Abstract
Scientific realism and legal realism are two different issues. Scientific realism can be defined with the ontological, semantic, epistemological, methodological, axiological, and ethical tenets involved, plus realism in scientific theory construction and concept formation. Legal realism or realism in the context of law, on the other hand, refers to a set of intellectual movements with emphasis on the sociological, empirical, and “realist” tenets in legal analysis that share the two tenets of critique of legal formalism and the idea of law as a social fact, and not a social or moral ideal. The American and Scandinavian schools of legal realism are briefly considered. Moreover, Alf Ross’ idea of the normative ideology collectively and more or less uniformly adopted by the judiciary and H. L. A. Hart’s parallel idea of the ultimate rule of recognition as collectively acknowledged by the judges and other officials both bear the impact of a realist account of law. Though Hart is usually labelled as a representative of (analytical) legal positivism, the rule of recognition, when defined as “as a complex, but normally concordant, practice of the courts, officials, and private persons in identifying the law by reference to certain criteria”, carries a patently realist tint in it. Still, a fully realist stance on law cannot stand on its own, self-defined criteria, any more than a fully positivist account of law can so do. The formal validity of law, as defined by analytical legal positivism, and the efficient enforcement of law, as defined by analytical legal realism, lean on and presuppose the presence of the other approach to the law.
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Notes
- 1.
On the varieties of philosophical realism, Niiniluoto, Critical Scientific Realism, pp. 2–13. Cf. Pihlström, Tutkiiko tiede todellisuutta?, pp. 30–66, 72–73.
- 2.
Popper, Objective Knowledge, p. 106 et seq.
- 3.
On Tarski’s theory of truth, Tarski, “The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages”; Niiniluoto, Critical Scientific Realism, pp. 55–64; Pihlström, Tutkiiko tiede todellisuutta?, pp. 45–52.
- 4.
Pihlström, Tutkiiko tiede todellisuutta?, pp. 34–35.
- 5.
Pihlström, Tutkiiko tiede todellisuutta?, p. 35.
- 6.
According to Charles S. Peirce, the scientific method entails an element of public justifiability and self-correctiveness. Niiniluoto, Johdatus tieteenfilosofiaan, pp. 81–85; Peirce, Johdatus tieteen logiikkaan ja muita kirjoituksia, pp. 137–150; Siltala, Oikeustieteen tieteenteoria, pp. 469–471.
- 7.
Pihlström, Tutkiiko tiede todellisuutta?, pp. 57–58; Niiniluoto, Critical Scientific Realism, p. 160 et seq.
- 8.
A kind of legal realist program was pursued by the German Free Law movement, too, as represented by Oscar Bülow, Eugen Ehrlich, Hermann Kantorowicz, and Hermann Isay. Larenz, Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft, pp. 59–62; Wieacker, Privatrechtsgeschichte der Neuzeit, pp. 579–581.
- 9.
Summers, Instrumentalism and American Legal Theory, pp. 19–26 (and pp. 22–23 in specific); Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law 1870–1960, p. 169 et seq.; Summers, ed., American Legal Theory; Golding, “Jurisprudence and Legal Philosophy in the Twentieth-Century America – Major Themes and Developments”. Cf. also Tamanaha, Beyond the Formalist–Realist Divide, in which the ingenuity of the realist movement is strongly undermined.
- 10.
Summers, Instrumentalism and American Legal Theory; cf. Summers, ed., American Legal Theory; de Been, Legal Realism Regained, p. 177 et seq.
- 11.
On Scandinavian legal realism, Helin, Lainoppi ja metafysiikka, pp. 11–260. – Praeterea censeo metaphysicam esse delendam (i.e. “Besides, I think that metaphysics ought to be deleted”), as Hägerström’s own nihilistic slogan sounded. Helin, Lainoppi ja metafysiikka, p. 32.
- 12.
In Danish: den normative ideologi der besjæler dommeren. Ross, Om ret og retfærdighed, p. 56. The term “judges” comprises all kinds of law-applying officials in Ross’ theory of law.
- 13.
Ross refers to the idea of an empiricist approach in the preface to the English edition of Om ret og retfærdighed. Such an empiricist approach is not equal to scientific realism, though. Ross, On Law and Justice, p. IX. – Of the representatives of Scandinavian legal realism, Theodor Geiger had the strongest inclination towards a fully-fledged sociological approach to the law. Geiger, Vorstudien zu einer Soziologie des Rechts.
- 14.
The terms law in the books and law in action were coined by Roscoe Pound. Cf. Pound, “Law in Books and Law in Action”, pp. 12–36.
- 15.
Frank, Law and the Modern Mind, pp. 259–269. – For a good account of the legal realists and their agenda, cf. Tamanaha, Law as a Means to an End, pp. 60–76. Cf. also Summers, Instrumentalism and American Legal Theory; Summers, ed., American Legal Theory.
- 16.
Holmes, “The Path of the Law”, p. 469. – According to Golding, the famous opening line in Holmes’ The Common Law, to the effect that “The life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience.” was openly targeted at Langdell. Golding, “Jurisprudence and Legal Philosophy in the Twentieth-Century America – Major Themes and Developments”, p. 442; Holmes even coined Langdell “the greatest living legal theologian” of the time. Tamanaha, Law as a Means to an End, p. 64, note 24, citing Holmes’ Book Review of the Second Edition of Langdell’s Casebook, in 14 American Law Review (1880).
- 17.
Schlegel, American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science.
- 18.
The terms jurisprudence of the policy sciences, policy-oriented jurisprudence, contemporary legal realism and the New Haven school or approach have also been used of the said intellectual movement. Cf. Nagan and Willard, “Lasswell/McDougal Collaboration: Configurative Philosophy of Law”, p. 481. The basic text of configurative jurisprudence is Lasswell and McDougal, Jurisprudence for a Free Society. Studies in Law, Science and Policy.
- 19.
Nagan and Willard, “Lasswell/McDougal Collaboration: Configurative Philosophy of Law”, p. 482.
- 20.
Unger, False Necessity, p. 1. – Cf. Thomas Morawetz’ use of Duncan Kennedy’s happy phrase, to the effect that the law is steeped with politics all the way down. Morawetz, “Law as Experience: The Internal Aspect of Law”, p. 218. Cf. also Kennedy, “Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical Phenomenology”, passim. Kennedy makes use of the acronymic expression HIWTCO, or “how-I-want-to-come-out”, with reference to the essentially idiosyncratic, non-legal motives and strategies guiding the judge’s or other legal official’s legal decision-making. Kennedy, “Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical Phenomenology”, p. 548 et seq. Cf. Kennedy, A Critique of Adjudication, passim; Kairys, ed., The Politics of Law. A Progressive Critique, passim. – Martti Koskenniemi’s fine book, From Apology to Utopia. The Structure of International Legal Argument, applies a thoroughly CLS-spirited methodological (but not necessarily very Derridean) conception of deconstruction to the structures of argumentation in international law.
- 21.
Cf. Hart, Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy, pp. 123–144 (“American Jurisprudence through English Eyes: The Nightmare and the Noble Dream”). Hart, however, did not deal with the nihilistic agenda of the Crits in his essay. For Hart, the nightmare vision of law was represented by the American legal realists who yet were more moderate than the Crits in their critique of law.
- 22.
Kennedy, A Critique of Adjudication, p. 15.
- 23.
de Been, Legal Realism Regained.
- 24.
A good comparison of the legal realists and the Crits is found in de Been, Legal Realism Regained, p. 177.
- 25.
There is, however, the much criticized and, so it seems, mostly unwarranted reference to the methodology of descriptive sociology in the Preface to Hart’s book. Hart, The Concept of Law (1961), p. V.
- 26.
Hart, The Concept of Law (1961), p. 98.
- 27.
Ross, Om ret og retfærdighed, p. 56: “Retsvidenskaben beskæftiger sig med den normative ideologi der besjæler dommeren.”
- 28.
On H. L. A. Hart’s legal philosophy, Hart, The Concept of Law (1961); Lacey, A Life of H. L. A. Hart: The Nightmare and the Noble Dream.
- 29.
“… at man ved retskilderne forstår indbegrebet af de faktorer der øver indflydelse på dommerens formulering af den regel hvorpå han baserar sin afgørelse”, Ross, Om ret og retfærdighed, p. 56.
- 30.
“… fra sådanne tilfælde, i hvilke kilden præsterer dommeren en fuldt færdig retsregel der blot overtages af dommeren til sådanne tilfælde, i hvilke kilden ikke byder dommeren andet og mere ond visse inspirerende ideer ud fra hvilke han selv formulerer den regel han har brug for.” Ross, Om ret og retfærdighed, p. 56.
- 31.
“… in those hard cases … [lawyers] make use of standards that do not function as rules, but operate differently as principles, policies and other sorts of standards.” Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, p. 22.
- 32.
“Law as integrity ask judges to assume, so far as this is possible, that the law is structured by a coherent set of principles about justice and fairness and procedural due process, and it asks them to enforce these in the fresh cases that come before them, so that each person’s situation is fair and just according to the same standards.” Dworkin, Law’s Empire, p. 243. (Italics added).
- 33.
Despite the differences in terminology, i.e. legal rules and principles in Dworkin and the different levels of legal formality in Summers, the subject matter is more or less the same in the both, even though Dworkin and Summers do not have any cross-references to the other scholar’s theory of law. A parallel reading of Dworkin and Summers can be found in Siltala, A Theory of Precedent, pp. 49–54.
- 34.
“Når den retsvidenskabelige påstand om, at en vis regel er gældende dansk ret, som påvist efter sit realindhold er en forudsigelse om reglens anveldelse i fremtidige retsafgørelser, følger heraf, at sådanne påstande aldrig kan gøre krav på absolut sikkerhed, men kun kan hævdes med større eller mindre sandsynlighed, alt efter styrken af de holdepunkter, fremtidskalkulationerne hviler på. Sandsyndlighedsværdien kan variere over hele feltet lige fra praktisk vished og ned til værdier omkring 0,5. Der kommer herved en relativitet ind i retsvidenskabelige sætninger, som det er vigtigt at have for øje, men som altfor ofte overses. (…) I virkeligheden er påstanden om, at en regel er gældende ret, noget højst relativt. Om man vil, kan man også sige, at en regel kan være gældende ret i højere eller mindre grad varierende med den grad af sandsynlighed, hvormed det kan forudsiges, at den vil finde anvendelse.” Ross, Om ret og retfærdighed, s. 58. (Italics in original.)
- 35.
“Retsvidenskaben beskæftiger sig med den normative ideologi der besjæler dommeren. Kendskab til denne ideologi (og dens tolkning) sætter os derfor i stand til med betydelig sikkerhed at forudberegne det retsgrundlag, hvorpå visse fremtidige afgørelser vil blive truffet, og som altså vill figurere i domspræmisserne.” Ross, Om ret og retfærdighed, pp. 56–57. (Italics added; translation by the present author.) – On the inherently collective character of the judges’ normative ideology, cf.: “Det er i det foregående talt snart om “dommeren”, snart om “domstolene”. Forudsætningen for, at man kan operere med begrebet “dansk ret” som et for det hele retssamfund fælles, identisk system er, at de individuelt forskellige dommere besjæles af en fælles, overindividuel ideologi, og at det derfor kommer ud på et, om man refererer til “dommeren” eller til “domstolene”. Retten er et socialt, d.v.s. overindividuelt fænomen. I det omfang, den enkelte dommer motiveres af særegen ideosynkrasi, henregnes denne ikke til “dansk ret” – selv om den naturligvis ligefuldt er en faktor der må tages i betragtning af den der er interesseret i at forudkalkulere en konkret retsafgørelse.” Ross, Om ret og retfærdighed, pp. 48–49.
- 36.
Nonetheless, Hart does make a reference to the case where the rule of recognition may indeed include content-bound elements, in addition to purely formal criteria, related to the source of origin of a legal source or argument. The possibility of such content-bound elements has the effect of turning his theory of law into one of inclusive, or soft, legal positivism. “In some systems, as in the United States, the ultimate criteria of legal validity explicitly incorporate principles of justice or substantive moral values; in other systems, as in England, where there are no formal restrictions on the competence of the supreme legislature, its legislation may yet no less scrupulously conform to justice or morality.” Hart, The Concept of Law (1961), p. 199. If such is the case, there is no obstacle – at least “in principle” – of taking legal principles in Hart’s rule of recognition as well. Cf. Hart, The Concept of Law (1994), p. 250, where Hart’s reply to Dworkin’s criticism of his rule-bound theory is posthumously presented.
- 37.
Cf. Hart, The Concept of Law (1961), pp. 120–132. There, Hart outlines the semantics of legal interpretation with reference to the core of settled meanings, on the one hand, where the meaning-content of law is unambiguous, and the core of penumbra, on the other, where several interpretation outcomes are equally possible. Cf. Hart, The Concept of Law (1961), pp. 200–201, where Hart briefly touches upon the issues of legal interpretation.
- 38.
Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, p. 22.
- 39.
“… the rule of recognition exists only as a complex, but normally concordant, practice of the courts, officials, and private persons in identifying the law by reference to certain criteria. Its existence is a matter of fact.” Hart, The Concept of Law (1961), p. 107. (Italics added.) – Cf. Hart, The Concept of Law (1961), p. 111 (italics added): “Here what is crucial is that there should be a unified or shared official acceptance of the rule of recognition containing the system’s criteria of validity.” – On Alf Ross’ reflection on the collective nature of law and judicial ideology: “Det er i det foregående talt snart om “dommeren”, snart om “domstolene”. Forudsætningen for, at man kan operere med begrebet “dansk ret” som et for det hele retssamfund fælles, identisk system er, at de individuelt forskellige dommere besjæles af en fælles, overindividuel ideologi, og at det derfor kommer ud på et, om man refererer til “dommeren” eller til “domstolene”. Retten er et socialt, d.v.s. overindividuelt fænomen. I det omfang, den enkelte dommer motiveres af særegen ideosynkrasi, henregnes denne ikke til “dansk ret” – selv om den naturligvis ligefuldt er en faktor der må tages i betragtning af den der er interesseret i at forudkalkulere en konkret retsafgørelse.” Ross, Om ret og retfærdighed, pp. 48–49. (Italics added.)
- 40.
The question whether the judge’s normative ideology or the rule of recognition, which draws the borderline between the law and the not-law, is itself inside or outside of the law cannot be answered by a straightforward yes or no. I have reflected on the ontological status of Kelsen’s basic norm and Hart’s rule of recognition in Siltala, A Theory of Precedent, pp. 221–229; Siltala, Oikeustieteen tieteenteoria, pp. 711–730. The argument of course applies mutatis mutandis to Ross’ idea of the ultimate premises of the judicial ideology.
- 41.
Hart, The Concept of Law (1961), pp. 112–113.
- 42.
Ross, Om ret og retfærdighed, pp. 41–66.
- 43.
Ross, Towards a Realistic Jurisprudence, pp. 61–62. Cf. Helin, Lainoppi ja metafysiikka, p. 143: “Like the concepts of a ‘state’, ‘[legally] competent organ’, and ‘sovereign’, similarly a ‘court of justice’ and ‘judge’ are legally qualified concepts. (…) The law cannot be defined in an exhaustive manner by reference to the judge’s behavior, since we already need to know something of the legal order so as to find out who is a judge.” (Translation by the present author.)
- 44.
Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre (1960), p. 219: “Eine Rechtsordnung wird als gültig angesehen, wenn ihre Normen im grossen und ganzen wirksam sind, das heiβt tatsächligt befolgt und angewendet werden. Und auch eine einzelne Rechtsnorm verliert ihrte Geltung nicht, wenn sie nur in einzelnen Fällen nicht wirksam ist, das heiβt nicht befolgt oder angewendet wird, obgleich sie befolgt und angewendet werden soll.” Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre (1960), p. 219. (Italics in original.) – Kelsen thereby rules out of consideration such individual desuetude cases in which a formally valid legal norm is not, for some reason or another, applied in the court practice.
- 45.
In Finland, Jaakko Jonkka, currently the Chancellor of Justice, has stressed that the decisions given by Chancellor of Justice, even if given as a response to a complaint made by an individual whose legal rights allegedly have been violated by some state official, are frequently “forward-looking” in character as well, endowed with the intention of guiding the future conduct of officials. Jonkka, “A Model for the Weighing and Balancing of Interest in the Prosecutor’s Legal Discretion”.
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Siltala, R. (2011). Legal Realism: The Law in Action, Not the Law in Books, As the Subject Matter of Legal Analysis. In: Law, Truth, and Reason. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 97. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-1872-2_7
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