The Limits of Logocentrism (On the Way to Grammatology)

Abstract

In the discourse of the history of metaphysics, Logos occupies a variety of contexts. In order to demonstrate where the thesis of the prevalence of Logos reaches its limits an articulation of the operations of deconstruction is needed. In this way, logocentrism can be situated along with the other principal centrisms, that is, phonocentrism. ethocentrism, phallocentrism and egocentrisim. The examination of logocentrism departs from the instance of Heidegger’s “Logos” essay. By juxtaposing Heraclitus’ account with that of Heidegger, it becomes evident that Heidegger has transposed the place of Logos. Logos is no longer the universal structure of what is said apart from we who listen to it. With Heidegger, I show that we are situated alongside Logos in the ontological difference. In the process, it becomes clear that Logos qua language is both the house and the name of the Being of beings. On this basis, Logos is taken to its limits where language itself occupies the place of the indecidable or hinge at the edge of the discourse of metaphysics.