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Challenges for Decidable Epistemic Logics from Security Protocols

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Games, Norms and Reasons

Part of the book series: Synthese Library ((SYLI,volume 353))

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Abstract

A central question in knowledge theory relates to how knowers update their knowledge on receipt of a communication. This is important, since the very purpose of communications is (typically) to create such an update of knowledge in the recipient. However, there is often a lack of concordance between the intended update and that which occurs, leading to interesting situations and much work for knowledge theorists

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Correspondence to R. Ramanujam .

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Ramanujam, R., Suresh, S. (2011). Challenges for Decidable Epistemic Logics from Security Protocols. In: van Benthem, J., Gupta, A., Pacuit, E. (eds) Games, Norms and Reasons. Synthese Library, vol 353. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-0714-6_13

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