Abstract
This article explores the role of ‘robustness-notions’ in an account of the engineering sciences. The engineering sciences aim at technological production of, and intervention with phenomena relevant to the (dys-)functioning of materials and technological devices, by means of scientific understanding thereof. It is proposed that different kinds of robustness-notions enable and guide scientific research: (1) Robustness is as a metaphysical belief that we have about the physical world – i.e., we believe that the world is robust in the sense that the same physical conditions will always produce the same effects. (2) ‘Same conditions – same effects’ functions as a regulative principle that enables and guides scientific research because it points to, and justifies methodological notions. (3) Repetition, variance and multiple-determination function as methodological criteria for scientific methods that justify the acceptance of epistemological and ontological results. (4) Reproducibility and stability function as ontological criteria for the acceptance of phenomena described by A→B. (5) Reliability functions as an epistemological criterion for the acceptance of epistemological results, in particular law-like knowledge of a conditional form: “A→B, provided Cdevice, and unless other known and/or unknown causally relevant conditions.” The crucial question is how different kinds of robustness-notions are related and how they play their part in the production and acceptance of scientific results. Focus is on production and acceptance of physical phenomena and the rule-like knowledge thereof. Based on an analysis of how philosophy of science tradtionally justified scientific knowledge, I propose a general schema that specifies how inferences to the claim that a scientific result has a certain epistemological property (such as truth) are justified by scientific methods that meet specific methodological criteria. It is proposed that ‘same conditions – same effects’ as a regulative criterion justifies ‘repetition, variation and multiple-determination’ as methodological criteria for the production and acceptance of (ontological and epistemological) scientific results.
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
Knuuttila and Boon (2011) present a critical analysis of how and why scientific models (and theoretical knowledge) give us knowledge. They argue that most philosophical accounts eventually draw on a representational relationship between scientific models and how the real world is.
- 3.
Note that epistemological criterion E is a necessary property for scientific knowledge to be accepted, but may not be a sufficient criterion for acceptance, since other criteria, such as relevance or explanatory power, may play a role as well. Van Fraassen (1980, pp. 12–13) calls these additional criteria pragmatic values.
- 4.
In this manner, a distinction is made between properties of the world, e.g. material entities in the real world, and properties of expressions of a language, including theories. For example, red is regarded as a property of material or physical objects (e.g. the apple is red), whereas truth is regarded as a property of an expression (e.g. ‘the apple is red’ is true). Importantly, the way in which we learn their meaning is different. Usually, we learn the meaning of the properties of material objects by designation (e.g. by pointing at a red apple and saying ‘Look! The apple is red.’), not by definition. The meaning of semantic concepts cannot be learned by designation (e.g. by pointing at something and saying ‘Look! Newton’s theory is true.’). Instead, the meaning of semantic concepts must be given by definition.
- 5.
For instance, knowing how to use the term ‘bachelor’ (e.g. in saying, ‘this man is a bachelor’) requires an explication of how we determine whether this man is a bachelor. Similarly, in order to use a semantic concept such as truth in saying ‘this theory or law is true’, it needs to be explicated how we determine whether the theory is true. Importantly, a definition of a term (e.g. a definition of being a bachelor) not only states its meaning (e.g. a man is a bachelor means that a man is not married), it also presents a criterion for whether the term applies (e.g. a man is a bachelor if a man is not married).
- 6.
In accepting Van Fraassen’s claim, I deliberately ignore the well-known critique with regard to his notion of observability. The important point of Van Fraassen’s suggestion is, in my view, that we have a more or less intuitively clear understanding of the meaning of truth in every day situations. In those situations, we know how to use this notion and how it functions in distinguishing between claims that are true and those that are not. The use of this notion with regard to theoretical knowledge, on the other hand, is not intuitively clear.
- 7.
Stochastic behaviour in quantum physical experiments does not violate the idea of ‘same conditions – same effects’ given that under the same conditions the same stochastic behaviour will occur. Hence, physicists still work with the presupposition that the same experimental set-up in quantum physics will produce the same patterns.
- 8.
This problem resembles David Hume’s problem of causal relations: How can we know that causes and effects will be related in the future as they were in the past if we cannot find out empirically which power, force, energy or necessary connexion keeps them together? (Hume (1777 (1975)). On the Idea of Necessary Connexion, Part I in: Enquiry concerning Human Understanding.) Accordingly, Hume framed the problem of inferring a stable relationship between cause and effect as a fundamental problem of empiricism: we cannot observe the connection in an unproblematic manner – as a consequence, inductive inference to a stable relationship between cause and effect cannot be empirically verified. To this fundamental problem of empiricism, Popper (1963) added that inductive inference cannot be logically justified either. In order to avoid such metaphysical problems, Popper framed it as the problem of induction, i.e. as a problem of the logic of science. The underlying philosophical problem is that the metaphysical belief that the world is structured, regular or robust cannot be proven.
- 9.
Understanding metaphysical presuppositions as regulative ideas was Kant’s solution to the problems of empiricism raised by Hume. I do not claim that ‘same conditions – same effects’ is the only kind of basic belief that enables and guides scientific research. I largely agree with Chang (2009), who, with a similar Kantian approach, aimed to explain the functioning of these kinds of principles. He proposed calling basic beliefs about the world ‘ontological principles’, which – similar to what I claim about the function of ‘same conditions – same effects’ as a regulative principle – enable epistemic activities such as observation, experimentation, counting, logical reasoning, etc.
- 10.
‘Same conditions – same effects’ differs from the ceteris paribus clause in the sense that the latter does not count ‘all other conditions’ as part of the rule-like knowledge, whereas the former counts any addition to knowledge of them as an extension of the rule-like knowledge. In scientific practice, this difference is crucial because explicit knowledge of these conditions (Cdevice and K) enables us to predict under which circumstances the phenomenon described as A→B can or cannot be expected. Ceteris paribus laws only apply to what Cartwright calls a nomological machine: the law applies only when ‘all other conditions being equal,’ which would only allow for a very limited use.
- 11.
Hacking (1983, p. 221) is canonical: ‘A phenomenon is noteworthy. A phenomenon is discernible. A phenomenon is commonly an event of process of a certain type that occurs regularly under definite circumstances’.
- 12.
The understanding of phenomena I propose can loosely be explained by an analogy with Aristotle’s notion of four causes of an object: the physical world is the material cause of a phenomenon, whereas our technological devices and experimental set-up are their formal cause. Additionally, the scientist is the efficient cause for describing the phenomenon as A→B, while the scientific or practical purpose for which the phenomena described as A→B is ‘carved out’ is its final cause.
- 13.
Clearly, some phenomena are observable in principle, e.g. the orbits of planets, the tides, an apple falling. However, as Kant has already argued, we are already actively involved even in ‘simple’ observations of phenomena, i.e. we actively ‘carve them out’ even in ‘simple’ observations. Massimi’s article (2008) on this matter is insightful.
- 14.
In scientific practices, repetition is often too limited as a methodological criterion for reproducibility because repetition (or replication) often does not produce the same results. This is because not all relevant causal conditions are known. If repetition shows anomalous behaviour, a possible but not entirely essential explanation is that the previously measured data or phenomena are not reproducible and were, therefore, artefacts. Usually, scientists will search for ‘hidden’ causally relevant conditions.
- 15.
Which resonates with one of the central ideas of logical positivism that the meaning of a synthetic statement is the method of its empirical verification.
- 16.
This realism is close to Hacking’s realism, which emphasizes the materiality of the world.
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Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Léna Soler and the PractiScienS group for their agenda-setting endeavours on this topic and for their suggestions for improving this text. I would also like to thank Henk Procee for his numerous suggestions on the topic and on the content of this chapter. This research is supported by a Vidi grant from the Dutch National Science Foundation (NWO).
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Boon, M. (2012). Understanding Scientific Practices: The Role of Robustness Notions. In: Soler, L., Trizio, E., Nickles, T., Wimsatt, W. (eds) Characterizing the Robustness of Science. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 292. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-2759-5_12
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