torah were not applied to them when they themselves became strangers and wanderers in the Diaspora for nearly 2000 years, after the destruction of the Jewish State in the year 70 C.E.
- 35.
The insights described in this article are derived from the main works of Buber and Lévinas. Buber, Martin. 1983. Ich und Du. 11th ed. Heidelberg: Schneider; Buber, Martin. 1997. Das Dialogishe Prinzip. Heidelberg: Lambert Schneider Verlag; Lévinas, Emmanuel. 1947. De l’existence à l’existant. Paris: Editions de la Revue Fontaine; Lévinas, Emmanuel. 1961. Totalité et Infini. Essai sur l’extériorité. La Haye: Nijhoff; Lévinas, Emmanuel. 1965. Alterité et Transcendance. Montpellier: Fata Morgana.
- 36.
Burggraeve, Roger. 1999. Violence and the Vulnerable Face of the Other: The Vision of Emmanuel Lévinas on Moral Evil and Our Responsibility. Journal of Social Philosophy 30: 29–45. Lévinas has taken the expression conatus essendi from Spinoza, who described it as persistence in self-assertion: “each thing, in so far as it is in itself, endeavours [conatur] to persevere in its being” (Baruch de Spinoza, Ethics, ed. and tr. G.H.R. Parkinson. 2000. Oxford: University Press. 171.) For Spinoza, the conatus is the first and unique basis of virtue (Ibid. 230) and is in itself an expression of the power of God. Lévinas uses the term conatus essendi in a more general sense. For him, it is the ‘law of being’ – the drive of being to preserve itself or otherwise: the sheer desire or effort to exist. (See Tamra Wright et al. 1988. “The Paradox of Morality: An Interview with Emmanuel Lévinas”. In The Provocation of Lévinas: Re-thinking the Other, eds. Robert Bernasconi and David Woods, 172–175. New York and London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.) In opposition to Spinoza, Lévinas does not identify the conatus with God. On the contrary, God is reflected in the face of the radical Other, who inhibits the conatus.
- 37.
Emmanuel Lévinas. 1961. op. cit.
- 38.
Lévinas, Emmanuel. 1984. Ethique comme philosophie première. In Justifications de l'éthique, Actes du 19e Congrès de l'Association des Sociétés de Philosophie de langue française (6–9 septembre 1982), ed. Gilbert Hottois, 41–51. Bruxelles. Translated as Lévinas, Emmanuel. 1989. Ethics as First Philosophy. In The Lévinas reader, ed. Seán Hand, 75–87. Oxford: Blackwell.
- 39.
Lévinas calls it la mauvaise conscience.
- 40.
Lévinas explains this by returning to the image of the face: the appearance of the face is at the same time a vulnerability, because it “invites” or “challenges” the I to reduce the other to that countenance, and a withdrawal or retreat, because it escapes the gaze of the I and will always remain irreducible, separate, or “other” – the epiphany of the face will always escape any fully-fledged representation or adequate reproduction. Therefore, the otherness (altérité) of the other is an expression of infinity, it transcends the totalizing “I”.
- 41.
Stephen Darwall adds that this relation of responsibility arises out of respect for our dignity as human beings. See Darwall, Stephen. December 2005. op. cit.
- 42.
It is clear that both Buber’s and Lévinas’ philosophies defend an ethical particularism, since for them relations between persons are part of the basic subject-matter of ethics, so that fundamental principles may be attached directly to these relations. For Buber and Lévinas, agents are already encumbered with a variety of ties and commitments to particular other agents and they begin their ethical reasoning from those commitments.
- 43.
Martin, Buber. 1983. op. cit. 22.
- 44.
Lévinas stresses the orientation towards the other, out of the separation between the same and the other which is an inherent condition of Being.
- 45.
Although Buber refers to an “eternal Thou” or God (i.e. the Thou that by its nature cannot become It) he does not move towards a conception of transcendence. On the contrary, Buber says that God, the Thou who sustains the I-Thou relation eternally, cannot be sought, He can only be met. He reveals himself in “this world of ours”, through the authentic relationships with our fellowmen: “In every Thou we address the eternal Thou”. Buber, Martin. 1983.
- 46.
Lévinas, Emmanuel. 1961. op. cit. 188.
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Verlinden, A. (2010). Reconciling Global Duties with Special Responsibilities: Towards a Dialogical Ethics. In: van Hooft, S., Vandekerckhove, W. (eds) Questioning Cosmopolitanism. Studies in Global Justice, vol 6. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-8704-1_6
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