Abstract
In ‘Three Varieties of Knowledge’, D. Davidson distinguishes three types of knowledge: knowledge of the self, of others’ thoughts, and knowledge of the world. He notes that the Cartesian tradition privileged the first type of knowledge believing that the other two could be derived from it. Against Cartesianism and logical positivism, Davidson maintains that these three modes of knowledge are irreducible, although complementary. I am particularly interested here in one of the arguments brought up by Davidson against the reduction of any one of these modes of thoughts. I will begin my analysis with his views on the characterization and explanation of intentional behavior. according to Davidson, the normative character of rationality and of the concepts used in the characterization and explanation of behavior constitute an inevitable obstacle to their reduction to an explanation using nonnormative concepts, and more particularly, to strict laws. The thesis of the irreducibility of explanations by rationalizations of the explanatory type found in physics but also in biology and neurophysiology, refers, of course, to his theory of identity, and more particularly, to his third principle: the anomalism of the mental. As we all know, this doctrine has been the object of numerous debates in contemporary philosophy. However, it is not my intention to add to this debate. My goal is to examine if the normative character of rationality, which is also an argument in support of the anomalism of the mental, can support the thesis of the irreducibility of explanations through reasons.
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Fisette, D. (1996). Davidson on Norms and the Explanation of Behavior. In: Marion, M., Cohen, R.S. (eds) Québec Studies in the Philosophy of Science. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 178. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-0113-1_9
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