Abstract
The last decades witnessed a proliferation of new players in the international humanitarian arena. The increased number of States and non-governmental actors required an additional effort to establish new coordination settings to avoid gaps, overlaps, and duplications. However, as shown by recent emergencies, the issue still remains critical. Starting from the features of the main different actors and highlighting roles and responsibilities, this paper will present the institutional framework of the most important coordination mechanisms that have been developed in recent years.
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
‘There is agreement among humanitarian actors that it is one of the most significant challenges to effective disaster response. An International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) survey found that coordination problems were reported by 40—90 % of international and national organizations’, IFRC 2007a, b, 150.
- 3.
Seybolt 1997, 4.
- 4.
McEntire 1997, 223.
- 5.
Fischer 2003, 6.
- 6.
Minear 2002, 20.
- 7.
UNDAC 2006, para B.1.
- 8.
The reference text on this regard is the first evaluation of coordination efforts for the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs after the genocide in Rwanda in 1994. The report highlighted three broad categories to describe the forms of coordination: ‘coordination by command,’ ‘coordination by consensus,’ ‘coordination by default’. Donini and Niland 1994, p 13.
- 9.
According to some scholars: ‘The 1927 Convention is the only important multilateral instrument of public international law to have been concerned exclusively with disaster relief, beyond the context of armed conflicts’, Macalister-Smith 1981, 147.
- 10.
1986 Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency; 1993 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction Paris, and 1998 Tampere Convention on the Provision of Telecommunication Resources for Disaster Mitigation and Relief Operations.
- 11.
For example: 1991 Agreement Establishing the Caribbean Disaster Emergency Response Agency (CDERA); 2005 ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response; 1987 Arab Cooperation Agreement on Regulating and Facilitating Relief Operations, and EU Council Decision 2001/792/EC establishing the Community Civil Protection Mechanism. For a more comprehensive survey of legal texts refer to Chap. 1 by de Guttry in this volume.
- 12.
A complex emergency is ‘a humanitarian crisis in a country, region or society where there is total or considerable breakdown of authority resulting from internal or external conflict and which requires an international response that goes beyond the mandate or capacity of any single agency and/or the ongoing United Nations country program’, IASC 2004, p 5.
- 13.
United Nations International Law Commission, Sixty-first session, Geneva, 4 May-5 June and 6 July-7 August 2009, Protection of persons in the event of disasters, Draft Articles 1–5, Document A/CN.4/629. As described by de Guttry in Chap. 1 in this volume ‘The specific elements of the definition of “disaster” can, therefore, be summed up in the following manner: (a) it is a man-made or a natural event; (b) its consequences produce risks or cause significant injuries or widespread damage; (c) persons, property and/or the environment are affected’.
- 14.
Katoch 2006, 154–158.
- 15.
For a general overview of the concept http://www.urd.org/spip.php?page=mot&id_mot=36%26lang=en. Accessed 23 February 2012.
- 16.
For a more comprehensive analysis of current challenges of disaster relief refer to Chap. 21 by Donini in this volume.
- 17.
This was recognized by the ECOSOC in 2004: ‘the need to ensure that this multiplication of actors does not detract from the effectiveness of the humanitarian response and the neutrality and independence of humanitarian assistance’, ECOSOC Res. 2004/50, U.N. Doc. No. E/2004/INF/2/Add.2 (2004) at 134.
- 18.
As shown by some recent research (Harvey 2010, p 5) by studying the official data of relief international contributions by the European Commission it appears that during the 1970 and 1980s, when humanitarian action was limited by Cold War tensions, the affected States played a much more central role in disaster response because financial resources were channeled directly to their national governments. In the 1990s, however, this contribution fell to 6 % from over 90 % in 1976 while the contribution to NGOs has significantly risen.
- 19.
Kent 2011, 1.
- 20.
- 21.
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development—Development Assistance Committee (DAC): ‘For 50 years now, the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) has grouped the world’s main donors, defining and monitoring global standards in key areas of development’. http://www.oecd.org/, accessed 11 February 2012.
- 22.
For a detailed analysis of the changing landscape of donors in humanitarian action see Macrae 2003.
- 23.
‘Of the 10 largest world donors, Saudi Arabia has shown the largest increase of reported contributions in the past four years (2,465 %)’. Stoddard 2010, 22.
- 24.
See Kent and Burke 2011.
- 25.
This trend takes origin from the theory of corporate social responsibility, by offering means and know-how to the community, and exponentially increased after the 2004 South East Asia Tsunami. In this respect were recorded very good examples and less positive experiences, because there are sometimes mixed motivations behind the actions of the business sector. However, the corporate sector has a great potential to bring an incredible added value to emergency response but needs to be placed in an overall framework agreed with the humanitarian community. There should be guidelines and rules that need to be undersigned by the business companies prior to deployment.
- 26.
- 27.
The Feinstein International Centre of the Tufts University has recognized the following Typology of Humanitarian Actors: ‘“Principled-Dunantist” based on the basic tenets of humanitarianism developed by Henri Dunant. Proponents of principle-centered action argue for a narrower definition of humanitarianism limited to life-saving assistance and protection of civilians, based on core principles of neutrality, impartiality, and independence. “Pragmatist-Wilsonian” recognize the importance of principles but place a higher premium on action, even when this means putting core principles in jeopardy. They identify broadly with foreign policy objectives of their home government, whose funds they often use. “Solidarist” beyond the provision of assistance and protection they address the root causes of conflict, which are political at the core. “Faith-based” the world’s major religious traditions, western and non-western alike, embody humanitarian affirmations and obligations. In addition to international faith-based agencies that do not usually engage in proselytizing, there is a wide variety of religious organizations at the local level. Faith-based entities may themselves embody principled, pragmatist, and/or solidarist features.’ See Donini et al. 2008, p 11.
- 28.
See Eide et al. 2005.
- 29.
See infra Sect. 20.2.2.5.
- 30.
See for example, the tools developed by different NGOs constituencies or coordination ‘umbrella’. In the framework of the Red Cross Red Crescent Movement, the Agreement on the organization of the international activities of the components of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (‘Seville Agreement’) of 1997.
- 31.
For a more comprehensive analysis of national legal frameworks governing disaster response refer to Chap. 12 by Mancini in this volume.
- 32.
In some cases it is not easy to identify the institution in charge, for example, when the 2005 earthquake struck Pakistan, there was no provision in the national law designating the institution in charge for co-ordinating relief.
- 33.
Interview to President George W. Bush to ABC ‘Good Morning America’, reported in ‘Foreign governments line up to help after Katrina’ Reuters 1 September 2005, http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/reliefweb_pdf/node-183522.pdf. Accessed 15 December 2011.
- 34.
van der Linde 2008, 1.
- 35.
ALNAP 2010, 22.
- 36.
After the Gujarat Earthquake, the Indian government publicly welcomed ‘acts of solidarity’; in the aftermath of Nargis Cyclone, ‘The Government of the Union of Myanmar welcomes international humanitarian assistance’, The Tripartite Core Group, Post-Nargis Joint Assessment, 39.
- 37.
Regardless of the fact that Italy did not request intentional assistance in the aftermath of the 2009 L’Aquila earthquake, there were several pressing offers of international assistance coming from various countries and NGOs. Nonetheless, it was officially reported that international offers would be considered only after a proper needs assessment, some NGOs decided anyway to deploy their teams to Italy.
- 38.
3051st JUSTICE and HOME AFFAIRS Council meeting, Brussels, 2 and 3 December 2010.
- 39.
- 40.
GAO 2006
- 41.
In Italy the Augustus methodology and DiComAC concept were developed. OECD 2010, 18, 44.
- 42.
ALNAP 2010, 23.
- 43.
Bennett et al. 2006, 40.
- 44.
Binder and Grünewald 2010, 42.
- 45.
IASC is a policy-making body chaired by the ERC and is composed by the executive heads of the humanitarian and development UN agencies, of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent, ICRC, IOM, and NGO consortia.
- 46.
The Central Emergency Revolving Fund (CERF) is a quick available source of emergency funding at disposal of operational organizations especially at the initial phases of the emergency.
- 47.
The Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeals Process (CAP) assesses the needs of critical situations and prepares a comprehensive interagency response strategy.
- 48.
The role of DHA was not well-defined and there was confusion between its co-ordinating role and its more operational roles. Furthermore, DHA never received adequate funding and human resources. For a more comprehensive analysis of DHA role see Weiss 1998.
- 49.
UN GA A/51/1950 Renewing the United Nations: A program for Reform, Report from the Secretary-General.
- 50.
OCHA Mission Statement available at: http://www.unocha.org, accessed 18 February 2012.
- 51.
The Resident Coordinator system aims at bringing together the different UN agencies to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of operational activities at the country level. It includes all organizations of the United Nations system dealing with operational activities for development, regardless of their formal presence in the country. At country level, RCs are tasked to ensure leadership within the UN system, facilitating the coordination and coherence of all UN operational activities, advocating and promoting the UN global agenda. The UN General Assembly established the concept of a single official to co-ordinate operational activities within the UN system in 1977 (GA Resolution 32/197). The concept has evolved, and the role of the UN Country Team has been reaffirmed in all GA Resolutions (GA Resolutions 47/199, 50/120, 56/201, 59/201 and 62/208) as well as on the Comprehensive Policy Reviews of 1992, 2004 and 2007.
- 52.
The fact that the Resident Coordinator is wearing more than one hat at the time is criticized. For this reason, it is often stressed that the Resident Coordinator should be independent from any agency, including his/her mother entity, a neutral position vis à vis the government, strong humanitarian experience, and a mix of diplomatic and operational skills.
- 53.
The designation is decided by the UN ERC in consultation with the Inter-Agency Standing Committee. In this function, the Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator (RC/HC) is in charge for supporting national efforts and he/she is accountable to the Emergency Relief Coordinator for the strategic and operational coordination of the response of the United Nations Country Team member agencies and relevant humanitarian actors.
- 54.
See infra Sect. 20.2.2.3.
- 55.
In Haiti, for example, the weak humanitarian leadership was responsible for many of the shortcomings of the response ‘As a result, operational agencies did not have a framework for their activities, the military could not be properly assigned tasks and the government could not be sufficiently engaged with and supported’. Binder and Grünewald 2010, 33.
- 56.
The United Nations Country Team (UNCT) exists in 136 countries, covering all of the 180 countries where there are United Nations programs.
- 57.
http://oneresponse.info/COORDINATION/CLUSTERAPPROACH/Pages/Cluster%20Approach.aspx. Accessed 8 February 2012.
- 58.
Disagreement remains over whether the conceptualization of clusters was a consultative process or not. IASC is the most representative humanitarian forum established, however it cannot claim to represent the full spectrum of humanitarian actors, and there are concerns about the way in which national authorities were included in the elaboration process (ALNAP 2010, p 23). It has been noted that the process was pushed by OCHA and ERC without adequate time for consultation and that the lead had been assigned in advance. Furthermore, ‘donors were outside of the original planning of the clusters, and were gradually brought in then funding requirements became apparent’, Stoddard et al. 2007, 7.
- 59.
The Central Emergency Relief Fund provides a minimum amount of flexible and predictable financing for the most urgent life-saving programs that are critically under-funded. The CERF can also be used immediately to provide quick initial funding for rapid response in sudden onset disasters.
- 60.
Today the number of clusters has been increased by adding some cross-cutting issues like: environment, age, gender, mental health. For further elements http://oneresponse.info/COORDINATION/CLUSTERAPPROACH, accessed 13 February 2012.
- 61.
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), like some NGOs (following of the Dunantist approach), do not take part in the cluster approach, but they co-ordinate with UN to achieve efficient response for the affected people. However, at the global level they participate as an observer in many of the cluster working group meetings.
- 62.
See IASC 2007.
- 63.
Stoddard et al. 2007, 13.
- 64.
Adinolfi et al. 2005, 47.
- 65.
Guidance for Humanitarian Country Teams endorsed by the 75th IASC Working Group 18 November 2009.
- 66.
See infra Sect. 20.3.1.
- 67.
UNGA Res 57/150, 16 December 2002 ‘Strengthening the Effectiveness and Coordination of International Urban Search and Rescue Assistance’.
- 68.
OSOCC guidelines OCHA, 2nd edition 2009.
- 69.
‘Incident command system provides a flexible core mechanism for co-ordinated and collaborative incident management, whether for incidents where additional resources are required or are provided from different organizations within a single jurisdiction or outside the jurisdiction, or for complex incidents with national implications’, US National Incident Management System, Homeland and Security 2008.
- 70.
See Weir 2006.
- 71.
For a detailed analysis of the different instruments see Chap. 6 by Casolari in this volume.
- 72.
See Chap. 5 by Gestri in this volume.
- 73.
See Chap. 1 by de Guttry in this volume.
- 74.
See infra Sect. 20.2.4.1.
- 75.
For the involvement of NATO in civil defense see Alexander 2006, 13.
- 76.
In 1953, the first procedures for ‘NATO Cooperation for Disaster Assistance in Peacetime’ were adopted. For a more comprehensive analysis see North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO’s Role in Disaster Assistance 14 (2001).
- 77.
For a comprehensive analysis of civil military relations refer to Chap. 24 by Calvi-Parisetti in this volume.
- 78.
‘Member States, even those who do not give a primary role to their military forces in domestic response, are now using their military capacity for relief operations on a global basis.’ United Nations Press Release, UN Updates Guidelines for International Military Aid in Disaster Relief Operations (Nov. 27, 2006), available at http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=20733&Cr=disaster&Cr1=relief. Accessed 9 February 2012.
- 79.
- 80.
In Pakistan in the aftermath of 2005 earthquake was used a model of ‘non-interfering coordination’ in which the military shared an open and honest assessment of needs with the humanitarian community and allowed NGOs to choose what operations they would undertake and where. In this model, gaps in humanitarian delivery are ‘back-filled’ by the army and government agencies.
- 81.
Haugevik and de Carvalho 2007, 7.
- 82.
Binder and Grünewald 2010, 39.
- 83.
The ASEAN, CDERA, and BSEC Agreements (1998 Agreement among the Governments of the Participating States of the Black Sea Economic Co-operation on Collaboration in Emergency Assistance and Emergency Response to Natural and Man-Made Disasters), the 1995 Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Finland and the Government of the Republic of Estonia on Co-operation and Mutual Assistance in Cases of Accidents, and the 1974 Agreement between Sweden and Norway concerning the Improvement of Rescue Services in Frontier Areas make specific reference to the use of military.
- 84.
‘Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defense Assets in Disaster Relief,’ known as the ‘Oslo Guidelines’, first prepared in 1994 by a number of donor States and humanitarian agencies and revised in 2006, available at http://reliefweb.int/node/22924, accessed 14 February 2012. A similar, more restrictive document is dedicated to the complex emergencies ‘Guidelines on the Use Of Military and Civil Defense Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies’ (‘MCDA Guidelines’) of March 2003.
- 85.
The concept of last resort raises many concerns from several donor countries because they usually apply military resources under civil responsibility and direction in the framework of their civil protection. This situation was recognized by the 2006 revision of the Oslo Guidelines when it was acknowledged in the ‘Last resort’ paragraph the concept of civil protection by contrast to civil defense. ‘However, foreign civil protection assets, when civilian in nature and respecting humanitarian principles, can provide an important direct and indirect contribution to humanitarian actions based on humanitarian needs assessments and their possible advantages in terms of speed, specialization, efficiency and effectiveness, especially in the early phases of relief response the use of civil protection assets should be needs driven, complementary to and coherent whit humanitarian aid operations, respecting the overall coordinating role of the UN’, Oslo Guidelines, para 7.
- 86.
SIPRI 2008, 14.
- 87.
The Guidelines are available at http://ochanet.unocha.org/p/Documents/INSARAG%20Guidelines%202011-Latest.pdf. Accessed 9 February 2012.
- 88.
For more details see Chap. 5 by Gestri in this volume.
- 89.
2008/73/EC, Euratom and 2010/481/EU, Euratom.
- 90.
Sphere 2011
- 91.
International Organization for Standardization, Business Plan—ISO/TC 223: Societal Security (ver. 1, Nov. 24, 2006), at 1.43.
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De Siervo, G. (2012). Actors, Activities, and Coordination in Emergencies. In: de Guttry, A., Gestri, M., Venturini, G. (eds) International Disaster Response Law. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague, The Netherlands. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-6704-882-8_20
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