Abstract
The phrase “propositional attitude” was used by Russell to cover such “mental” things as beliefs, hopes, wishes, fears and the like. One can even use the phrase more widely to refer to indirect discourse in generaL The grammatical mark of an expression for a propositional attitude in English is that it can take a that-complement. Russell’s example was (1) Othello believes that Desdemona loves Cassio and the problem is the individuation of the object of Othello’s belief. To believe is to believe something, but since Desdemona does not love Cassio. there is no such thing as “Desdemona#x2019;s loving Cassio” to be the object of Othello#x2019;s belief. It seems plausible, however, to analyse the meaning of (1) by requiring it to be true if and only if Othello stands in whatever relation is the meaning of #x2019;believe#x2019; to the entity which is the meaning of (2) Desdemona loves Cassio and that this be an entity which still exists, even though Desdemona does not in fact love Cassio.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Bibliography
Barwise, J. and Perry, J.: 1983, Situations and Attitudes, Cambridge Mass. MIT Press.
Belnap, N. D.: 1977a, ‘How a computer should think’, Contemporary Aspects of Philosophy, in G. Ryle (ed.), Oxford, Oriel Press, pp. 30–56.
Belnap, N. D.: 1977b, ‘A useful four-valued logic’, Modern Uses of Multiple-Valued Logic, (in J. M. Dunn and G. Epstein (eds.), Dordrecht, D. Reidel, pp. 8–37.
Bigelow, J. c.: 1978, ‘Believing in semantics’, Linguistics and Philosophy 2, 101–144.
Burge, T.: 1978, ‘Belief and synonymy’, The Journal of Philosophy 75, 119–138.
Carnap, R.: 1947, Meaning and Necessity, Chicago, University of Chicago Press (2nd edition with appendices, 1956).
Casteñeda, H.-N.: 1974, ‘Thinking and the structure of the world’, Philosophia 4,3–40.
Church, A.: 1950, ‘On Carnap’s analysis of statements of assertion and belief’, Analysis 10, 97–99.
Cresswell, M. J.: 1975, ‘Hyperintensional logic’, Studia Logica 34, pp. 25–38.
Cresswpll, M. J.: 1980, ‘Quotational theories of propositional attitudes’, Journal of Philosophical Logic 9, pp. 17–40. Reprinted as chapter 6 of Semantical Essays: Possible Worlds and their Rivals, Dordrecht, Kluwer 1988, pp. 78-103.
Cresswell, M. J.: 1982, The autonomy of semantics. Processes, Beliefs, and Questions in S. Peters and E. Saarinen (eds.), Dordrecht, D. Reidel, pp. 69–86.
Cresswell, M. J.: 1985, Structured Meanings: The Semantics of Propositional Attitudes, Cambridge Mass., MIT Press.
Cresswell, M. J. and A. von Stechow: 1982, ‘De re belief generalized’, Linguistics and Philosophy 5, pp. 503–535.
Davidson, D.: 1969, ‘On saying that’, Words and Objections in D. Davidson and K. J. J. Hintikka (eds.), Dordrecht, D. Reidel, pp. 158–174.
Fodor, J. A. 1975: The Language of Thought. New York, Crowell.
Fodor, J. A.: 1978, ‘Propositional attitudes’, The Monist 61, pp. 501–523.
van Fraassen, B. C.: 1979, ‘Propositional attitudes in weak pragmatics’, Studia Logica 38, pp. 365–374.
Godei, K.: 1931, ‘Über formal unentscheidbare Satze der Principia Mathematica und verwandter Systeme 1’, Monatshefte für Mathematik und Physik 38, 173–198. (Translated by B. Meltzer with an introduction by R. B. Braithwaite, Edinburgh, Oliver and Boyd).
Hintikka, K. J. J.: 1962, Knowledge and Belief, Ithaca, Cornell University Press.
Hintikka, K. J. J.: 1970, ‘Knowledge, belief and logical consequence’. Ajatus, Vol 32. pp. 32–47 (reprinted in Hintikka [1975, pp. 179-191].)
Hintikka, K. J. L 1975. The Intentions of Intentionality and Other New Models for Modalities, Dordrecht, D. ReideL
Hintikka, K. J. J.: 1973, Logic. Language Games and Information, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Hintikka, K. J. L 1975, ‘Impossible possible worlds vindicated’. Journal of Philosophical Logic 4, 475–484.
Kaplan, D.: 1969, Quantifying in Words and Objections (ed. D. Davidson and K. J. J. Hintikka) D. Reidel Dordrecht, pp. 206–42.
Kaplan, D.: 1979. On the logic of demonstratives. The Journal of Philosophical Logic 8, 81–98.
Katz, J. J. 1972, Semantic Theory. New York. Harper and Row.
Klein, E. H.: 1978. On sentences which report beliefs, desires and other mental attitudes. Ph.D. Thesis. University of Cambridge.
Kripke, S. A.: 1972. ‘Naming and necessity’, Semantics of Natural Language. in D. Davidson and G. H. Harman (eds.), Dordrecht, D. Reidel. pp. 253–355.
Lewis, C. L: 1918. A Survey of Symbolic Logic. Berkeley, University of California Press.
Lewis, D. K.: 1970. ‘General semantics’. Synthese 22 (1970) pp. 18–67. (Reprinted in Semantics of Natural Language. (ed. D. Davidson and G. H. Harman). Dordrechl. D. Reidel. pp. 169-218, and in Partee [1976] pp. 1-50)
Lewis, D. K.: 1979. ‘Attitudes de dicto and de se’. Philosophical Review 8,513–43.
Mates, B.: 1950. ‘Synonymity’, University of California Publications in Philosophy Vol 25. pp. 201–226 (reprinted in Semantics and the Philosophy of Language. ed. L. Linsky. University of Illinois Press 1952, pp. 111-136).
Montague, R. M.: 1963. Syntactical treatments of modality. Acta Philosophic-Fenllica, Modal and Many-valued Logics pp. 153–166 (Reprinted in Montague (1974) pp. 286-3(2).
Montague, R. M.: 1974. Formal Philosophy. in R. H. Thomason (ed.). New Haven. Yale University Press.
Moore, R. C. and G. G. Hendrix: 1982, ‘Computational models of beliefs and the semantics of belief sentences’. in Peters, P. S. and E. Soarinen (eds.). Processes Beliefs, and Questions. Dordrecht. Reidel, pp. 107–27.
Parsons, T.: 1974. A Prolegomenon to Melinongian semantics. Journal of Philosophy 71, 561–80.
Partee, B. H.: 1973. ‘The semantics of belief sentences’. Approaches to,Natural Language (ed. K. J. J. Hintikka, J, M. E. Moravcsik and P. Suppes) Dordrecht. Reidel. pp. 309–.136.
Partee, B. H,: 1979. ‘Semantics: Mathematics or Psychology?’. Semantics from Different Points of View (ed. R. Bäuerle. U, Egli, A. von Stechow) Berlin. Springer. pp. 1–14.
Putnam, H.: 1975. ‘The meaning of “meaning”’ Language, Mind and Knowlledge (ed. K. Gunderson) Minnesota Studies in thc Philosophy of Science. Vol 7. University of Minnesota Press. Minneapolis. 1975. reprinted in Mind, Language and Reality Philosophical Papers Vol 2. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. pp. 215 271.
Quine, W. V. O.: 1953. ‘Reference and modality’. From a Logical Point of View. Cambridge Mass,. Harvard University Press (second edition 1961). pp. 139–159.
Quine, W. V. O.: 1956. ‘Quantifiers and propositional attitudes’. The Journal of Philosophy 53, 177–187.
Quine, W. V. O.: 1960, Word and Object. Cambridge Mass., MIT Press, 1960.
Rantala, V.: 1975, ‘Urn models: A new kind of non-standard model for first-order logic’, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 4, 455–474.
Reeves, A. L.: 1973, ‘In defence ofa simple solution’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 51, 17–38.
Rescher, N.: 1975, A Theory of Possibility, Oxford Blackwell.
Russell, B. A. W.: 1912, The Problems of Philosophy, London, Oxford University Press.
Russell, B. A. W.: 1921, The Analysis of Mind, London, George Allen and Unwin.
Russell, B. A. W., 1940, An Enquiry into Meaning and Truth, London, George Allen and Unwin, 1940.
Smullyan, A. F.: 1948, ‘Modality and description’, The Journal of Symbolic Logic 13, 31–37.
Stalnaker, R. c.: 1976, ‘Propositions’, Issues in the Philosophy of Language, in A. F. Mackay and D. Merill (eds.), New Haven, Yale University Press, pp. 79–91.
Stalnaker, R. C.: 1978, ‘Assertion’, Syntac and Semantics Vol 9, in P. Cole (ed.), New York, Academic Press, pp. 315–332.
Stalnaker, R.: 1985, Inquiry, Cambridge Mass., Bradford Books, MIT Press.
Tarski, A.: 1935, ‘Der Wahrheitsbegriff in den formalisierten Sprachen’, Studia Philosophica 1,261–405. Translated in Logic, Semantics and Metamathematics, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1956, pp. 151-278).
Thomason, R. H.: 1977, ‘Indirect discourse is not quotational’, The Monist 60, 340–354.
Thomason, R. H.: 1980a, ‘A model theory for propositional attitudes’, Linguistics and Philosophy 4, 47–70.
Thomason, R. H.: 1980b, ‘A note on syntactical treatments of modality’, Synthese 44, 391–395.
Whitehead, A. N. and B. A. W. Russell: 1910, Principia Mathematica, Cambridge, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 3 Vols, 1st edition 1910-1913, second edition 1923-1927.
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1989 D. Reidel Publishing Company
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Bäuerle, R., Cresswell, M.J. (1989). Propositional Attitudes. In: Handbook of Philosophical Logic. Synthese Library, vol 167. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-1171-0_7
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-1171-0_7
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-010-7021-8
Online ISBN: 978-94-009-1171-0
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive