“To Forgive All…”

Abstract

We return in this chapter to the question of the conditions under which we are justified in holding persons obligable for their actions. In light of what has been said in the preceding two chapters, it should obviously not be expected that I shall attempt to propound a general formula in terms of which to answer this question. Rather, I shall merely suggest some of the considerations that must be weighed in making reasonable judgments of obligability and, more generally, in justifying the practice of making such judgments. Since reference to the overall causal structure of the universe plays no role in deciding questions of obligability in a particular case, this is a further indication of the independence of the question of obligability from that of determinism/indeterminism. Still so strong is the seductive power of the pictures associated with these exotic metaphysical doctrines that our fidelity to our homely, everyday notion of obligability may be weakened — at least while we are under the spell of these pictures. So I shall say more in opposition to the general rejection of obligability, which, as I have argued, is based on the acceptance of an inadequate principle of non-obligability. I have suggested that this general rejection is paradoxical, or, at least highly infelicitous. But, in addition, the practice of holding persons obligable has, at the practical level, much to recommend it beyond the avoidance of conceptual difficulty.

“It’s no sin to be poor — but it might as well be.”

— Abe Martin