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Sweet Dreams Are Made of This? A HOT Response to Sebastián

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Consciousness Inside and Out: Phenomenology, Neuroscience, and the Nature of Experience

Part of the book series: Studies in Brain and Mind ((SIBM,volume 6))

Abstract

Sebastián (this issue) argues that data from dream research undermines a prominent version of the higher-order representation theory of consciousness. In this commentary, I argue that Sebastián’s attack falls short, for three main reasons. First, the data from dream studies is notoriously hard to interpret, leaving ample space for the higher-order theorist to contest Sebastián’s claims. Second, even accepting the dream data as given, there is still enough brain activity present in the dreaming brain to vindicate higher-order claims. And third, it is not clear that the higher-order theory must be committed to the anatomical claims exposing it to Sebastián’s critique.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    The initial phenomenal/access distinction is in Block (1995). For Rosenthal on Block’s distinction, see Rosenthal (2002). For Block’s reflexive consciousness, see Block (2001).

  2. 2.

    I do reconsider Sebastián’s cognitive access claim in Sect. 30.4, where I present alternative realizations for HOT.

  3. 3.

    This does not, however, provide an argument that also challenges Michael Tye’s “PANIC” theory (1995). But I am skeptical of Sebastián’s attempt to assimilate Tye’s and Rosenthal’s views in this way. So, following the lead of Sebastián’s title, I will focus solely on the HOT view.

  4. 4.

    Malcolm (1959) and Dennett (1976).

  5. 5.

    See Dennett (1991). See also Schwitzgebel (2011).

  6. 6.

    Cf. Hurlburt and Schwitzgebel (2007).

  7. 7.

    David Rosenthal endorsed this sort of response in conversation. Thanks to both David Rosenthal and Hakwan Lau for helpful comments on the CO3 talk this paper is based upon.

  8. 8.

    Muzur, Pace-Schott, and Hobson write, “We are aware that increased delta activity does not always mean (complete) inactivity… Rather than evaluating the absolute metabolism of the prefrontal cortex, we consider ‘deactivation’ of the prefrontal cortex in terms of relative activity” (2002, 476). Thanks to Richard Brown for noting this point in discussion during CO3.

  9. 9.

    See http://consciousnessonline.com/2011/02/18/not-a-hot-dream/

  10. 10.

    See also Ioannides et al. (2009) and Tian et al. (2006).

  11. 11.

    See also Van Orden et al. (2001) and Anderson (2007, 2008). Thanks to Cameron Buckner for alerting me to this point and for the references.

  12. 12.

    Carruthers (2000) and Lau (2008), for example.

  13. 13.

    Cf. Ivanowich, this volume.

  14. 14.

    See Nichols (forthcoming) for an overview.

  15. 15.

    Braun et al. (1997) and Nofzinger et al. (1997); see Nir and Tononi (2010) for overview.

  16. 16.

    Flohr (1995, 1999).

  17. 17.

    Thanks to Richard Brown, Jake Berger, Matthew Ivanowich, Michal Klincewicz, Hakwan Lau, Myrto Mylopoulos, David Rosenthal, and Miguel Sebastián for helpful discussion.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Houston, 513 Agnes Arnold Hall, Houston, TX, 77204, USA

    Josh Weisberg

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Correspondence to Josh Weisberg .

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  1. Philosophy Program, LaGuardia Community College, CUNY, Long Island City, USA

    Richard Brown

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Weisberg, J. (2014). Sweet Dreams Are Made of This? A HOT Response to Sebastián. In: Brown, R. (eds) Consciousness Inside and Out: Phenomenology, Neuroscience, and the Nature of Experience. Studies in Brain and Mind, vol 6. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6001-1_30

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