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Cognitive Enhancement and Criminal Behavior

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Cognitive Enhancement

Part of the book series: Trends in Augmentation of Human Performance ((TAHP,volume 1))

Abstract

Some offenders appear to have an impaired capacity to appreciate the moral significance of their acts and a limited ability to engage in effective practical reasoning. These deficits may interfere with the communicative aspects of punishment and with rehabilitation. This chapter will discuss whether it could ever be morally permissible to employ certain types of cognitive enhancements to enhance offenders’ capacities for practical reasoning and moral communication as part of their rehabilitation. The text sets out the considerations that need to be balanced when deciding which types of techniques should be permissible and under what circumstances they may be used. It argues that offenders have three main interests that should be taken into account here: (1) being treated as a member of the moral community; (2) being treated as a rational human being; and (3) being spared unnecessary suffering.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    For more detail on the issues connected with safety and efficacy e.g. (see Greely 2012; Farah 2004; Maletzky et al. 2006; Maletzky and Field 2003).

  2. 2.

    Studies concerning empathy and moral understanding have often been carried out on individuals with psychopathic personality disorder. There is some disagreement concerning whether psychopathy is a mental illness and hence whether interventions to increase psychopaths’ emotional deficits would count as a treatment or an enhancement. For opposing views on the mental illness question (see: Mealey 1997; Kendell 2002).

  3. 3.

    Regarding the use of these medications in Scotland see: http://www.forensicnetwork.scot.nhs.uk/Medication%20for%20Sex%20Offenders/medication%20for%20sex%20offenders%20protocol.pdf. Regarding the use of these medications in England see: http://www.insidetime.org/resources/Publications/Use-of-Med-to-treat-SexOff_PSJ176.pdf.

  4. 4.

    This issue is discussed in Kennett (2006).

  5. 5.

    My reasons for adopting this view about free will are similar to those advanced by the following writers: Smart (1961), Strawson (1986), Pereboom (2001), Honderich (2005) and Harrison (2009).

  6. 6.

    This point is emphasized in Double (2002).

  7. 7.

    For a defense of this idea from the point of view of a free will sceptic (see: Vilhauer 2009).

  8. 8.

    Depo-Provera is a branded drug that was originally developed as a progesterone-only female contraceptive. The active ingredient is medroxyprogesterone acetate (MPA). It is given as an injection every three months. When used in males, it can reduce compulsive sexual fantasies and sex drive (see Maletzky et al. 2006; Maletzky and Field 2003, who also list possible side-effects).

  9. 9.

    Michael Ross, quoted in Fischer (2006, 2–3).

  10. 10.

    For examples of potential side-effects see references in footnote 1 above. Loss of bone density is one possible long-term side-effect of anti-androgens that are currently given to sex offenders (Greely 2012). As Greely notes, the possibility of this side-effect is known due to studies on the use of this medication as a form of birth control for women: “Sex offenders receive the drug at much higher doses. What is effect on their bones? No one knows, as it was never tested on men, and because the recipients are sex offenders, almost no one cares” (163).

  11. 11.

    This principle is defended in Honderich (1984, 78).

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Acknowledgements

My research was funded by the Clark Foundation for Legal Education and by the Arts and Humanities Research Council. I am grateful to Elisabeth Hildt, Antony Duff and James Chalmers for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this chapter.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of Law, University of Aberdeen, Aberdeen, UK

    Elizabeth Shaw

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  1. Elizabeth Shaw
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Correspondence to Elizabeth Shaw .

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  1. , Department of Philosophy, University of Mainz, Jakob Welder-Weg 18, Mainz, 55099, Germany

    Elisabeth Hildt

  2. , Psychiatry and Psychotherapy, University Medical Center Mainz, Untere Zahlbacher Str. 8, Mainz, 55131, Germany

    Andreas G. Franke

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Shaw, E. (2013). Cognitive Enhancement and Criminal Behavior. In: Hildt, E., Franke, A. (eds) Cognitive Enhancement. Trends in Augmentation of Human Performance, vol 1. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6253-4_20

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