Abstract
As Part II opens, Demea, addressing himself to Cleanthes, makes the distinction between the existence of God and the nature of God, maintaining that the former is certain and self-evident, while the latter is incomprehensible and unknown:
I must own, Cleanthes, said Demea, that nothing can more surprise me, than the light, in which you have, all along, put this argument. By the whole tenor of your discourse, one would imagine that you were maintaining the being of a God, against the cavils of atheists and infidels; and were necessitated to become a champion for that fundamental principle of all religion. But this, I hope, is not by any means a question among us. No man; no man, at least, of common sense, I am persuaded, ever entertained a serious doubt with regard to a truth so certain and self-evident. The question is not concerning the being but the nature of God. This, I affirm, from the infirmities of human understanding, to be altogether incomprehensible and unknown to us.1
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References
D. 141.
John Laird (“The Present Day Relevance of Hume’s Dialogues,” p. 207) makes the point that the Dialogues “are in the main between Cleanthes and Philo. Demea, in principle, does not count.” There is already a sense in which Demea does count: in the opening paragraphs of Part II, Hume is attempting to show, in fact to insist, that Philo’s view of the unknowability and incomprehensibility of the divine nature is identical to that held by “all divines almost, from the foundation of Christianity, who have ever treated of this or any other theological subject, and in particular, to that held by Demea, the orthodox religionist in the discussion. Reason, therefore, and religion arrive at the same, rather than different, views regarding the divine nature.
R. J. Butler “Natural Belief and the Enigma of Hume,” Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, 42, 1960, p. 94. Butler quotes the following to support his position: “The idea of existence, then, is the very same with the idea of what we conceive to be existent. To reflect on any thing simply, and to reflect it as existent, are nothing different from each other. That idea, when conjoined with the idea of any object, makes no addition to it. Whatever we conceive, we conceive to be existent. Any idea we please to form is the idea of a being; and the idea of a being is any idea we please to form.” (T. 66–67).
Butler, p. 94–95.
D. 142.
D. 143.
D. 142.
D. 190–191.
In regard to causality, Hume writes: “’Tis a general maxim in philosophy, that whatever begins to exist, must have a cause of existence. This is commonly taken for granted in all reasonings, without any proof given or demanded.” (T. 78–79). Similarly, concerning our belief in physical objects, he writes: (the sceptic) must assent to the principle concerning the existence of body, though he cannot pretend by any arguments of philosohpy to maintain its veracity... We may well ask, What causes induce us to believe in the existence of body? but’tis in vain to ask, Whether there be body or not. That is a point, which we must take for granted in all our reasonings.” (T. 187).
This is compatible with Philo's assertion early in Part XII that the original cause is intelligent, for this is what the natural belief leads us to believe. But just as we believe in a necessary connection between cause and effect and cannot explain what this connection is, so we believe in an intelligent cause but cannot explain what this intelligence is. It is important to realize that Philo can speak in these two ways consistent with the doctrine of natural belief, just as Hume can speak of necessary connection in two ways consistent with his views on natural belief.
D. 158.
D. 159.
“Our ideas reach no further than experience: We have no experience of divine attributes and operations: I need not conclude my syllogism: You can draw the inference yourself.” (D. 142–143).
D. 143.
Chappell, p. 319.
This is the position Nathan adopts in his paper.
D. 144.
D. 144–145.
The significance of the difference in these two positions will be developed as we proceed.
Chappell, p 399–400.
The passage reads: “For aught we can know a priori matter may contain the source or spring of order originally, within itself, as well as mind does; and there is no more difficulty in conceiving, that the several elements from an internal unknown cause, may fall into the most exquisite arrangement, than to conceive that their ideas, in the great universal mind, from a like internal, unknown cause, fall into that arrangement” (D. 146).
D. 145.
D. 145.
Question d) is required, since it is not the case that any claim of resemblance in answer to c) will justify calling the cause external.
D. 64. In a related passage Kemp Smith writes:’Philo is permitted to make his points; but however cogent and conclusive they may be, something must always be done to preserve Cleanthes’ dignity and to cover over this failure to make any effective reply” (D. 64). I will show that Kemp Smith’s interpretation fails to explain Philo’s ‘constructive pyrrhonism’, and its uses in dealing with Cleanthes’ Argument.
D. 147.
D. 147.
D. 145.
D. 144.
D. 147.
D. 149–150.
Chappell, p. 400.
Chappell, p. 400.
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© 1986 Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht
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Tweyman, S. (1986). Hume’s Dialogues: Part II. In: Scepticism and Belief in Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. International Archives of the History of Ideas/Archives Internationales D’Histoire des Idees, vol 106. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-4341-4_3
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