The Idea of a Hoq in Maimonides’ Explanation of the Law

Abstract

According to a view widely held in Rabbinic literature and mediaeval Jewish philosophy and scriptural exegesis, there exist a small number of Mosaic commandments, the huqqim (literally: “statutes”), which are said either to have no reasons or to have reasons which we do not, and perhaps cannot, know.¹ The existence of this class of laws, it was further believed, is already indicated in the language of the Torah which appears to distinguish the huqqim from the mishpatim (literally: “ordinances” or “judgments”) by juxtaposing the two in many verses.² Although the Torah itself gives no principle of differentiation for this division, the mishpatim came to be identified with those laws which are rationally necessary, according to some, or which are conventionally but universally accepted, according to others; while the huqqim were identified with those laws whose validity depends essentially on divine decree or which we know only by divine revelation.³