Abstract
Modern scholars disagree about the extent to which the historical Ibn Rushd actually defended the ideas commonly associated with Averroism and whether his philosophical ideas were controversial in his own day and age. The medieval sources mention persecutions, but the details of the conflict remain unclear. Controversies concerning the case of Ibn Rushd are connected to more general disagreements about the history of philosophy in the Islamic world. One of the main controversies divides the Straussians from their opponents. This contribution surveys the debate concerning Ibn Rushd’s radicalism and analyses some of the methodological differences among modern historians of Arabic philosophy. Understanding some of these differences may help to explain the reasons for such diverging assessments of Ibn Rushd’s thought.
The argument presented in this article was first developed in a contribution for a workshop at the Institute for Advanced Study (Princeton) on the transmission of radical ideas from the Islamic world to the West. I would like to thank the organisers, Patricia Crone, Jonathan Israel, and Martin Mulsow, as well as the participants for their responses.
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Notes
- 1.
The question whether falsafa should be rendered as Islamic or Arabic philosophy has at least two levels. One of them concerns the body of texts: while ‘Arabic philosophy’ seems to exclude texts written in other languages of the Islamicate world, ‘Islamic philosophy’ seems to exclude Arabic texts written by Jewish and Christian authors which are part of the same tradition. The second level concerns the nature of the philosophy and its possible religious implications. For those who use the term ‘Islamic philosophy’ consciously, Islam is key and led to various strategies of harmonisation, while those who speak of ‘Arabic philosophy’ tend to suggest that the religious context is accidental. For the sake of convenience both terms are combined here. While I believe that the question of the body of texts is valid and important for the terminology, I doubt (as should become more obvious below) that this is a particularly useful battlefield for debating a much more complex set of questions.
- 2.
To this effect see also the postscript in Dimitri Gutas, ‘The Study of Arabic Philosophy in the Twentieth Century: An Essay on the Historiography of Arabic Philosophy’, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 29 (2002), pp. 5–25 (25).
- 3.
Abdelmajid El Ghannouchi, ‘Distinction et relation des discourse philosophique et religieux chez Ibn Rushd: Faʿl al-maqāl ou la double vérité’, in Averroes (1126–1198) oder der Triumph des Rationalismus, ed. Raif Georges Khoury (Heidelberg: Winter, 2002), pp. 139–145; Oliver Leaman, ‘Is Averroes an Averroist?’, in Averroismus im Mittelalter und in der Renaissance, eds Friedrich Niewöhner and Loris Sturlese (Zurich: Spur, 1994), pp. 9–22.
- 4.
Thomas Aquinas, De unitate intellectus contra Averroistas, in Aquinas against the Averroists. On There Being Only One Intellect, trans. Ralph McInerny (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 1993). The longer title De unitate intellectus contra Averroistas, which is often used to refer to the treatise, is a fourteenth-century emendation, as Dag Nikolaus Hasse reminds us in his ‘Averroica secta: Notes on the Formation of Averroist Movements in Fourteenth-Century Bologna and Renaissance Italy’, in Averroès et les averroïsmes juif et latin, ed. Jean-Baptiste Brenet (Turnhout: Brepols, 2007), pp. 307–331, at 309–310.
- 5.
Friedrich Niewöhner, ‘Zum Ursprung der Lehre von der doppelten Wahrheit: Eine Koran-Interpretation des Averroes,’ in Averroismus im Mittelalter und in der Renaissance, eds Niewöhner and Sturlese, pp. 23–41, 25. The Latin text has: ‘per rationem concludo de necessitate… firmiter tamen teneo oppositum per fidem. Ergo sentit quod fides sit de aliquibus, quorum contraria de necessitate conclude possunt.’
- 6.
Aufklärung im Mittelalter? Die Verurteilung von 1277: Das Dokument des Bischofs von Paris, ed. Kurt Flasch (Mainz: Dieterich, 1989), p. 89. It was not Tempier’s first condemnation. On 10 December 1270, he condemned 13 propositions including the unity of the intellect and the eternity of the world, but there is no trace yet of a doctrine referring to a possible superiority of philosophy or reason over revelation or religion.
- 7.
John Tolan, ‘“Saracen Philosophers Secretly Deride Islam”’, Medieval Encounters, 8 (2002), pp. 184–208.
- 8.
Leibniz, Theodicy: Essays and the Goodness of God, the Freedom of Man and the Origin of Evil (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1951), p. 80, available online on www.gutenberg.org (accessed 18 March 2008). See also Marco Sgarbi’s Chap. 13 in this volume.
- 9.
Leibniz, Theodicy, p. 80. See also Jonathan Israel, Enlightenment Contested: Philosophy, Modernity, and the Emancipation of Man, 1670–1752 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 626.
- 10.
Israel, Enlightenment Contested, pp. 621–622.
- 11.
Aquinas, De unitate intellectus, p. 19.
- 12.
John Marenbon, ‘Latin Averroism’, in Islamic Crosspollinations: Interactions in the Medieval Middle East, eds Anna Akasoy, James E. Montgomery and Peter E. Pormann (Exeter: Gibb Memorial Trust, 2007), pp. 135–147.
- 13.
For different statements and how they relate to different audiences see Herbert A. Davidson, Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes, on Intellect: Their Cosmologies, Theories of the Active Intellect, and Theories of Human Intellect (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 335–336; Arthur Hyman, ‘Averroes’ Theory of the Intellect and the Ancient Commentators’, in Averroes and the Aristotelian Tradition: Sources, Constitution, and Reception of the Philosophy of Ibn Rushd (1126–1198), eds Gerhard Endress and Jan Aertsen (Leiden: Brill, 1999), pp. 188–198; Id., ‘Averroes as Commentator on Aristotle’s Theory of the Intellect’, in Studies in Aristotle, ed. Dominic J. O’Meara (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1981), pp. 161–191; Alfred Ivry, ‘Averroes’ Three Commentaries on De Anima’, in Averroes and the Aristotelian Tradition, eds Endress and Aertsen, pp. 199–216.
- 14.
Ibn Rushd, The Book of the Decisive Treatise Determining the Connection between the Law and Wisdom, ed. and trans. Charles Butterworth (Provo: Brigham Young University Press, 2001), p. 15.
- 15.
Herbert Davidson, Proofs for Eternity, Creation, and the Existence of God, pp. 9 and passim.
- 16.
Richard Dales, ‘The Origin of the Doctrine of the Double Truth’, Viator, 15 (1984), pp. 169–179; Niewöhner, ‘Zum Ursprung der Lehre von der doppelten Wahrheit’; Richard Taylor, ‘“Truth Does not Contradict Truth”: Averroes and the Unity of Truth’, Topoi, 19 (2000), pp. 3–16.
- 17.
For al-rāsikhūna fī’l-‛ilm see Jane Dammen McAuliffe, ‘Text and Textuality: Q. 3:7 as a Point of Intersection’, in Literary Structures of Religious Meaning in the Qur’ān, ed. Issa J. Boullata (Richmond: Curzon, 2000), pp. 56–76 for the dynamic reception of the text. Stefan Wild, ‘The Self-referentiality of the Qurʾān: Sura 3:7 as an Exegetical Challenge’, in With Reverence for the Word: Medieval Scriptural Exegesis in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, eds Jane Dammen McAuliffe, Barry D. Walfish and Joseph W. Goering (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 422–436. Q 3:7 (in Yusuf Ali’s translation) says: ‘He it is Who has sent down to thee the Book: In it are verses basic or fundamental (of established meaning); they are the foundation of the Book: others are allegorical. But those in whose hearts is perversity follow the part thereof that is allegorical, seeking discord, and searching for its hidden meanings, but no one knows its hidden meanings except Allah. And those who are firmly grounded in knowledge say: “We believe in the Book; the whole of it is from our Lord:” and none will grasp the Message except men of understanding.’ There are two ways of reading the passage in italics. The alternative to Yusuf Ali’s translation is: ‘… but no one knows its hidden meanings except Allah and those who are firmly grounded in knowledge. They say …’
- 18.
For such a kind of medieval relativism see Marenbon, ‘Latin Averroism’, p. 140. This is also the way in which the Dictionary of the History of Ideas: Studies of Selected Pivotal Ideas (ed. Philip P. Wiener [New York: Scribner, 1973–1974], s.v.) explains the double truth as described by Tempier. To me, it is not clear that this is what the bishop criticised – he rather seems to say that the Averroists claim p based on philosophical doctrines, whereas religion demands non-p. He takes it for granted that religion provides the true view.
- 19.
‘Is Averroes an Averroist?’ and Averroes and his Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), pp. 144–160. The statement is in accordance with Leaman’s own view of Islamic philosophy. He denies that the compatibility of Islam and philosophy was a major concern for Muslim philosophers for the simple reason that Islam is a religion, not a philosophy. The falāsifa still assumed that religion and philosophy reflect the same truth. Oliver Leaman, ‘Does the Interpretation of Islamic Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?’, International Journal of Middle East Studies, 12 (1980), pp. 525–538, 529 and 535.
- 20.
Taylor, ‘“Truth Does not Contradict Truth”’, p. 7.
- 21.
Ibid., p. 8.
- 22.
Ibid., p. 11.
- 23.
Muhsin Mahdi, ‘Remarks on Averroes’ Decisive Treatise’, in Islamic Theology and Philosophy: Studies in Honor of George F. Hourani, ed. Michael Marmura (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1984), pp. 188–202.
- 24.
Charles Butterworth, ‘The Source that Nourishes: Averroes’s Decisive Determination’, Arabic Sciences and Philosophy, 5 (1995), pp. 93–119.
- 25.
Ibid., p. 104.
- 26.
Ibid., p. 119.
- 27.
Ibid., p. 97.
- 28.
Gutas, ‘The Study of Arabic Philosophy in the Twentieth Century’, p. 14. While I can see the point in Gutas’s argument that Faʿl al-maqāl has been too uncritically taken by the Straussians as representing a typical discussion in Arabic philosophy which may correspond to the question whether history of philosophy is concerned with problems rather than doctrines, theories or systems (see below), I find it much more difficult to follow the implications of his stress on the character of the text as a legal discussion. For the text’s legal perspective see also Niewöhner, ‘Zum Ursprung der Lehre von der doppelten Wahrheit’, p. 27.
- 29.
Joseph E. Lowry, ‘The Legal Hermeneutics of al-Shāfiʿī and Ibn Qutayba: A Reconsideration’, Islamic Law and Society, 11 (2004), pp. 1–41 (27ff).
- 30.
Pace Leaman, Averroes, p. 144.
- 31.
Ibn Rushd, Faʿl al-maqāl, p. 23.
- 32.
Mahdi, ‘Remarks on Averroes’ Decisive Treatise’, describes the ‘legal character’ of the first part of Faʿl al-maqāl as follows: ‘It seems clear that the kind of inquiry employed in the first part of the Decisive Treatise is not a demonstrative inquiry of the kind employed in demonstrative books. It is not clear, however, that it is identical with the promised “legal inquiry”; rather, it appears that Averroes’ position is not legal nor demonstrative, but situated somewhere in between’ (p. 189).
- 33.
Harry Austryn Wolfson, ‘The Twice-Revealed Averroes’, Speculum, 36 (1961), pp. 373–392 (repr. in Harry Austryn Wolfson, Studies in the History of Philosophy and Religion, ed. Isadore Twersky and George H. Williams, 2 vols [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1973], I, pp. 371–401).
- 34.
Norman Golb, ‘The Hebrew Translation of Averroes’ “Faʿl al-maqāl”’, Proceedings of the American Academy for Jewish Research, 25 (1956), pp. 91–113 and 26 (1957), pp. 41–64.
- 35.
Alfred Ivry, ‘Averroes and the West: The First Encounter/Non-Encounter’, in A Straight Path: Studies in Medieval Philosophy and Culture, ed. Ruth Link-Salinger (Washington: Catholic University of American Press, 1988), pp. 142–158; see also Charles Burnett, ‘The Second Revelation of Arabic Philosophy and Science’, in Islam and the Italian Renaissance, eds Charles Burnett and Anna Contadini (London: The Warburg Institute, 1999), pp. 185–198.
- 36.
Marenbon, ‘Latin Averroism’, p. 144.
- 37.
Ed. Henry Frederick Amedroz (Beirut: Maʿba‘at al-Ābā’ al-Yasū‘iyyīn, 1908), pp. 291–293.
- 38.
Maribel Fierro, ‘Spiritual Alienation and Political Activism: The Ghuraba’ in al-Andalus during the Sixth/Twelfth Century’, Arabica, 47 (2000), pp. 230–260; Ead., ‘Revolución y tradición: Algunos aspectos del mundo del saber en al-Andalus durante las épocas almorávide y almohade’, in Biografías almohades, II, eds María Luisa Ávila and Maribel Fierro (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 2000), pp. 131–165; Tilman Nagel, Im Offenkundigen das Verborgene: Die Heilszusage des sunnitischen Islams (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2002), pp. 33–175.
- 39.
Translation Hourani from Averroes on the Harmony of Religion and Philosophy, trans. George F. Hourani (London: Luzac, 1961), pp. 12–13.
- 40.
Sarah Stroumsa, ‘Philosophes almohades? Averroès, Maïmonide et l’idéologie almohade’, in Los Almohades: Problemas y perspectivas, eds Patrice Cressier, Maribel Fierro and Luis Molina (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 2005), II, pp. 1137–1162 (in particular 1140–1141).
- 41.
Émile Fricaud, ‘Le problème de la disgrace d’Averroès’, in Averroès et l’averroïsme (XIIe–XVe siècle): Un itinéraire historique du Haut Atlas à Paris et à Padoue, eds André Bazzana, Nicole Bériou and Pierre Guichard (Lyon: Presses Universitaires de Lyon, 2005), pp. 155–189. See also the article on Ibn Rushd in the Biblioteca de al-Andalus (eds Jorge Lirola Delgado and José Miguel Puerta Vílchez [Almería: Fundación Ibn Tufayl de Estudios Árabes, 2004-], IV, pp. 517–617) which offers an equally balanced view.
- 42.
Stroumsa, ‘Philosophes almohades’, pp. 1147–1149.
- 43.
Thomas E. Burman, Religious Polemic and the Intellectual History of the Mozarabs, c. 1050–1200 (Leiden: Brill, 1994), pp. 78 ff.
- 44.
Dag Nikolaus Hasse, ‘King Avicenna: The Iconographic Consequences of a Mistranslation’, Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes, 60 (1997), pp. 230–243; Marie-Thérèse d’Alverny, Avicenne en Occident (Paris: Vrin, 1993), article XV, pp. 79–87. See also Amos Bertolacci in the present volume.
- 45.
Israel, Enlightenment Contested, p. 622 for D’Argens and p. 626 for Bayle.
- 46.
Marc Geoffroy, ‘Ibn Rushd et la théologie almohadiste: Une version inconnue du Kitāb al-kašf ‛an manāhiǧ al-adilla dans deux manuscrits d’Istanbul’, Medioevo, 26 (2001), pp. 327–352.
- 47.
A list of potentially relevant characters can be extracted from Josep Puig, ‘Materials on Averroes’s Circle’, Journal of Near Eastern Studies, 51 (1992), pp. 241–260 and and Muʿammad Ibn Sharīfa, Ibn Rushd al-ʿafīd: Sīra wathā’iqiyya (Casablanca: Maʿba‛at al-najāʿ, 1999). Parallels can be found in Ibn Sab‛īn’s Sicilian Questions, see my Philosophie und Mystik in der späten Almohadenzeit (Leiden: Brill, 2006), pp. 264–289.
- 48.
See my ‘Ibn Sab‛īn’s Sicilian Questions: the Text, its Sources, and their Historical Context’, al-Qanʿara, 29 (2008), pp. 115–146.
- 49.
Methodology is used here in the sense of a set of methods including such of a philological nature (editorial principles such as how significant it is how an author should have interpreted Aristotle; how far should the Greek text of an Aristotelian work be used even if it was not at the disposal of the Muslim writer), historical contextualisation (should it be taken into consideration, for example, where an author got his money from or which audience he addressed) and philosophical interpretation (e.g. usefulness for today and whether a past philosopher was actually right) held together by a framework of more abstract ideas concerning the purpose of studying the history of philosophy.
- 50.
For what follows see, among other publications, Charles Butterworth, ‘Averroës: Politics and Opinion’, The American Political Science Review, 66 (1972), pp. 894–901; Id., ‘Rhetoric and Islamic Political Philosophy,’ International Journal of Middle East Studies, 3 (1972), pp. 187–198; Id., ‘Ethical and Political Philosophy’, in The Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy, eds Peter Adamson and Richard C. Taylor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 266–286; Gutas, ‘The Study of Arabic Philosophy in the Twentieth Century’; James Montgomery in the present volume.
- 51.
Muhsin Mahdi, ‘Philosophy and Political Thought: Reflections and Comparisons’, Arabic Sciences and Philosophy, 1 (1991), pp. 9–29.
- 52.
Rémi Brague’s addition of Mecca as representing the harmonising tradition of Islam, al-Fārābī in particular, is an unfortunate choice given that the holy city never was a centre of philosophy. ‘Athens, Jerusalem, Mecca: Leo Strauss’s “Muslim” Understanding of Greek Philosophy’, Poetics Today, 19 (1998), pp. 235–259.
- 53.
Persecution and the Art of Writing (New York: The Free Press, 1952), p. 33.
- 54.
See also ‘On Ibn Rushd, Philosophy and the Arab World (Interview)’, Alif: Journal of Comparative Poetics, 16 (1996), pp. 255–258.
- 55.
Gutas, ‘The Study of Arabic Philosophy in the Twentieth Century’, p. 20.
- 56.
‘Review: On Translating Averroes’ Commentaries’, Journal of the American Oriental Society, 110 (1990), pp. 92–101. Butterworth has replied in ‘Translation and Philosophy: The Case of Averroes’ Commentaries’, International Journal of Middle East Studies, 26 (1994), pp. 19–35.
- 57.
Gutas, ‘Review: On Translating Averroes’ Commentaries’, p. 93.
- 58.
Butterworth, ‘Translation and Philosophy: The Case of Averroes’ Commentaries’, p. 21.
- 59.
Ibid., p. 20.
- 60.
Ibid., p. 20.
- 61.
Ibid., p. 21.
- 62.
Among other journalists, Seymour M. Hersh pointed out the Straussian connection in his article ‘Selective Intelligence’ published 12 May 2003 in the New Yorker. A long critique of this theory of a Straussian conspiracy is Catherine and Michael Zuckert, The Truth about Leo Strauss: Political Philosophy and American Democracy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2006).
- 63.
Gutas, ‘The Study of Arabic Philosophy in the Twentieth Century’. In addition to Straussianism, Gutas highlights Orientalist and esoteric interpretations as erroneous.
- 64.
A concise and very readable definition is offered by Simon Critchley in his Continental Philosophy: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) and his introduction to A Companion to Continental Philosophy, eds Simon Critchley and William R. Schroeder (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998).
- 65.
Philosophy in History: Essays in the Historiography of Philosophy, eds Richard Rorty, Jerome B. Schneewind and Quentin Skinner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984). See also the first volume of Quentin Skinner, Visions of Politics (‘Regarding Method’) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
- 66.
Rorty, Schneewind and Skinner, ‘Introduction’, Philosophy in History, pp. 1–14 (12).
- 67.
Charles Taylor, ‘Philosophy and its History’, in Philosophy in History, pp. 17–30.
- 68.
Richard Rorty, ‘The Historiography of Philosophy: Four Genres’, in Philosophy in History, pp. 49–75.
- 69.
Charles Butterworth, ‘The Study of Arabic Philosophy Today’, in Arabic Philosophy and the West: Continuity and Interaction, ed. Thérèse-Anne Druart (Washington: Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University, 1988), pp. 55–140 (95).
- 70.
Muhsin Mahdi, ‘Orientalism and the Study of Islamic Philosophy’, Journal of Islamic Studies, 1 (1990), pp. 73–98 (93).
- 71.
Lorenz Krüger, ‘Why do we Study the History of Philosophy’, in Philosophy in History, pp. 77–101 (80).
- 72.
Krüger, ‘Why do we Study the History of Philosophy’, p. 81.
- 73.
Gutas criticises Butterworth for working on the assumption that Ibn Rushd had access to the text of Aristotle’s Poetics as we have it now and to ignore ‘factors such as translators’ misunderstandings, scribal errors, extrapolations, exegetical additions and elaborations that accumulated over the twelve centuries and more that separate classical Greek philosophy and the beginning of Arabic, and the semantic and connotative range of Arabic terms and expressions that were current at the time of each Arabic philosopher’ (Gutas, ‘The Study of Arabic Philosophy’, p. 22). In his Greek Thought, Arabic Culture (London: Routledge, 1998), Gutas employs a much broader notion of historical context.
- 74.
Leaman, ‘Does the Interpretation of Islamic Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?’; An Introduction to Medieval Islamic Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), ch. 6 (pp. 182–201), Averroes and his Philosophy, pp. 9–11. Butterworth and Gutas are united in their criticism of Leaman’s credentials. See Charles Butterworth, ‘Review: On Scholarship and Scholarly Conventions’, Journal of the American Oriental Society, 106 (1986), pp. 725–732, and Dimitri Gutas’s review in Der Islam, 65 (1988), pp. 339–342.
- 75.
Taylor, ‘“Truth Does not Contradict Truth”’, p. 3.
- 76.
Ibid. Mohammed Abed al-Jabri, Introduction à la critique de la raison arabe (Paris: La Découverte and Institut du monde arabe, 1994).
- 77.
Taylor, ‘“Truth Does not Contradict Truth”’, p. 12: ‘There are many contemporary philosophers of religion who follow some parts of the route of Averroes and it may be that further careful study of Averroes’ thought on philosophy and religion will have something to contribute to current discussions of the interpretation of texts and the understanding of the powers and limits of philosophy, as well as of the relationship or connection between philosophy and religion.’
- 78.
Mahdi, ‘Orientalism and the Study of Islamic Philosophy’, p. 97.
- 79.
Catherine and Michael Zuckert, The Truth about Leo Strauss, p. 42.
- 80.
The significance of inner-Christian conflicts on German Oriental scholarship has recently been explored by Suzanne L. Marchand in her German Orientalism in the Age of Empire: Religion, Race, and Scholarship (Washington: German Historical Institute; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
- 81.
Butterworth, ‘Translation and Philosophy’, p. 21.
- 82.
Charles Butterworth, ‘Averroës, Precursor of the Enlightenment?’, Alif: Journal of Comparative Poetics, 16 (1996), pp. 6–18.
- 83.
Aziz al-Azmeh, Ibn Khaldūn in Modern Scholarship: A Study in Orientalism (London: Third World Centre for Research and Publishing, 1981).
- 84.
Mahdi, ‘Orientalism and the Study of Islamic Philosophy’, pp. 85 ff.
- 85.
Gutas, ‘The Study of Arabic Philosophy in the Twentieth Century’.
- 86.
Published in Die Welt des Islams, 32 (1992), pp. 145–147. Whereas other reviewers including Butterworth and Gutas (see note 74 above) have doubted Leaman’s academic credentials, van Ess at least acknowledges that Leaman approaches problems as a ‘Systemiker’. This, however, is not the main point in the criticism of Butterworth and Gutas.
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Akasoy, A. (2013). Was Ibn Rushd an Averroist? The Problem, the Debate, and Its Philosophical Implications. In: Akasoy, A., Giglioni, G. (eds) Renaissance Averroism and Its Aftermath: Arabic Philosophy in Early Modern Europe. International Archives of the History of Ideas Archives internationales d'histoire des idées, vol 211. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-5240-5_16
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