Fleet Recovery and Life Extension – Some Lessons Learned

Abstract

Extending the life of an existing fleet which still has acceptable operational capability can be enormously attractive in economic terms. Ideally, such extension programs will be planned and managed (via an ASI program), although many are urgent “recovery” programs required when substantial problems are discovered. This paper discusses examples of planned and unplanned programs, highlighting the differences in approach required.

Regulatory systems usually demand that we preserve the prevailing “acceptable level of safety” during fleet life extension, although inevitably, progressive life extension must lead to enhanced risk of unforeseen events which are absent from our structural integrity models. We cannot remove this risk, but we can mitigate it. Paradoxically this requires additional (and potentially unwelcome) investment in broad investigative strategies such as teardowns and damage enhancement test programs. This paper will provide examples of a management program that was successful precisely because it contained such strategies.

The paper argues that we may underestimate the extent to which organisational issues may bring an additional (and perhaps more important) threat to the safety of old aircraft. Two examples are provided in which complacency and a perception that the fleet is nearing end-of-service promoted drawing down of maintenance/safety resourcing, leading to maintenance underperformance, increased risk, accidents, and loss of life. These issues will be particularly evident where we have poor corporate culture, weak organisational structure, progressive deferral of fleet withdrawal dates and increased operational demand. The examples suggest that our structural safety models are in themselves of limited value if these broader system/organisational risks are neglected.

Oral presentation.