Abstract
This article explores the success, or lack thereof, of economic sanctions in deterring serious human rights abuses in South Africa, Iraq and Sudan. The author concludes that economic sanctions may in some cases be a useful and effective tool for change, provided they are compatible with international human rights standards, tied to benchmarks and accompanied by regular monitoring. However, the international community should remain aware of the potential pitfalls involved in implementing such sanctions.
The author wishes to thank Rachel Rebouche and Vanessa MacDonnell for their valuable comments in preparing this essay.
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Notes
- 1.
Charter of the United Nations , Article 2(4) read with Article 51.
- 2.
Charter of the United Nations , Article 41: “The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio , and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations .”
- 3.
United Nations General Assembly , Res. 3068 (XXVIII), International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid , adopted and opened for signature and ratification as of November 30, 1973. Entry into force July 18, 1976.
- 4.
United Nations General Assembly , Res. 1761 (XVII), U.N. Doc. A/1761 (November 6, 1962).
- 5.
Unites Nations Security Council , Res. 181, U.N. Doc. S/RES/181 (August 7, 1963).
- 6.
During the 1960s and 1970s, important international human rights covenants, such as the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination , 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (January 4, 1969), were drafted and gained ever-growing support. The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), also reverberated around the world and encouraged anti-Apartheid campaigners.
- 7.
Racial discrimination and oppression of the black majority in South Africa that began in 1652 with the arrival of the Dutch at the Cape of Good Hope became significantly more egregious with the introduction of the system of Apartheid after 1948.
- 8.
United Nations Security Council , Res. 418, U.N. Doc. S/RES/418 (November 4, 1977).
- 9.
United Nations Security Council , Res. 591, U.N. Doc. S/RES/591 (November 28, 1986). Among other actions taken to circumvent sanctions , South Africa purchased large quantities of oil on the black market and developed a substantial home-based arms industry.
- 10.
In fact, President Reagan loaned South Africa $1.1 billion during the height of opposition to Apartheid by US civil society and members of Congress .
- 11.
For example, US civil society , lead by groups like TransAfrica and the Free South Africa Movement, succeeded in mobilizing popular opposition to Apartheid and applying pressure on businesses to abandon their ventures in South Africa . The so-called Sullivan Principles, designed by Reverend Leon Sullivan, resulted in a number of American corporations operating in South Africa changing their business practices by abolishing racial discrimination in their work force. The Sullivan Principles set out a number of rights for South African workers, such as better wages, training for workers, the right to join a union, and premised the decision to divest on whether or not a South African employer had implemented those rights.
- 12.
The work of the Black Political Caucus in the US was instrumental in putting the Apartheid issue before Congress . African American leaders saw the struggle against Apartheid as a part of the global struggle against racism .
- 13.
Ronald Reagan , “Message to the House of Representatives Returning Without Approval a Bill Concerning Apartheid in South Africa ,” The Public Papers of President Ronald W. Reagan, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library (September 26, 1986), http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1986/092686 h.htm (Accessed June 12, 2009).
- 14.
New York Times , September 27, 1986. Legislation signed by California Governor George Deukmejian.
- 15.
Comprehensive Anti- Apartheid Act, 22 U.S.C. § 5001 (1986) (repealed June 8, 1994, date on which President certified to Congress that interim government, elected on nonracial basis through free and fair elections , had taken office in South Africa ).
- 16.
Moreover, civil society and some members of government worked together to draft the Sullivan Principles.
- 17.
However, as suggested before, even though UK government opposed sanctions , popular unrest in the UK and throughout the Commonwealth induced businesses and non-governmental actors to withdraw from the South African market. An example was shareholder pressure that forced Barclay’s Bank to divest its considerable interests in South Africa .
- 18.
John Allen, Rabble Rousers for Peace: The Authorized Biography of Desmond Tutu (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 2006), 178.
- 19.
Ibid., 231.
- 20.
United Nations Security Council , Res. 661, U.N. Doc. S/RES/661 (August 6, 1990).
- 21.
United Nations Security Council , Res. 687, U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (April 8, 1991).
- 22.
John Pilger, “Squeezed to Death,” The Guardian, March 4, 2000. “When asked on US television if she [Madeline Albright, US Secretary of State] thought that the death of half a million Iraqi children [from sanctions in Iraq ] was a price worth paying, Albright replied: “This is a very hard choice, but we think the price is worth it.”
- 23.
Ali M. Shah, “Sanctions and Childhood Mortality in Iraq ,” The Lancet 355, No. 1851 (2000).
- 24.
United Nations Security Council , Res. 986, U.N. Doc. S/RES.986 (April 14, 1995).
- 25.
United Nations Security Council , Res. 706, U.N. Doc. S/RES/706 (August 15, 1991); United Nations Security Council, Res. 712, U.N. Doc. S/RES/712 (September 19, 1991).
- 26.
Independent Inquiry Committee , The Management of the Oil-for Food Programme, Volume 2: Report of Investigation, Programme Background, Independent Inquiry Committee into the United Nations Oil-for-Food Programme, September 7, 2005, http://www.iic-offp.org/documents/Sept05/Mgmt_V2.pdf (Accessed June 12, 2009).
- 27.
Ibid.
- 28.
Ibid., 60.
- 29.
Accounts of the situation in Darfur are provided in Gérard Prunier, Chapter 3, Sections 3.1 and 3.2 (above), Catherine Lu, Chapter 18, Sections 18.1 and 18.2 (below) and Luis Moreno-Ocampo , Chapter 16 (below).
- 30.
Reuters, “China urges Sudan to be ‘cooperative’ on Darfur ,” Reuters, February 24, 2008, http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L24571773.htm (Accessed June 12, 2009).
- 31.
In terms of the effect of economic sanctions , one factor that distinguishes Sudan from both Iraq and South Africa is the state of Sudan’s economy before sanctions were imposed. The end of British rule in the 1950s, followed by a series of civil wars between the Northern and Southern regions of Sudan and the prolonged famine of the 1970s, created the political vacuum in which authoritarian regimes foster, and has left the region very much impoverished. With scarce resources available only to the elite, there was an even greater worry that sanctions could damage an already frail economic system.
- 32.
International inaction in the Darfur situation is addressed in Gérard Prunier, Chapter 3, Section 3.2 (above).
- 33.
An argument for the need to take into account national interests in genocide prevention , in particular China ’s oil interests in Sudan , is presented in Yehuda Bauer, Chapter 7, Sections 7.1 and 7.3 (above).
- 34.
See Russell McAleavey, “Pressuring Sudan : The Prospect of an Oil-for-Food Program for Darfur ,” in Fordham International Law Journal 31, no.4 (2008): 1058–1088. In the following paragraphs I have drawn on the information contained in the McAleavey article.
- 35.
United Nations Security Council , Res. 1564, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1564 (January 25, 2005).
- 36.
To view the full report, see United Nations , Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, (Geneva, January 25, 2005), http://www.un.org/News/dh/sudan/com_inq_darfur.pdf (Accessed June 12, 2009).
- 37.
The difficulty in meeting Genocide Convention criteria particularly in relation to intent is addressed in Gérard Prunier, Chapter 3, Section 3.1 (above) and Francis M. Deng, Chapter 4, Section 4.2 (above).
- 38.
Ibid.
- 39.
The United States , until shortly before the vote was taken by the Security Council had threatened to veto the reference to the ICC. The reference was an important boost to the credibility of the Court and was made possible by the United States’ abstention
- 40.
See Charter of the United Nations , Article 41, note 2.
- 41.
United Nations Secretary-General, “Secretary-General Welcomes Adoption of Security Council Resolution Referring Situation in Darfur , Sudan , to International Criminal Court Prosecutor ,” SG/SM/9797, AFR/1132, April 1, 2005, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/sgsm9797.doc.htm (Accessed June 12, 2009).
- 42.
The ICC’s treatment of the Darfur situation is examined in Catherine Lu, Chapter 18, Sections 18.1 and 18.2 (below) and Luis Moreno-Ocampo , Chapter 16 (below).
- 43.
Ahmad Haran directed the “Darfur Security desk” as the Minister of State for the Interior of the Government of the Sudan . Haran is acused of using his office to greatly increase the strength and numbers of the Janjaweed , who targeted civilians with the justification that they were supporters of the rebels .
- 44.
Kushayb is accused of leading the attacks on four villages and towns, commanding thousands of Janjaweed , and ordering and participating in crimes against humanity and war crimes. See The Prosecutor v. Ahmad Muhammad Harun (“Ahmad Harun”) and Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman (“Ali Kushayb”), International Criminal Court , Warrant of Arrest for Ali Kushayb, International Criminal Court, ICC-02/05-01/07-3 (April 17, 2007), http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Situations+and+Cases/Situations/Situation+ICC+0205/Related+Cases/ICC+0205+0107/Court+Records/Chambers/Pre+Trial+Chamber+I/WARRANT+OF+ARREST+FOR+ALI+KUSHAYB.htm (Accessed June 12, 2009).
- 45.
United Nations Security Council , Res. 1679, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1679 (May 16, 2006).
- 46.
The difficulties particular to the peacekeeping mission in Sudan are discussed in Gérard Prunier, Chapter 3, Section 3.2 (above).
- 47.
See Executive Order no. 13,067, 62 FR 59989 (November 5, 1997); Executive Order no. 13,400, 71 FR 25483 (May 1, 2006), Executive Order no. 13412, 71 FR 61369 (October 17, 2006).
- 48.
Civil society groups like Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have been instrumental in calling the world’s attention to the Darfur crisis . NGOs have exerted sustained pressure on governments to vote for sanctions against the Sudanese government and for UN intervention in the conflict . The lack of a vibrant human rights NGO community in China may be another explanation of China’s failure to agree to sanctions in Sudan . For an example of actions taken by Human Rights Watch towards Darfur see “US slams Sudan’s appointee linked to Darfur atrocities ,” Agence France -Presse, January 22, 2009, http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5gvhevbfJOD4I9EAeZ5OxHyHtkPUw, (Accessed June 15, 2009).
- 49.
Richard J. Goldstone, “An Oil-for-food Program for Darfur ,” New York Times , June 12, 2007.
- 50.
Anne Penketh, “Judge and Activists Demand UN Oil Sanctions on Sudan ,” The Independent, June 16, 2007.
- 51.
Ibid.
- 52.
Goldstone, “Oil-for-Food,” 2007.
- 53.
The Economist , “Sudan : Peacekeepers Into the Fray,” The Economist, March 15, 2008.
- 54.
Marlise Simons, Lydia Polgreen and Jeffrey Gettelman, “Arrest is Sought of Sudan Leader in Genocide Case,” New York Times , July 15, 2008.
- 55.
Xan Rice, “Sudan ’s President Announces Unilateral Ceasefire in Darfur ,” The Guardian, November 13, 2008.
- 56.
See David Blair, “If Peace Comes to Darfur , Thank the International Criminal Court ,” The Telegraph, November 14, 2008.
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Goldstone, R.J. (2011). The Role of Economic Sanctions in Deterring Serious Human Rights Violations: South Africa, Iraq and Darfur. In: Provost, R., Akhavan, P. (eds) Confronting Genocide. Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice, vol 7. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-9840-5_11
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