Abstract
This chapter considers the techniques employed by the United Kingdom as one of the most experienced Western democracies in fighting terrorism. They describe how the UK has faced terrorist threats for over half a century. These threats began with political and religious violence in Northern Ireland in the Ulster counties and thereafter segued into global jihadist terrorism. The authors describe how, in the twenty-first century, the British government has deployed legal formulas and measures that it had applied in the 1970s and 1980s to counter political violence in Northern Ireland and adjusted them to address modern challenges posed by groups linked or inspired by Al Qaeda. Exclusion orders, extended periods of detention or increasing executive powers and usurping judicial review and authority are some of the measures attempted in Britain’s contemporary counter-terrorism efforts. It is argued that extending law enforcement or executive authority denigrates individual rights and freedoms unnecessarily and ultimately have a transcendent impact beyond the purpose for which they were created.
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Notes
- 1.
D. López Garrido, Terrorismo, política y Derecho. La legislación antiterrorista en España, Reino Unido, República Federal de Alemania, Italia y Francia (Madrid: Alianza Editoral, 1987), 56. However, this experience, acquired before Northern Ireland’s conflict in the fight against guerrillas and terrorists in Malaysia, Kenya, Cyprus and Rhodesia, was wasted. The British did not apply to Ulster the valuable lessons that could have learned from those conflicts. For example, the success of campaigns against the insurgency in Kenya and Malaysia was based on the recognition of the interests of the local population, while in Rhodesia, where repression was made without recognizing any right to the local population, the counterinsurgency fight failed. (B. Hoffman and J. Morrisontaw, “A strategic framework for countering terrorism,” in European Democracies Against Terrorism. Govermental Policies and Intergovernmental Cooperation, ed. F. Reinares (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004), 8–9, 12–13).
- 2.
Thus it has been recognized even by the British courts, concerning certain measures taken under the so-called “war on terror”, as will be mentioned in subsequent paragraphs of this chapter.
- 3.
About the origins of British anti-terrorism legislation see A. Bunyan, The Political Police in Britain (London: St. Martin’s Press, 1955), 51–56; also L. K. Donohue, Counter-Terrorist Law and Emergency Powers in the United Kingdom, 1922–2000 (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2001).
- 4.
“The Troubles and their aftermath became the defining national security experience for the postwar generation in Britain – much as the first world war was for Eden and Macmillan, or the Second World War for Heath and Callaghan” (D. Godson, “The Real Lessons of Ulster,” Prospect Magazine, no. 140 (2007): 1).
- 5.
D. Godson, “The Real Lessons of Ulster,” 3; R. Alonso Pascual, Irlanda del Norte. Una historia de guerra y la búsqueda de la paz (Madrid: Editorial Complutense, 2001), 152.
- 6.
M. Burleigh, Sangre y rabia. Una historia cultural del terrorismo (Madrid: Taurus, 2008), 387.
- 7.
Both the reintroduction of Internment as Operation Demetrius were brought about by two heinous actions of the IRA: a murder by a bomb of five engineers who were repairing a BBC transmitter and the execution of three off-duty Scottish soldiers (including two brothers of 17 and 18 years) who were surprised by IRA gunmen in a field (Vv. Aa, Lost Lives (Edinburgh, 2004), 270–274). This is not the only opinion on the Internment, one of the most important British civil servant in Northern Ireland during Kenneth Bloomfield’s period, said that Internment was not conceived as a response to IRA, but as a way to curb on a wave of loyalist violence (D. Godson, “The Real Lessons of Ulster,” no. 140 (2007): 4).
- 8.
Alonso, Irlanda del Norte, 153. Some counterterrorism policies are not only unsuccessful, but counterproductive, as British law Internment (B. Hoffman and J. Morrisontaw, “A Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism,” 4).
- 9.
Besides the number of deaths, is significant the escalation in number of bomb attacks, a good indicator of the operational capacity of terrorist groups: in April 1971 there were 36; on May, 47, on July, 78; after implementation of Internment in August there were 131 bomb attacks; in September, 196; and in October, 117 (Donohue, Counter-Terrorist Law and Emergency Powers in the United Kingdom, 118).
- 10.
P. Cumaraswamy, Cuestión de los Derechos Humanos de todas las personas sometidas a cualquier forma de detención o prisión. Informe del Relator Especial sobre la independencia de magistrados y abogados, Sr. Param Cumaraswamy, presentado de conformidad con la resolución 1997/23 de la Comisión de Derechos Humanos. Accessed via computer resource http://www.unhchr.ch
- 11.
Whether this rule abolished Internment or just changed its name and endowed it with certain judicial guarantees for detainees is a subject of some debate. See M. F. Noone, “El Ejército Republicano Irlandés: Soldados ilegítimos,” Military Review LXXXVI (2006).
- 12.
J. Diplock, Report of the Commission to Consider Legal Procedures to Deal with Terrorist Activities in Northern Ireland (London: HMSO, 1972).
- 13.
Initially, this rule was renewed annually, but became permanent in 1933.
- 14.
López Garrido, Terrorismo, política y Derecho, 57.
- 15.
The adoption of the “Diplock courts” was triggered by the murder of a bus driver named Agnew, occurred in Belfast, the day before he was to testify against several terrorist (Donohue, Counter-Terrorist Law and Emergency Powers in the United Kingdom, 123). A full report on the Diplock courts in Vv.Aa, Replacement Arrangements for the Diplock Court System. A Consultation Paper (Belfast, 2006b); see also J. D. Jackson, K. Quinn, and T. O’Malley, “The Jury System in Contemporary Ireland: In the Shadow of a Troubled Past,” Law and Contemporary Problems 62 (1999).
- 16.
D. Bonner, “The United Kingdom’s Response to Terrorism: The Impact of Decisions of European Judicial Institutions and of the Northern Ireland Peace Process,” in European Democracies Against Terrorism. Governmental Policies and Intergovernmental Cooperation, ed. F. Reinares (Alderhorst: Ashgate, 2004), 45.
- 17.
Diplock courts were in effect in Britain, one way or another, until 2007; in fact, even in a late time of Northern Ireland conflict, one of each three serious crimes were tried by a court Diplock (L. M. Jacobs, “It’s Time to Leave the Troubles Behind: Northern Ireland Must Try Paramilitary Suspects by Jury Rather Than in Diplock-Type,” Texas International Law Journal (Texas, 2010): 656).
- 18.
J. D. Jackson, The Restoration of Jury Trial in Northern Ireland: Can We Learn From the Professional Alternative? (St. Louis/Warszaw, 2001–2002), 17.
- 19.
B. McGuiverin, “In the Face of Danger: A Comparative Analysis of the Use of Emergency Powers in the United States and the United Kingdom in the 20th Century,” 263.
- 20.
M. P. O’Connor and C. L. Rumman, “Into the Fire: How to Avoid Getting Burned by the Same Mistakes Made Fighting Terrorism in Northern Ireland,” 24.
- 21.
C. D. Rasnic, “Northern Ireland’s Criminal Trials Without Jury: The Diplock Experiment,” (1996), 67.
- 22.
López Garrido, Terrorismo, política y Derecho, at 74.
- 23.
Great Britain is a term that refers to the three regions that form the island: Scotland, Wales and England, but excludes Northern Ireland. In contrast, the term United Kingdom, covers four areas, since its full name is United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
- 24.
IRA never recognized the action: only in 2004, a Sinn Fein’s spokesman formally recognized the Birmingham bombing was a mistake, declaring that what happened was bad and it shouldn’t have occurred. Well known is the case of the six Irish, with no relation to IRA, who were accused and convicted of having organized this attack. After 16 years in prison of their life imprisonment sentences, they were eventually acquitted by a British court. On this case, see C. Mullin, Error of Judgment. The Truth About the Birmingham Bombings (London: Poolbeg, 1986).
- 25.
To get an idea of the climate in those days in Britain, it suffices to know that “The Times” described the action as an act of war and that a deputy stated in Parliament that the Chamber wanted blood (Alonso, Irlanda del Norte, 202 note 41).
- 26.
Until then, the current rule in force was the Magistrates Court Act, 1952.
- 27.
P. Hillary, Suspect Community. People’s Experience of the Prevention of Terrorism Acts in Britain. (London: Pluto Press, 1993), quoted in Alonso, Irlanda del Norte, 202.
- 28.
López Garrido, Terrorismo, política y Derecho, at 58. As happened later in the case of nationalist terrorism in Spain, with the so-called strategy of “democratization of violence”. In the late 1980s a relative decline of the deadly terrorist attacks was accompanied by a surge in street violence, implemented in a conscious way by terrorist organizations as an alternative and complement to the attacks themselves.
- 29.
D. Kurff, “Las leyes antiterroristas en el Derecho comparado europeo, con especial incidencia en la situación del Ulster,” Vv. Aa, Democracia y leyes antiterroristas en Europa. Ulster, Italia, Alemania y Estado Español (Bilbao, 1983), 61.
- 30.
Alonso, Irlanda del Norte, 154.
- 31.
For example, squat without resting the hands on the floor or standing with arms outstretched and palms turned upward.
- 32.
However, in 1978, the Court rejected, by 14 votes to three that the five techniques constituted torture (Kurff, “Las leyes antiterroristas en el Derecho comparado europeo,” 83).
- 33.
Alonso, Irlanda del Norte, 154.
- 34.
Kurff, “Las leyes antiterroristas en el Derecho comparado europeo,” 43.
- 35.
Fourteen Northern Ireland’s organizations were included in this list, which it has been now added 21 international organizations. None of the groups that have been, at some point, included in the United Kingdom lists have been subsequently excluded of them (K. Thorne, “Proscription of Terrorist Groups in the United Kingdom,” (2006), www.hdcentre.org, 1).
- 36.
Of the remaining 39 organizations, the only non-Muslim was the ISYF, a Sikh organization.
- 37.
Pam Am flight 109 exploded in the air while flying over the Scottish town of Lockerbie, 270 people were killed in the attack, including 11 Lockerbie villagers.
- 38.
For common criminals, the maximum detention period was 36 h (Bonner, “The United Kingdom’s Response to Terrorism: The Impact of Decisions of European Judicial Institutions and of the Northern Ireland Peace Process,” 43).
- 39.
Bonner, “The United Kingdom’s Response to Terrorism,” 40–41.
- 40.
An official report entitled “Statistics on the Operation of Prevention Terrorism Legislation 16/01,” contains statistics on terrorist activity in Britain in 2000. It reflects the growing importance of international terrorism in front of domestic terrorism, this latter is the associated with the issue of Northern Ireland. The full report is available at http://rds.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs/hosb1601.pdf.
- 41.
A reflection on the concept of terrorism in Rodríguez-Villasante and J. L. Prieto, “¿A que llamamos terrorismo?,” Cuadernos de Estrategia, n. 133, monographic entitled ‘Lucha contra el Terrorismo y Derecho Internacional’, 8.
- 42.
Arrest on reasonable suspicion is included in a conceptual debate about the extent to which police action is legitimate in a preventive manner, that is, before the wrongful act has been committed: “En un sistema democrático deberían establecerse fines en relación con el control penal del Estado. De ahí que ya en el siglo XIX, y más aún en el XX, se haya planteado con insistencia -sobre todo con el rebrote de las tendencias utilitaristas por el resurgimiento del liberalismo económico- la idea de la prevención como función de la policía. Si el sistema ha de ser preventivo, lógicamente la acción de la policía al ejecutarlo también ha de ser preventiva. Y de hecho también la labor de la policía ha sido preventiva; más aún, se ha señalado que la prevención efectiva no puede ser de la pena sino solo de la acción policial” (J. Bustos Ramírez, “Las funciones de la policía y la libertad y seguridad de los ciudadanos,” Nuevo Foro Penal 32 (1986): 165).
- 43.
In 2008, a report by the BBC stated that London’s Metropolitan Police had conducted, during that year, about 175,000 arrests and searches of vehicles based on Section 44 of the Act of 2000 (V. Dodd, “Metropolitan Police Used Anti-terror Laws to Stop and Search 58 Under-10s,” The Guardian, August 18, 2009. Accessed via computer resource, http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2009/aug/18/met-police-stop-search-children (removed December 12, 2009)).
- 44.
The Anti-Terrorism Legislation (Oxford, 2002), 212. An official statistical report of the Home Office on police operations during the term of the 2000 law, see “Operation of Police Powers Under the Terrorism Act 2000 and Subsequent Legislation: Arrests, Outcomes and Stops & Searches,” Home Office Statistical Bulletin, no. 04/2010 (February 25, 2010).
- 45.
For example, if it was thought that, being deported, the individual would be tortured or sentenced to death in their country of origin.
- 46.
Under Article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights, certain safeguards and civil rights can be temporarily abolished if the state concerned is under dangers which threaten its own existence.
- 47.
In fact, British government, in exercising the powers contained in Part 4 of this Act, has been, of all those affected by threats and acts of global terrorism, the only one who has tried to claim that state.
- 48.
E. Álvarez Conde and H. González, “Legislación antiterrorista comparada después de los atentados del 11 de septiembre y su incidencia en el ejercicio de los derechos fundamentales,” ARI 7 (2006): 5. Another important issue the Act stated in Section XI, was on communications and data protection, a subject matter discussed in detail by C. Walker and Y. Akdeniz, “Antiterrorism Laws and Data Retention: War Is Over?,” Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 54, no. 2 (2003): 159–182.
- 49.
One of the characteristic features of the new terrorism is the use of new technologies to publicize their actions. On the nature of “communicative element” that has the terrorist violence of Al Qaeda see M. R. Torres Soriano, “Violencia y acción comunicativa en el terrorismo de Al Qaeda,” Política y Estrategia 96 (October–December 2006). Profesor Torres says: “Violencia y comunicación están indisolublemente unidas en el terrorismo llevado a cabo por la organización terrorista Al Qaeda. El carácter religioso de su ideología no implica que sus atentados no busquen la propagación de un determinado mensaje dentro de amplios sectores de la población (…) La realización de espectaculares atentados ha permitido a Al Qaeda convertirse en un ente propagandístico y comunicacional que apunta hacia dos sectores de población bien diferenciados: el occidental y el musulmán. En el primero pretende lograr la erosión del apoyo que ésta presta a sus gobernantes, y en el segundo, la expansión de una ideología fundamentalista de vuelta a los orígenes del Islam” (83).
- 50.
England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions (2006-04-13).
- 51.
C. Walker, “Keeping Control of Terrorists Without Losing Control of Constitutionalism,” Stanford Law Review 59 (2007): 1423.
- 52.
An analysis of these attacks in F. Gregory, “Los atentados de Londres de 7 y 21 de julio de 2005: ¿Una nueva normalidad o lo ya previsto,” DT, no. 10 (July 2006). Only 8 days after the attacks on 15 July, the Home Secretary Charles Clarke consulted the liberal and conservative spokesmen in Parliament, Mark Oaten and David Davis, to propose changes in anti-terrorism legislation. In August, Prime Minister Tony Blair announced that there would be new terrorist legislation in autumn of that year 2005.
- 53.
“The new legislation also clarifies some of the previous provisions, and makes additional provisions to several offences. In this way, new offences include, as an example, the encouragement of terrorism (maximum penalty of 7 years imprisonment), dissemination of terrorist publications (7 years), preparation of acts of terrorism in any way (life), training in terrorist skills (10 years) and attending training facilities where such skills are being imparted (10 years)” (Thorne, “Proscription of Terrorist Groups in the United Kingdom,” at 4).
- 54.
Previous rule of 2003 fixed the maximum limit of detention without file charge in 14 days for suspicious of murder, rape or serious economic fraud.
- 55.
“Longer pre-charge detention is not only unnecessary; it is also unjust and potentially counter-productive. Allowing suspects to be held for over a month without charge would inevitably lead to injustice and would fly in the face of our basic democratic principles of justice, fairness and liberty. It would have significant implications for the individuals affected and would certainly not help to win hearts and minds” (Russel, “Terrorism Pre-charge Detention: Comparative Law Study,” (2007), 4).
- 56.
Al Qaeda has been defined as the largest network of global terrorism that has existed in history (Torres, “Violencia y acción comunicativa en el terrorismo de Al Qaeda,” 85).
- 57.
The full text of the letter is posted on the website of the Home Secretary (URL: http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk). On the role of new technologies in terrorism and in the fight against it, both professor Álvarez Conde and González Hortensia reflect on it: “La globalización y el desarrollo tecnológico abren nuevas posibilidades al fenómeno terrorista, pero también deben suponer un avance en la lucha contra el mismo. Hay que elaborar toda una teoría de la gobernabilidad de la globalización, evitando que ésta se convierta en un factor favorable para los terroristas, que parecen encontrarse en un campo abierto para atentar contra los valores democráticos” (“Legislación antiterrorista comparada después de los atentados del 11 de septiembre y su incidencia en el ejercicio de los derechos fundamentales”, 1).
- 58.
Among those who criticized the extension of detention without file charges for 90 days was Archbishop Desmond Tutu, imprisoned by the South African government during the years of Apartheid. He compared the legislation that sought to introduce British government with the South African one in those years when detention without file charge was legally valid for 90 days, exactly the same time. Other British politicians compared this measure with the disastrous internment legislation introduced in Northern Ireland to combat the IRA in the 1970s.
- 59.
On October 10, 2006, new Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, publicly gave up the purpose, present or future, to extend the detention period without file charge until 90 days. Michael Todd, which held a high position on Manchester Police, backed Hayman’s arguments in a series of opinions that were collected by British press (P. Wintour, “Police Support Blair on Terror Detentions,” The Guardian (London), November 7, 2006; “Who Can We Trust in the Fight Against Terrorism,” The Times (London), November 7, 2006). The participation of police in the debate over a legislative matter was the subject of criticism from various politicians, reaching even to speak of a politicization of police.
- 60.
This terrorist plan was responsible for the changes in procedures for passenger access control at airports, as well as limitations on the introduction of liquids on board aircraft.
- 61.
Received royal assent on November 26, 2008.
- 62.
A study on the role of intelligence in combating terrorism in Cuadernos de Estrategia, no. 141 (June, 2009), monograph entitled ‘La inteligencia, factor clave en la lucha contra el terrorismo’.
- 63.
The predictable reaction from British press made the Home Secretary to draft a circular reminding security forces that legitimate journalistic activity should be permitted and it only had to be limited when the normal journalistic practices as taking pictures or videos, may pose a direct support for the attacks preparation. It was tried, with this circular, to limit abuses that had occurred by the police in order to prevent press from taking pictures in certain contexts of actions of security forces. An analysis of this issue in Vv.Aa., “The Impact of U.K. Anti-terror Laws on Freedom of Expression,” in ICJ Panel of Eminent Jurists on Terrorism, Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights (London: ICJ, 2006a).
- 64.
The 42 days were rejected by a group of 36 Labour Members Party. They voted against the government project of his own party.
- 65.
David Heath’s parliamentary intervention (Vv.Aa, Parliamentary Debates (London, 2010), 648 column).
- 66.
They were sent back to Ulster, in what has sometimes been defined as a kind of policy of internal exile.
- 67.
Bonner, “The United Kingdom’s response to terrorism”, 47.
- 68.
Alonso, Irlanda del Norte, 201.
- 69.
Committee on the Administration of Justice (C.A.J.), War on Terror: Lessons from Northern Ireland (Belfast: Committee on the Administration of Justice, 2007), 7.
- 70.
C.A.J., War on Terror: Lessons from Northern Ireland (2007), 10.
- 71.
Godson, “The Real Lessons of Ulster,” 2.
- 72.
Bonner, “The United Kingdom’s Response to Terrorism,” 49.
- 73.
B. L. Smith, K. R. Damphousse, and P. Roberts, Preincident Indicators of Terrorist Incidents. The Identification of Behavioural, Geographic and Temporal Patterns of Preparatory Conduct (Arkansas, 2003), 24.
- 74.
Russel, “Terrorism Pre-charge Detention: Comparative Law Study,” (2007), 4. Other countries using the figure of detention without file charge are South Africa and New Zealand, limited in both to 2 days; 3 days is the limit set by Denmark and Norway; finally, Italy sets a limit of 4 days. The legislation that is closest to the British is the Australian, whose general rule places the limit at 24 h, but can be raised to 12 days with the intervention of a judge to approve the action.
- 75.
Russel, “Terrorism Pre-charge Detention: Comparative Law Study,” 6; as Bonner states, “in a liberal democracy, antiterrorist policies should comply with the rule of law, not only in the sense of a pure principle of legality, but also in the sense that the rules, legally enacted, should comply with basic human rights and freedoms” (“The United Kingdom’s Response to Terrorism,” 51).
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Martínez-Peñas, L., Fernández-Rodríguez, M. (2012). Evolution of British Law on Terrorism: From Ulster to Global Terrorism (1970–2010). In: Masferrer, A. (eds) Post 9/11 and the State of Permanent Legal Emergency. Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice, vol 14. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-4062-4_9
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