Abstract
The notion of technology as well as our relationships to technological tools are philosophically described by Martin Heidegger and Gabriel Marcel. Understanding the phenomenon of cyber-crime from a philosophical viewpoint is not possible without unveiling the way human being is more and more connected to his/her technological tools. Cyber-crime is contributing to put the Infinite within the finite self. In doing so, cyber-crime is distorting the meaning of existential finitude as well as the meaning of the Infinite. This is the ultimate effect of the idolatry of technology. Human being is thus facing a deep anthropological change, since the parameters of what-it-means-to-be as well as dwelling in the existence have been radically modified. When the finite-Infinite dualism has disappeared (so that the Infinite is now an aspect of human being), we no longer have any reliable parameter for analyzing the meaning of human existence. The presence of the Infinite within the finite being is not rationally justified by every discourse or practice drawn from the cyber-space (including cyber-crime). Human being has lost the basic connexion with his/her existential questioning.
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Notes
- 1.
According to Habermas (2012), when we perceive a given process (whether it is social, political, economic, cultural, or religious) as a crisis, we are giving a normative meaning to the crisis itself: solving the crisis is then perceived as the basic means to release its victims (Jürgen HABERMAS, Raison et légitimité. Problèmes de légitimation dans le capitalisme avancé, Paris, Petite bibliothèque Payot, 2012, p. 12).
- 2.
In his Phenomenology of religious life (2012a: 373), Heidegger seems quite aware of Schleiermarcher’s notion of piety: piety is “the basis of all ecclesiastical communions and should be considered purely in itself, neither a Knowing, nor a Doing, but a modification of Feeling, or of immediate self-consciousness” (Friedrich Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1986, p. 5).
- 3.
In Identity and Difference (1957), Heidegger said that we should listen to the appeal of Being which is involved in the essence of technology (Questions I et II, 268, 275). Heidegger even asserted that we are not allowed neither to interpret the technological world as being the work of the Devil, nor to destroy such world, except if the technological world is destroyed by itself. It is a very strong warning for the future of humankind and the need to safeguard the Earth.
- 4.
Since the “death of God” (Nietzsche), the atomic age has transformed the way we look at reality (Heidegger 2008b, 221, 254–260). Everything is calculated and thus closely linked to the principle of reason. Modern technology is moving toward the greatest perfection, as if it could actually reach it. Such perfection lies in the possibility to project calculation on all objects as components of reality. The presupposition that we could calculate every object unveils an a priori belief: the principle of reason is perceived as being universally valid. The domination of the principle of reason, said Heidegger, actually characterizes the technological (atomic) era. Heidegger asked the following question: What does it mean that an historical era is characterized by atomic energy and its releasement? According to Heidegger, the atomic era is subjected to the strong principle of sufficient reason. Human being is always searching for security. That’s exactly what human being as the animal rationale in the atomic era means, said Heidegger.
- 5.
Ma and Brakel (2006, 523) defined standing-reserve as “a calculable resource that is always ready for the call of technological purposes”. Weinberger (1992, 113) called it “manipulated stuff”, while Folz (1984, 329) talked about “a resource to be in stock for further disposal”. Those definitions actually converge to unveil Heidegger’s notion of standing-reserve.
- 6.
In The Age of the World Picture, Heidegger defined machine technology in the following manner: “Machine technology is itself an autonomous transformation of praxis, a type of transformation wherein praxis first demands the employment of mathematical physical science. Machine technology remains up to now the most visible outgrowth of the essence of modern technology, which is identical with the essence of modern metaphysics” (Martin Heidegger 1977. The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays. New York: Harper and Row, p. 116).
- 7.
In The Word of Nietzsche, Heidegger said that the essence of consciousness is self-consciousness. Everything that is either the object (ecosystems) of the subject (human being), or the subject (some non-human beings) of the subject (human being). Nature appears everywhere as the object of technology (Martin Heidegger. 1977. The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays. New York: Harper and Row, p. 100).
- 8.
According to Heidegger (2006b, 35), only human being exists. Rocks, and trees as well as angels and God “are”, but do not exist, since they are neither subjected to existential finitude, nor aware of it. According to Heidegger (2001, 45), human being is the witness of everything-that-is: human being is unveiling and denouncing everything-that-is. Poetry, which makes language possible, is the most dangerous (subversive) work (Martin Heidegger, Approches de Hölderlin, Paris: Gallimard, 2001, p. 45–55). Human being knows his/her home (Earth). But, said Hölderlin, the sons of gods (those who imitate gods’ virtues) do not know where they are going to. They have lost the meaning of their destiny. According to Hölderlin, human being is born free, so that the whole human existence is being-free. And being-free is basically a mortal being (Johan Christian Friedrich Hölderlin, Odes, Élégies, Hymnes, Paris, Gallimard, 2008, p. 130–137). The meaning of existence has been at the midst of every philosophizing, since the first philosophers (particularly Greek philosophers). However, since the 19th century, it has impregnated every human activity and artistic creation, including literature (Dostoïevski’s The Karamazov Brothers), poetry (Baudelaire’s Fleurs du mal), and architecture (Ruskin’s The Stones of Venice, 1853). Heidegger (1967, 46–47) explained how Van Gogh’s A Pair of Shoes (1887) mirrored existentiality. When Heidegger (1994, 19–37) looked at Trakl’s poems (for instance, A Winter Evening), he was unveiling, as Plato did it (2011a, 577), that poets are nothing but interpreters of forgotten gods (Heidegger 1994, 115). According to Heidegger (1994, 48), looking at something is nothing but entering the realm of the unspoken/unsaid (Brito 1999, 105–113, 204–210). That’s exactly the way Dante (2010, 454, 462) considered the sacred poem in two basic ways: (a) the Paradise as the sacred poem: there is a basic link between earthly experience and divine science (Dante 2010, 454, 462); (b) his self-perception as writer mirrors his conviction that he was writing about divine matters (Dante 2010, 388).
- 9.
According to Heidegger (1962, 61–62), phenomenology is the science of Being of entities, but only if we are considering its subject-matter. Phenomena actually go to make up the Being of entities. Ontology and phenomenology are not two distinct philosophical disciplines. Rather, Heidegger defined philosophy as “universal phenomenological ontology”. Phenomenology is exhibiting an entity “as it shows itself in itself” (Heidegger 1962, 59). According to Heidegger (1962, 60), only as phenomenology is ontology possible. The point of departure for every philosophy is nothing but the hermeneutic of Dasein. Heidegger (1962, 31) thus discussed ontological inquiry apart from the ontical inquiry of positive sciences. Ontological inquiry “remains naïve and opaque if in its researches into the Being of entities it fails to discuss the meaning of Being in general”. In any attempt to disclose Being, the analysis of entities is nothing but preliminary step (Heidegger 1962, 95). Entities, as they are encountered in the world, are what is used, or produced. From a phenomenological viewpoint, our understanding must focus on Being rather than entities.
- 10.
Dasein is ontically different, since it is ontological (Heidegger 1962, 32). Dasein’s Being-ontological is pre-ontological: it means “in such a way that one has an understanding of Being” (Heidegger 1962, 35). Heidegger focused on the pre-ontological understanding of Being. He thus defined the way his ontology has to be understood: “So, whenever an ontology takes for its theme entities whose character of Being is other than that of Dasein, it has its own foundation and motivation in Dasein’s own ontical structure, in which a pre-ontological understanding of Being is comprised as a definite characteristic” (Heidegger 1962, 33). According to Heidegger (1962, 195), understanding is Dasein’s potentiality-for-Being. As said Grondin (2006, 40), the hermeneutic circle implies that any interpretation is based on prior interpretations. The hermeneutic circle is an integral part of existence. It belongs to the structure of meaning (Heidegger 1962, 195).
- 11.
Heidegger knew how Greek ontology has been distorted, so that the meaning of Being has been neglected, or forgotten: “Greek ontology and its history – which, in their numerous filiations and distortions, determine the conceptual character of philosophy even today – prove that when Dasein understands either itself or Being in general, it does so in terms of the world, and that the ontology which has thus arisen has deteriorated to a tradition in which it gets reduced to something self-evident – merely material for reworking, as it was for Hegel (…) If the question of Being is to have its own history made transparent, then this hardened tradition must be loosened up, and the concealments which it has brought about must be dissolved. We understand this task as one in which by taking the question of Being as our clue, we are to destroy the traditional content of ancient ontology until we arrive at those primordial experiences in which we achieved our first ways of determining the nature of Being” (Heidegger 1962, 43–44). Dastur (1990, 37) believed that the question of Being must be explicitly restated (as it is said in the first section of Being and Time), that is, to ask the same question in a more radical way.
- 12.
In Theaetetus, Plato is unveiling Protagoras’s anthropocentric principle: Plato. 1987. Theaetetus Sophist. Cambridge/London: Harvard University Press/William Heinemann Ltd, p. 41 (152a).
- 13.
The Being of entities has nothing to do with the movements of the soul. Heidegger (1962, 22) did not agree with Thomas Aquinas’ view on human soul: “… there are three degrees of movement in the soul (…) The first is by the soul passing from exterior things to concentrate its power on itself; the second is by the soul ascending so as to be associated with the united superior powers, namely the angels; the third is when the soul is led on yet further to the supreme good, that is, to God” (Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologica, I-I, q. 94, art. 2).
- 14.
- 15.
Heidegger (1980b, 28) referred to Aristotle’s notion of metaphysics as the science of Being as Being (2000-109-110): the subject matter of metaphysics is defined as the reality primary principles and the highest causes essentially belong to (Aristotle, Métaphysique. Tome 1. Livres A-Z. Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 2000).
- 16.
Gabriel Marcel moved away from Sartre’s existentialist philosophy. According to Marcel, existence does not precede essence. In asserting that existence precedes essence, Sartre is saying that human being is the ultimate source of good/evil, so that there is no “a priori” good/wrong actions. According to Sartre, values actually reveal human freedom (Jean-Paul Sartre. Cahiers pour une morale. 1983. Paris: Gallimard, p. 23, 39). Such philosophical perspective does not fit with Marcel’s view on morality and human being.
- 17.
In Le Chemin de Crête, Ariane is saying that some sick people cannot overcome the phase of despair and revolt. Sick people do not have access to the second-level knowledge. Marcel was thus explaining that facing reality could make despair appearing in our heart. There is an inner path for overcoming the influential power of despair (Gabriel Marcel. 1973. Cinq pièces majeures. Paris: Plon, p. 285). Our existential predicament makes everybody affected by unhappiness and finitude. Unhappiness and existential finitude could give birth to despair (Le Chemin de Crête: 340). We live in a broken world: a world without heart, that is, world without any center of life (Le monde cassé. Cinq pièces majeures. 1973, p. 121).
- 18.
According to Horkheimer et Adorno (1974), the individual is reduced to nothing, when he/she is subjected to economic powers. Economic productivity actually creates the economic conditions for a better life. It provides a huge superiority to technologies’ users over social masses (Max Horkheimer et Theodor W. Adorno. 1974. La dialectique de la raison. Fragments philosophiques. Paris: Gallimard, p. 17).
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Dion, M. (2014). A Heideggerian and Marcelian View of Technology: The Philosophical Challenge of Cybercrime. In: Financial Crimes and Existential Philosophy. Ethical Economy. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-7326-4_5
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