Skip to main content

Learning from the Past

  • Chapter
An Intimate Relation

Part of the book series: Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science ((BSPS,volume 116))

  • 163 Accesses

Abstract

Here is a big fact: Scientists are good at doing science. It seems a platitude, yet there are those, such as David Bloor, who would deny it.1 On the other hand, most people, including most philosophers, would agree that scientists are good at doing science; nevertheless, these same philosophers don’t seem to think this fact is in any way interesting or important. But it is. There are few facts in philosophy; let’s not let this one slip through our fingers.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 259.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 329.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 329.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Bibliography

  • Barnes, B. (1985). About Science, Oxford: Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bloor, D. (1976). Knowledge and Social Imagery, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

    Google Scholar 

  • Broad, W. and N. Wade. (1982). Betrayers of the Truth, New York: Simon and Schuster.

    Google Scholar 

  • Brown, J. R. (ed.). (1984). Scientific Rationality: The Sociological Turn, Dordrecht: Reidel.

    Google Scholar 

  • Brown, J. R. (1989). The Rational and the Social, London: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Butts, R. E. (1980). “Methodology and the Functional Identity of Science and Philosophy”, in Hintikka et al. (eds.). Pisa Conference Proceedings, vol. II, pp. 253–270.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cesi and Peters, (1980). Science, (September 5, 1980).

    Google Scholar 

  • Davidson, D. (1973). “The Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme”, Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association, 1973–74.

    Google Scholar 

  • Feuer, L. (1974). Einstein and the Generations of Science. New York: Basic Books.

    Google Scholar 

  • Garber, D. (1986). “Learning From the Past”, Synthese.

    Google Scholar 

  • Giere, R. (1973). “History and Philosophy of Science: An Intimate Connection or a Marriage of Convenience?”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.

    Google Scholar 

  • Giere, R. (1984). “Towards a Unified Theory of Science, in Cushing et al (eds.), Science and Reality, Notre Dame.

    Google Scholar 

  • Grandy, R. (1973). “Reference, Meaning, and Belief”, Journal of Philosophy.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hollis, M. (1982). “The Social Destruction of Reality”, in Hollis and Lukes (1982).

    Google Scholar 

  • Hollis and Lukes (eds.). (1982). Rationality and Relativism, Oxford: Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Holton, G. (1974). “On Being Caught Between Apollo and Dionysus”, Deadalus (Summer).

    Google Scholar 

  • Kuhn, T. (1962). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kuhn, T. (1971). “Notes on Lakatos”, in Buck and Cohen (eds.), PSA 1970, Dordrecht: Reidel.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lakatos, I. (1970). “Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes”, in Lakatos and Musgrave (eds.), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lakatos, I. (1971). “History of Science and Its Rational Reconstructions”, in Buck and Cohen (eds.), PSA 1970, Dordrecht: Reidel.

    Google Scholar 

  • Laudan, L. (1977). Progress and Its Problems, Berkeley: University of California Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Laudan, L. (1984). Science and Values, Dordrecht: Reidel.

    Google Scholar 

  • Laudan, L. (1986). “Some Problems Facing Intuitionist Meta-methodologies”, Synthese.

    Google Scholar 

  • Laudan, L. (1987). “Progress or Rationality? The Prospects for a Normative Naturalism”, American Philosophical Quarterly.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lukes, S. (1982). “Relativism in its Place”, in Hollis and Lukes (1982).

    Google Scholar 

  • Merton, R. (1957). Social Theory and Social Structure, (Revised and enlarged edition). New York: Free Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Merton, R. (1973). The Sociology of Science, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Quine, W. (1960). Word and Object, Cambridge: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Watson, J. (1968). The Double Helix, New York: Atheneum.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wilson, N. (1959). “Substances without Substrata”, Review of Metaphysics.

    Google Scholar 

  • Worrall, J. (1976). “Thomas Young and the ‘Refutation’ of Newtonian Optics”, in Howson J (ed.). Method and Appraisal in the Physical Sciences, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 1989 Kluwer Academic Publishers

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Brown, J.R. (1989). Learning from the Past. In: Brown, J.R., Mittelstrass, J. (eds) An Intimate Relation. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 116. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2327-0_17

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2327-0_17

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-010-7546-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-009-2327-0

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

Publish with us

Policies and ethics